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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
BUFFER STATES IN SUB-SYSTEMIC RIVALRIES: ANALYZING NEPAL’S ROLE
IN SINO-INDIAN SECURITY DYNAMICS
by
Bibek Chand
Florida International University, 2018
Miami, Florida
Professor Félix E. Martín, Major Professor
This dissertation analyzes the relevance and importance of small buffer states for
contemporary International Relations. It argues that sub-systemic interactions reinvigorate
the role of buffer states in regional security. Using the case study of the triadic relationship
among India, Nepal, and China, this study explains the evolving role of buffer states. The
technological innovations in weapons systems, transportation, and communication have
extended the reach of potential adversaries, rendering intermediate territorial space less
significant than in the past. Thus, it is hypothesized in this dissertation that increased subsystemic rivalry reinvigorates differently the relevance and significance of buffer states.
The role of such states has evolved from an overwhelmingly geographic concept based on
spatial discontinuity between larger rival powers to that of a fluid political space in which
Great/Middle Power rivalry and competition play out.
The research utilizes a mixed research design, specifically called the convergent
parallel design. Data was collected based on specific critical junctures between 1990-2017.
For quantitative analysis, data on trade, foreign direct investment, and foreign aid were
collected; for the qualitative data analysis, foreign policy statements, press releases, and

vii

media briefs were used. Incorporating the Kruskal-Wallis Test and content analysis, both
the results of the qualitative and quantitative analyses were collectively interpreted. Results
demonstrate that during critical historical junctures, material and rhetorical engagements
of both China and India invigorate within the buffer state of Nepal. In periods that India
increases its material and rhetorical engagements, China concomitantly decreases its
material engagement all the while increasing its rhetorical engagement. In essence, buffer
states maintain relevance through the externalization of interactions between larger powers
in the form of dynamic rhetorical and material engagements. In this case, Nepal maintains
its relevance as a dynamic political space for interactions between its neighbors, India and
China.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

"A swan," said the Ameer, "was once swimming in a pond, watched with
hungry eyes from one bank by a pack of wolves, and from the other by an
old tigress. From fright or curiosity, the swan incautiously approached the
latter. The tiger clawed at him and tore out some of his feathers. In his
distress he swam over to the other bank, when the wolves made a rush and
would have torn him to pieces, had he not escaped into deep water. Finding
himself secure, he resolved to confine his movements to the middle of the
pond. There resting at his ease, he noticed how the wolves snarled at each
other, and how very shallow the water was near the edge. He reflected that
were the pond to dry up, the tigress might and the wolves certainly would
devour him."1
- Abdur Rahman Khan, Ameer of Afghanistan (1880-1901)

1

Stephen Wheeler, The Ameer Abdur Rahman (London, UK: Bliss, Sands, and Foster, 1895),

137.

1

Introduction & Research Problem
The discipline of International Relations has been mostly preoccupied with the
political dynamics of the Great Powers.2 Conversely, small states have been relegated to a
peripheral role and inconsequential position within the discipline. Their analytical utility
has not been extensively explored, as the emphasis has been largely placed on the study of
Great Powers.3 Analytical neglect of small states may prevent a comprehensive
understanding of the processes of war and peace as well as stability and instability in the
international system. Such neglect poses a problem as it undervalues the role played by
smaller powers in Great and Middle Power interactions in critical periods in the
international system, ranging from the Napoleonic Wars4 to the end of the Cold War.5 From

Niels Amstrup, “The Perennial Problem of Small States: A Survey of Research Efforts,”
Cooperation and Conflict 11, no.2 (1976): 163; Christos Kassimeris, “The Foreign Policy of Small Powers,”
International Politics 46, no. 1 (2009): 84-85.
2

3

Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1968),
2 - Rothstein alludes to the obscurity of small states in the traditional literature of International Relations as
the international system is organized as a hierarchy, which means that small states are the bottom of such a
hierarchy and are rendered as inconsequential. He argues that small states should not be analyzed only
through this hierarchical lens but as political entities with unique patterns of behavior; Michael I. Handel,
Weak States in the International System (New York, NY: Frank Cass, 1990), 3 – Handel laments over the
basis of International Relations theories on relations among Great Powers and the relative lack of emphasis
on weak states;
Wouter P. Veenendaal and Jack Corbett, “Why Small States Offer Important Answers to Large
Questions,” Comparative Political Studies 48, no.4 (2015): 528 – Veenendaal and Corbett argue that the
peripheralization of small states is also commonplace in comparative political research and as such, support
the claim that small states are largely ignored in the wider discipline of Political Science. Their argument is
largely methodologically grounded, addressing the issue of not including the small states in analyses. Such
states could provide insight into whether the “smallness” of such states can offer alternative insights or
support claims within comparative political analyses that are extensively based on the larger states in the
international system.
4

Matthias Maass, Small States in World Politics: The Story of Small State Survival, 1648-2016, 1st
ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017);
The Napoleonic Wars witnessed the dramatic demise of small states; they fell from 339 in 1792 to
79 in 1814 – a fall by approximately eighty percent. The Napoleonic Wars initiated the demise of small states
in the international system, significantly altering the geopolitical space of Europe (and beyond).
5

Ibid., 183-84;

2

proxy wars to buffer zones, small states in the international system have continually
fulfilled critical functions as interactive geopolitical spaces for Great Power relations.
Furthermore, small states are essential and intrinsically valuable for the international state
system as they are the minor yet important political players in effectively balancing larger
powers, when needed.6 Among the wide range of functions such states fulfill,7 the role of
a buffer state is crucial given its strategic interest for larger powers and relevance for
regional patterns of stability and instability. Such small states played historically relevant
roles in the strategic calculations of the Great Powers, including empires of the British and
the Russians in the 19th and early 20th centuries.8 In the simplest of terms, buffer states are
small states straddled between rival Middle or Great Powers. These are states that “lessen
the shocks emanating from some mightier state in the process of violent upheaval.”9 John

The Cold War, while systemically stable, proved to be highly unstable for the smaller states in the
international system. Characterized by proxy wars fought by the US and USSR, small states emerged as the
geopolitical space wherein the Cold War played out. From the Central America to Africa, small states became
frontiers for intrastate wars fueled and sometimes, directed by the two superpowers.
Herbert Butterfield, “The Balance of Power,” in Diplomatic Investigations, Essays in the Theory
of International Politics, eds. Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wright (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1968).
6

7
Small states fulfill an array of functions ranging from buffers, proxies, bulwarks against a rival, or
part of larger geopolitical conceptions of shatterbelts and buffer zones. They may constitute instrumental
roles in alliance formations as well.
8

Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and
Annexation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p.70; David Fromkin, “The Great Game in
Asia,” Foreign Affairs 58, no. 4 (1980): 936–51; Miron Rezun, “The Great Game Revisited,” International
Journal 41, no. 2 (1986): 324–41;
During the Great Game of the 19th Century, the British and Russian mistrust of each other’s imperial
ambitions evolved into a geopolitical tussle in Central Asia, particularly in Afghanistan. It was largely a
manifestation of British concerns regarding Imperial Russia’s southward expansion into Central Asia. The
region was close to Britain’s Crown Jewel – India. Thus, the mistrust between Imperial Russia and the British
Empire manifested itself into a geopolitical tussle, largely in Afghanistan and Iran. Fromkin sums it well –
“…there always was a body of opinion in Britain that saw in every Russian move in Asia a threat to Britain’s
interest in India, no matter how farfetched that might seem to be as an analysis of the motives behind the
Russian move in question.”
9

Anicetas Simutis, “Buffer States: A Worn-out Myth,” America 70, no. 14 (1944): 376.

3

Chay and Thomas E. Ross’s 1986 edited book titled Buffer States in International Politics10
offers the most comprehensive account of buffer states in the international system – one of
the few that directly covers buffer states. Chay and Ross define such states as “countries
geographically and/or politically situated between two or more large powers whose
function is to maintain peace between the larger powers.”11 Tanisha M. Fazal, in her work
State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation,
defines a buffer state as a “state geographically located between two other states engaged
in a rivalry, unless the rivals are separated by an ocean.”12 Thus, buffer states are
instrumental in the maintenance of regional stability and peace as they are situated in
geopolitically sensitive areas, where rivalries are intense. As Faizal notes, buffer states are
specifically tied to land based geographic contiguity.
This dissertation addresses the buffer function of a small power within the context
of its evolving role, as regional approaches to security through sub-systemic13 analysis
expands within International Relations. It seeks to reinvigorate the concept of the buffer
state within the current context of the field of International Relations. Although small states
do not garner much attention within the discipline, this dissertation delves into one of their
historically significant functions i.e. acting as buffers between rival interests.

10

John Chay and Thomas E. Ross. Buffer States in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,

1986).
11
John Chay and Thomas E. Ross, “Preface,” in Buffer States in World Politics, eds. John Chay and
Thomas E. Ross (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), xiii.
12

Tanisha M. Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and
Annexation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007), p.70.
13

A sub-system, in the context of this dissertation, entails the regional level of analysis. As such,
sub-systemic approach to security entails the study of regional security studies.

4

Among others, scholars such as Amitav Acharya, T.V. Paul, Ole Wæver, and Barry
Buzan14 have conceptualized and promoted sub-systemic approaches to security,
highlighting the importance of regional powers. Sub-systemic analyses provide a more
localized and diffused extrapolation of security, which accounts for local power dynamics.
Sub-systems are regional or localized components of the international system, which are
generally characterized by “one state or two or more geographically proximate and
interacting states which share in some degree common ethnic, linguistic, cultural, social
and historical bonds and whose sense of identity is sometimes increased by the actions and
attitudes of states external to the system.” 15 Godehardt and Nabers (2011) conceptualized
the sub-system as not just a microcosm of the international system; sub-systems may not
always adopt the functions of the international system and may include their own rules of
engagement in the regional context.16 As such, regional political dynamics may take on
peculiar characteristics. An approach based solely on systemic analysis may not adequately
depict regional patterns of security issues, including rivalrous relationships between

14

For more on the increasing interest on sub-systems, see the titles T.V. Paul, International
Relations Theory and Regional Transformation (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Barry
Buzan and Ole Wæver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Barry Buzan, “The South Asian Security Complex in a Decentring
World Order: Reconsidering Regions and Powers Ten Years On,” International Studies Quarterly 48, no.1
(2011): 1-19; Nadine Godehardt and Dirk Nabers, Regional Powers and Regional Orders (New York, NY:
Routledge, 2011).
Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, “International Regions: A Comparative Approach to Five
Subordinate Systems,” International Studies Quarterly 13, no.4 (1969): 362;
Cantori and Spiegel use the terminology “subordinate systems” to refer to sub-systems. In more
contemporary works in International Relations, sub-system has attained popularity over subordinate system.
As such, this dissertation will use sub-system over subordinate system although the underlying concept is the
same. Refer to Patnaik (1980), Shaw (1974) & Krishnan and Dhal (2014) for examples of the usage of subsystemic approaches in International Relations.
15

16

Nadine Godehardt and Dirk Nabers, Regional Powers and Regional Orders (New York, NY:
Routledge, 2011), 1.

5

regional powers. Additionally, regional approaches to security allow closer extrapolations
of the role played by smaller states, whose roles may be significant regionally but
inconsequential systemically. Buffer states are part of such regional security configurations
wherein they play a significant geopolitical role locally but may not be strategically
important at the systemic level. In essence, buffer states are demarcations or territorial
cushions between rival powers and are relevant in regional security dynamics.
In the modern nation-state system, the British Empire was at the forefront in using
buffer zones and buffer systems17 among several other strategies to ensure the territorial
security of its imperial possessions. Afghanistan, Nepal, and Tibet functioned as buffer
states for the British Empire in India, separating it from Qing China in the north and the
Russian Empire in the west.18 Such buffer states fulfilled the function of geographic
barriers against rivals or competing empires, while further functioning as early warning
systems against any foreign incursions. The British line of thinking on the usage of buffer
states was consistent with the primacy of geographic distance as a strategy for spatial
security, which was prized as a strategic advantage up to the First World War. Military
geography, which describes the military capabilities of a state and the way its assets are
deployed, had long emphasized the importance of geographic obstacles such as distance

John Chay and Thomas E. Ross, “Introduction,” in Buffer States in World Politics, eds. John Chay
and Thomas E. Ross (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 2 - Chay and Ross interpret a buffer system as a
political organization that could consist of the buffer state and the larger powers it separates. It could also
mean a group of states that can serve as a buffer between rival areas of influence; Eastern Europe as a buffer
zone between Western Europe and Russia is an example of such a buffer system. The British were at the
forefront of using buffer zones, a policy that was explicit since the Great Game with Imperial Russia. Simply
put, a buffer system constitutes the buffer state and the two larger rivalrous powers (buffered states) that it
separates.
17

Thomas E. Ross, “Buffer States: A Geographer’s Perspective,” in Buffer States in World Politics,
eds. John Chay and Thomas E. Ross (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986): 20-21.
18

6

and high mountain chains.19 Due to advent of the air force and missile technologies since
the First World War, the utility of geographic distance has decreased in importance.
Geopolitical distance could no longer be used as a strategic tool to “buy time” during
conflicts. The buffer state has also lost its utility as an early warning system -- traditionally,
movement of land-based militaries across buffer states could give the core additional time
and space to prepare for the conflict. Advancement of military technology largely impacted
the utility of geographic space as a tool for enhancing state security, which entailed
securing the core.
The classical approach to buffer states is deeply rooted in Geopolitics, which
emerged as a field to assess the influence of geographical factors on the human realm of
politics. It is evident that the early formulation of the buffer state concept is Geopolitical
in nature, given the emphasis on its spatial importance. While geography played a key role
in state strategy,20 the classical conceptualization of the buffer state’s utility as a
geographical discontinuity or an “early warning system” evolved with changes in
technological advent. The technological innovation and military advent in the aftermath of
the First World War greatly depreciated the strategic value of geographic distance.21 As a

19

Nayef R.F. Al-Rodhan, Neo-statecraft and Meta-geopolitics: Reconciliation of Power, Interests,
and Justice in the 21st Century (Zurich, Switzerland: Lit Verlag, 2009): 45.
20
It continues to do so but in a different form. While spatial distance does figure as an important
aspect of military strategy, it does not hold the same importance as it did before the advent of planes and
motorized weapons systems. In the contemporary era, geography remains innate to security strategy, as
showcased by the importance played by Pakistan during the military endeavors into Afghanistan in 2001.

Nicholas J. Spykman, “Geography and Foreign Policy, I,” The American Political Science Review
32, no. 1 (1938): 33; Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 20; Al-Rodhan, Neo-statecraft and Metageopolitics, 45; Gray, War, Peace, and International Relations, p.322; Spykman discusses the depreciation of
geographic distance as a strategic tool due to technological innovation in the context of all states in the
international system, while Rothstein discusses it within the context of small states.
21

7

result, the relevance of buffer states should have diminished with such a change in strategic
culture, as their utility is tied to their geographical disposition. Yet, some buffer states
continue to maintain relevance through the interaction of larger rivalrous states and their
crucial role in the dynamics of regional stability. This phenomenon with buffer states calls
for a deeper exploration of why buffer states remain relevant in the interaction of regional
rivals despite the decline of strategic utility of spatial distance. Thus, the question emerges:
why do buffer states maintain relevance despite strides in military technology? What role
do they fulfill in contemporary regional/sub-systemic security systems? Given the limited
literature on buffer states and lack of any extensive extrapolation on how sub-systemic
changes affect the role of buffer states, the proposed study seeks to delve into how subsystemic rivalrous interactions provide continued relevance to buffer states as important
aspects of regional power dynamics. This dissertation seeks to add to the study of buffer
states but within the context of sub-systemic changes of power dynamics. It seeks to assess
the role of modern buffer states and add to the very limited literature related to such states
in the international system.
This dissertation provides an explanation for the relevance of buffer states in
contemporary International Relations, particularly through the lens of intensification of
rivalry between regional powers. It addresses and analyzes the externalization of such subsystemic rivalry in the buffer states. Furthermore, this dissertation seeks to explain the
evolving role of buffer states, away from a narrow geographic definition to one where such
states have emerged as political spaces for interactions of the more powerful states they
separate. It proposes that the continued relevance of the buffer state is a function of power
politics at the regional level which play an important role in the patterns of regional stability

8

and instability. This dissertation also seeks to add to the limited literature on the buffer
state concept, further expanding academic endeavors related to small states in the
international system.

Statement of Purpose
The objective of the proposed dissertation is to premise buffer states within subsystemic analysis in International Relations, by analyzing how and why such states are
relevant in regional security. The novelty of this approach rests on connecting the concept
of the buffer state to sub-systemic levels of analysis in International Relations.
Additionally, this research seeks to contextualize buffer states in contemporary
International Relations literature, given that the concept has been largely bereft from
academic attention. From a purely geopolitical concept, the buffer state remained an
important aspect of statecraft until the First World War; but with technological innovation,
the absolute geographical function of the buffer state in strategy of the larger powers
eroded.22 Rather than becoming obsolete, buffer states maintain relevance in contemporary
regional security, a fact that can be attributed to sub-systemic changes in power capabilities
and the extensive prevalence of “soft-balancing” in the post-Cold War period.23 Thus, this

22

Trygve Mathisen, The Functions of Small States in the Strategies of the Great Powers (Oslo,
Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1972), 126 - While technology has depreciated the utility of buffer states,
vicinal geographic position retains its political function. Vicinal geography, as defined by Mathisen, is the
contiguity of political borders, which remains an integral part of the international system. Technological
progress, particularly in the military realm, reduced the importance of buffer states for their functions as
added space in military maneuvering but they maintain relevance for the buffered states. This relevance is
tied to the geographic contiguity of the buffer to the buffered states.
Robert A. Pape, “Soft Balancing Against the United States,” International Security 30, no. 1
(2005): 7-45;
Pape writes about soft-balancing in the context of American preponderance in the post-Cold War
international system. He argues that since directly challenging US military preponderance is impossible or
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proposed study seeks to connect sub-systemic power dynamics to the evolving role of
buffer states. It explains why buffer states maintain strategic importance despite the erosion
of utility of geopolitical space.
The rationale for this proposed study is to provide a contemporary context for the
relevance of the buffer state as an analytical tool in International Relations. As regional or
sub-systemic approaches to security become more extensive within the field, an
extrapolation on the study of buffer states helps provide a more comprehensive explanation
of regional rivalries. Furthermore, it adds to the limited attention that is paid to the
relevance of small states within the interactions of the Middle and Great Powers and
provides a perspective that has long been in the periphery of the discipline of International
Relations. Lastly, the purpose of this dissertation is to use the buffer state framework to
assess the trilateral relationship between India, Nepal, and China (the case study for the
dissertation), as a function of the rise of India and China. Lastly, this dissertation is an
endeavor to create an analytical framework that can be used to assess other buffer systems.

just too costly, states will seek indirect and indirect means to delay, frustrate, and undermine aggressive
unilateral U.S. military policies. While this concept may not directly be related to buffer states, the indirect
usage of tools outside of military means is definitely relevant for buffer states, as such states are prone to
push and pull factors emanating from the larger powers it separates. Additionally, military means are risky
in buffer systems due to regional pressures and geographic proximity to the cores of the states involved.
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Significance of Study
The aim of this dissertation is to contextualize the buffer state concept in
contemporary International Relations and explain why it is still a useful analytical tool.
Linking buffer states to sub-systemic/regional political dynamics, the study seeks to
explain the implications of changes in power dynamics at the regional level to smaller
states in the region. Secondly, the dissertation adds to the limited literature on buffer states
in the field of International Relations, lending importance to the notion that smaller states
need to be included in the analysis of the Great Powers.24 It also seeks to add to the sparse
literature on buffer states and the dynamics of small states in the international system.
Through the specific case study of the triadic relations between India, Nepal, and China,
the dissertation also provides analysis on Sino-Indian25 relations and how these relations
externalize in geographically contiguous states, vis-à-vis Nepal, which maintains a
precarious disposition between its neighbors.
The dissertation proposes a novel approach in understanding the contemporary
analytical utility of the buffer state concept. The approach is based on tying the concept of
the buffer state to sub-systemic/regional dynamics of power, proposing that buffer states
maintain relevance and centrality through their evolving roles in regional power politics.
While their classical geopolitical utility may have waned due to technological innovation,
buffer states still maintain relevance as spaces of political interactions for larger rivalrous

Martin J. Bayly, “Imperial Ontological (In)security: ‘Buffer States’, International Relations and
the Case of Anglo-Afghan Relations, 1808-1878,” European Journal of International Relations 21, no. 4
(2015): 817.
24

25
Sino-Indian is chosen over Indo-Chinese to prevent confusion with the colonial name of
Southeast Asia, Indochina.
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powers. In sum, the contribution of this dissertation is twofold: first, it rescues the buffer
state concept and recasts it in a new significant dimension for the study of international
relations. Second, it advances an argument that sheds new light on why and how regional,
sub-systemic rivalries simultaneously affect and are affected by the political dynamic and
space within small buffer states. Specifically, this study promises to be the first study in
the International Relations discipline that focuses on Nepal as an exemplar of the refined
notion of the small buffer state, and how the Sino-Indian regional rivalry affects and is
affected simultaneously by the dynamic in Nepal’s geopolitical space.

Research Question & Hypothesis
The primary geographic utility of buffer states, focused on spatial discontinuity,
has been eroded with the innovation of technology in weaponry, transportation, and
communication.26 Nevertheless, buffer states still maintain relevance in international
relations, particularly in regional security and stability. The geographic utility refers to the
spatial utility of buffer states in classical Geopolitics, which emphasizes the strategic
importance of distance and space. The shift away from such a conception of buffer states
warrants a shift in their conceptual utility, focused on a more politically dynamic concept
that helps in explaining cycles of regional stability/instability. Herein lies the opportunity
to explain the buffer state’s relevance in regional stability in the contemporary context. The
buffer state retains an important dynamic in Great Power interactions, as it provides a
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Chay and Ross, “Introduction,” in Buffer States in World Politics, 3.
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political space for the externalization of the rivalry of the bigger states. Thus, this project
addresses the following research question:

RQ: Why and how are buffer states relevant in sub-systemic rivalries despite
erosion of their geographic function?

Based on the premising of the buffer states within regional patterns of security, the
hypothesis for the dissertation is as follows:

H1: If sub-systemic rivalries among Middle or Great powers envelop a small,
buffer state, then this rivalry will recover the buffer state’s political relevance
beyond a simple geographical discontinuity among rivalrous powers.

In accordance with the above hypothesis, the independent and dependent variables
are as follows.

Independent Variable (IV): Sub-systemic rivalry between middle or great powers
Dependent Variable (DV): The buffer state’s political relevance beyond just a geographical
discontinuity
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Thus, the higher or lower the sub-systemic rivalry between the buffered states,27
then the greater or lesser will be the political as well as strategic relevance of the buffer
state. The implication for the concept of the buffer state is that its role conception extends
beyond just a geographic concept; that the buffer can have increased or decreased relevance
in accordance with the power dynamics of the larger powers it separates. Relevance is
measured by increased or decreased engagement of the buffered states in the buffer state
i.e. increase or decrease in the measures of material and rhetorical engagement.
Additionally, the buffer state also fulfills a more strategic role for the externalization of
inter-Middle or Great Power rivalry over an overwhelmingly geographically focused role
for which the concept was created. Figure 1 showcases the buffer system, which consists
of the buffer state and its neighboring buffered states. Figure 2 provides a pictorial
depiction of the hypothesis.

27
Buffered states are countries that are geopolitically separated by the buffer state; if state B is the
buffer between two rival powers X and Y, then X and Y are the buffered states separated by buffer state B.
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Figure 1: A Buffer System within a Sub-system

Sub-system
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Figure 2: Pictorial Depiction of the Hypothesis

Organization of the Dissertation
The dissertation includes seven chapters. Chapter I introduces the premising of the
buffer state literature within the field of International Relations. It includes the research
question, hypothesis, and the significance of the study. The aim of Chapter II is to introduce
the literature review on the buffer state concept. Given that buffer states are
overwhelmingly small states, this chapter initially examines the existing literature on
various theoretical perspectives on small states. Then the chapter moves on to examine the
literature on buffer states, including the conceptualization of Nepal as a buffer state. Since
the buffer state is innately tied to geopolitics, literature on rivalry and geographic contiguity
are also discussed; the ending of this chapter covers contemporary work on the buffer state
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that discusses its relevance. Since the dissertation seeks to tie the buffer state to its subsystemic predicament, academic works on the emergence of sub-systemic approaches to
security studies are discussed throughout Chapter II.
Chapter III discusses the mixed method research design chosen for the dissertation
and the methodologies used to gather both qualitative and quantitative data. The
qualification of the case study used for the study i.e. the triadic relationship between India,
China, and Nepal is justified in this chapter. It also includes how the chosen case study fits
the pursuit of an explanation for the research question of the dissertation. The chapter also
discusses how the analyses for qualitative and quantitative data are carried out.
Chapter IV describes and explains the critical junctures in the India-Nepal-China
buffer system (INCBS) which have implications for the sub-systemic dynamics between
India and China, including the implications that may have been explained by the buffer
state Nepal. In this chapter, each critical juncture is carefully extrapolated and
contextualized on the central theme of buffer states in sub-systemic rivalries. Thus, these
critical junctures are carefully chosen to analyze the pre-, during, and post- intensity of
sub-systemic rivalry between India and China in Nepal.
Chapter V covers the conduct of qualitative and quantitative data analyses,
reporting of their results and the organized presentation of the analyses results. The
organization of the qualitative and quantitative data analyses for the convergent parallel
design of the proposed study is included in this chapter. The organization of the results of
the analyses is in preparation for the process of convergence/divergence and collective
interpretation, which are covered in Chapter VI.
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Chapter VI is focused on the collective comparison and interpretation of the results
of the analyses carried out in Chapter V within the larger framework of the buffer state
literature. The chapter compares the results of the two analyses. Then, the chapter covers
the amalgamation of the qualitative and quantitative analyses to decipher whether there is
convergence or divergence in the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyses. Lastly,
the data analyses are interpreted collectively.
Finally, Chapter VII includes the conclusion of the dissertation, which explains the
ties between the buffer state and the sub-systemic power dynamics through the detailed
analysis of the case study chosen. This chapters revisits the hypotheses of the dissertation
and accepts or rejects them based on the results of the data analyses. In essence, the
conclusion seeks to formulate theoretical implications of the study and how it adds to the
existing literature on buffer states and their relevance to International Relations through
changes in sub-systemic power dynamics.
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CHAPTER II: LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter II delves into existing theoretical as well as empirical works relevant to the
dissertation. Firstly, this chapter surveys existing literature on small states, given the need
to premise such states within the larger field of International Relations that extensively
concerns Great Power politics. Next, the literature on buffer states is reviewed as a sub-set
within the category of small states. It is followed by the literature on geographic contiguity
and its implications for the security dynamics of Middle or Great Powers. Given the
strongly geopolitical root of buffer states and their vital role in maintaining regional
stability, it is instrumental in deciphering how the buffer concept fits within the literature
on rivalry and geographic contiguity. Finally, the literature on the continued relevance and
utility of the buffer state concept in International Relations is explored. It ties in the
question on why and how buffer states continue to be relevant in regional patterns of
contemporary security dynamics despite extensive constraining of the utility of geopolitical
space due to advances in military technology.

On Small States
The literature on small states is pertinent to this dissertation, as most buffer states
tend to be small states in the international system. But it is also essential to note that not all
buffer states are small states. The issue of this line of thinking, however, rests on defining
what a small state is. Since there is no consensus on the definition of small states, it is a
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highly contested concept in both theory and practice.28 While the contemporary system of
states accords legal equality to all states, big and small, there is inherent inequality of other
forms that are expressed formally and informally in international affairs. While small states
were largely sidelined in academic endeavors in International Relations, there has been
increasing attention on such states after the end of the Cold War. The conclusion of the
bipolar split based on ideology created political space for many small states to pursue
foreign policies without many of the Cold War’s systemic constrains.
David Vital’s preliminary definition of small powers rests on measures such as
population,29 which authors like William E. Paterson and Robert Keohane criticize as
cursory and lacking analytical depth.30 Vital’s usage of population as a marker for small
powers runs the problem of lumping states like Sweden and Rwanda in the same category,
while remaining ambiguous towards larger underdeveloped states with significant
populations but limited power capabilities.
Vital revises his definition in his later work titled The Survival of Small States
(1971) by describing a small power as:

Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, “Small States in the European Union : What Do We
Know and What Would We Like to Know ?” 19, no. 4 (2006): p.652.
28

29
David Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations
(Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1967), 7-8- Vital defines small powers as those states with an upper limit of
population of 10-15 million if economically advanced or a population of 20-30 million for an underdeveloped
country.

William E. Paterson, “Small States in International Politics,” Cooperation and Conflict 4, no.1
(1969):119;
Robert O. Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas: Small States in International Politics,”
International Organization 23, no.2 (1969): 294.
30
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“that state which, in the long term, in itself and as a satellite or client or
close ally – i.e. as a non-autonomous participant in international politicscan constitute more than a dispensable and non-decisive increment to a
primary state’s total array of political and military resources, regardless of
whatever short-term, contingent weight as an auxiliary (or obstacle) to the
primary power it may have in certain circumstances.”31

In other words, Vital proposes a definition that is not contingent to population size;
in fact, he presents an approach that is more nuanced and tied to the dynamic nature of
small states in the international system.
Another perspective on small states rests on their alliance formation; specifically,
Robert Rothstein ties the role of small states to balance of power. He defines small states
as those states that cannot obtain security through their own capabilities.32 Such states
attain security through alliance formation with larger powers. But then again, this definition
does not accurately depict the various types of states that exist in the international system;
there is also the possibility of bifurcating the states of the world into Great Powers – states
capable of attaining security, and the other states – all non-Great Powers that have the
potential to face insecurity emanating from the Great Powers. Keohane rightly raises the
concern that Great Powers too could face security threats despite being materially capable.
He proposes an approach based on systemic roles, categorizing states into the following:

David Vital, The Survival of Small States (London, UK: Oxford University Press, 1971), 9 – Vital
describes tertiary powers as those states with miniscule impact on the international system.
31

32

Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 29.
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i

System-determining: States that are considered superpowers and can act unilaterally
without major threats to their own security,

ii

System-influencing: States that can impact the system through multinational organizations,

iii

System-affecting: States that can influence the system through alliance formations and
regional organizations, and

iv

System ineffectual: States that have minimal impact on the system or are dominated by
larger powers.33

Despite the lack of systemic influence, small states can play key roles at the subsystemic levels. Since small states exert limited international influence, their interests tend
to be limited as well. Given this reality, their international relations are concerned with
sub-systemic security dynamics.34 This holds true for buffer states as well, as they tend to
be mostly concerned with the security relations of the buffered states rather than systemic
level politics. This is largely due to their limited material capabilities and immediate
importance placed on relations with geographically contiguous neighbors. Raimo
Vayrynen focuses on this approach; he proposes another definition of small power:

33

Keohane, “Lilliputians’ Dilemmas,” 295-296.

34

Paterson, “Small States in International Politics,” 122.
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“A small power is a state which has a low objective and/or a low perceived
rank in the context where it is acting. Furthermore, small powers are
expected to behave in a given way, i.e. their role prescriptions differ from
those of middle and great powers, which affect together with their low rank
upon their behavior and possibilities of influence. Finally, the interests of
small powers are at least to some extent different from the interests of great
powers, a fact which denotes the latent or manifest conflict of interests
between these two classes of states.”35

Vayrynen’s approach is based on a multi-faceted analysis of what constitutes a
small power. Regardless, none of the authors provide a rigorous analysis of buffer states.
They set the premise for small states, which most buffer states are but the distinct nature
of a buffer state’s disposition between two rivalrous rival powers makes it a unique type of
small state. Keohane does raise important points on the systemic role of the small states
and how that impacts their behavior as well as strategies. But he does not use this
conception to further the behavior of buffer states or how they fit into regional patterns of
security and insecurity.
Veenendaal and Corbett (2015) showcase the biases against small states in the subfield of Comparative Politics. Although not directly related to the buffer state system, their
argument highlights the biases against small states in the academic setting. They put forth

35
Raimo Vayrynen, “On the Definition and Measurement of Small Power Status,” Cooperation and
Conflict 6, no.1 (1971): 99.
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a list of explanations on why small states are largely left out of major academic endeavors
in Comparative Politics:

“1. small states represent only a tiny proportion of the world’s population (e.g.,
Huntington, 1991; Moore, 1995);
2. small states are not “real” or fully independent states (e.g., Vanhanen, 1997);
3. other authors in this academic field exclude small states as well (e.g., LeDuc,
Niemi, & Norris, 2002; Lijphart, 1999);
4. there is a structural lack of data on small states (e.g., Powell, 1984; Vanhanen,
1997); and
5. the principle of “most similar” comparison is more appropriate in some
circumstances (e.g., Rhodes, Wanna, & Weller, 2009, p. 11).”36

The argument made by Veenendaal and Corbett not only showcases the need for
deeper extrapolation on the role of small states but also the academic biases that may
prevent a complete explanation of political dynamics occurring in the international system.
More academic attention to small states does not entail less importance to larger powers;
rather, the argument is that greater analytical attention to small states would facilitate a
more complete understanding of politics of the larger powers. Further academic attention
to small states would be beneficial not only for Comparative Politics but also for
International Relations; study of small states contributes in covering more case studies and

36
Wouter P. Veenendaal and Jack Corbett, “Why Small States Offer Important Answers to Large
Questions,” Comparative Political Studies 48, no. 4 (2015): 530
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may lend more validity to theorizing within Comparative Politics and International
Relations. While these authors do not directly contribute to the literature on buffer states,
they make a crucial point regarding the need to conduct more research on small states.
While small states have been traditionally sidelined by mainstream studies in
Political Science and International Relations, the trend is changing. There is an increased
interest in the study of small states, particularly related to their security. 37 Even within the
sub-field of security studies, there is a lack of a consistent and comprehensive approach to
security related academic endeavors in the study of small states. 38 Archer et al. seek to do
just that; they offer a comprehensive approach to understanding the security challenges and
opportunities of small states in the contemporary international system. Their work runs into
the same issue as others: how to define a small state. They settle on material power
capabilities as the parameter to define to small states. Their case is supported by three
benefits:

“First, if we are to analyse the opportunities, challenges and limitations of
a speciﬁc state, indications of absolute and relative capacity are important,
because they inform us of the absolute and relative limitations on these
states’ capacity to handle different types of challenges. Second, an absolute
and universal threshold between big and small states of, for example, a
population size of 15 million people, or a GDP of €500 billion, has the

Anders Wivel, Alyson J.K. Bailes, and Clive Archer, “Setting the Scene: Small States and
International Security,” in Small States and International Security, eds. Clive Archer, Alyson J.K. Bailes,
and Anders Wivel (New York, NY: Routledge, 2014), 4.
37

38

Kassimeris, “The Foreign Policy of Small Powers,” 84; Anders Wivel, “Setting the Scene,” 5.
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beneﬁt of creating a clear and easily applicable deﬁnition of small
states….Third, starting from a power possession deﬁnition allows us to
draw on the comprehensive literature on power and security in
international relations in order to identify why, when and how the security
challenges of small states are distinct from those faced by stronger
states.”39

Archer et al.’s characterization touches upon the novel idea of state limitations as a
means of assessing its smallness. They add nuance to their definition of small states by
including the relational dimension and asymmetry. Adding to this line of thinking,
Thorhallsson and Wivel (2006) argue that a state’s smallness is not just a matter of material
capabilities; it also depends on soft power and the understandings of foreign policy elites
and the public of the proper role of the state in global and regional affairs. 40 As such, the
definition of a small state is a matter of the relational dimension and role conception of
elites rather than being purely based on material capabilities.
As for the asymmetric approach, a small state is defined as the weaker actor in
such a power relationship.41 Asymmetric relationships are characterized by a substantial
power differential between the two actors involved, hence the name. Given its weaker
status in the dyadic relationship, the small state is unable to change the nature or
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Wivel, “Setting the Scene,” 6-7.
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Thorhallsson and Wivel, “Small States in the European Union,” 664-65.
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Wivel, “Setting the Scene,” 9.
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functioning of its relations with the larger power on its own.42 This dyadic approach to
assessing smallness of a state is highly subjective and may not always be useful for
overarching arguments. For instance, a Middle Power would be designated as a small
power if it is in a dyadic relationship with a Great Power, which is not accurate in the
depiction of the nature of the Middle Power. Nevertheless, it adds nuance to the
traditionally broad reaching conceptions of what constitutes a small state.
While small states have traditionally been academically sidelined, there is an
emerging body of literature that examines the role of such states in contemporary
international politics. The small states of the European Union have garnered the most
attention, especially after the end of the Cold War;43 work on non-western small states
continues to remain scarce but growing.44 The new wave of small state authors emphasize
the agency of such actors, going beyond their conceptualization as disposable players in
the international system. Gibert and Grzelczyk (2017) critique the overall academic
endeavors on small states for portraying them as passive participants; they argue that “small

42
Caroline Howard Grøn and Anders Wivel, “Maximizing Influence in the European Union after
the Lisbon Treaty : From Small State Policy to Smart State Strategy Maximizing Influence in the European
Union after the Lisbon Treaty,” Jounal of European Integration 33, no. 5 (2011): 524; Hans Mouritzen and
Anders Wivel, “Introduction” in The Geopolitics of Euro-Atlantic Integration, eds. Hans Mouritzen and
Anders Wivel (Oxon, OC: Routledge, 2005): 4.
43

Examples of such works include but are not limited to the following: Caroline Howard Grøn &
Anders Wivel (2011) Maximizing Influence in the European Union after the Lisbon Treaty: From Small State
Policy to Smart State Strategy, Journal of European Integration, 33:5, 523-539; Jean-Marc Rickli, “European
small states’ military policies after the Cold War: from territorial to niche strategies,” Vol 21, no.3 (2008),
307-325; Baldur Thorhallsson and Anders Wivel, “Small States in the European Union: What Do We Know
and What Would We Like to Know?” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, Vol. 19, no.4 (2006), 651668; Anders Wivel (2005), “The Security Challenge of Small EU Member States: Interests, Identity and the
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Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1, no. 1 (2017): 1-2.
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states have often been considered as interesting only in their relations within an institutional
setting they could contribute to, or receive advantages from, or in how they would attempt
to avoid collapse and disappearance, being absorbed by a larger state.”45 The authors infer
to the focus on small state voting behavior in the United Nations, without much attention
being paid to the motivations and interests of such states in the international system, outside
of institutional frameworks of intergovernmental organizations.
Kassimeris (2009) makes a similar case by arguing that small powers do not lack
power per se; what they lack is the opportunity to display it.46 Small states are not studied
for their agency; rather, they are largely included in academic discourse that focus on larger
powers – the crux of most of the studies is on how small states fit as minor players or mere
additions to Great Power politics. The end of the Cold War heralded a new era for the study
of small states; it opened up the international political space for more dynamic small power
interactions. Thus, there are emerging calls for greater look at the agency of small states in
international politics as the systemic constrains of the Cold War were lifted.
There is also a push to include other regions of the world to garner a more global
understanding of the role of small states in international politics. A collection of journal
articles published by Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal makes a fresh push for the
study of small states outside of the West. Titled “Non-Western Small States,” the special
issue opens a new avenue for the study of small states, which were traditionally
marginalized. Bailes et al. (2017) make the case that small states are inherently different;
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using the case studies of Cuba, Armenia, and Singapore, the authors make the case that
small state diplomacy is tied to flexibility in their approach to changing power dynamics
in the international system and unity of action in the domestic realm.47 They further critique
Alliance Theory for not incorporating the differentiated behavior of small states; instead,
they propose Alliance Shelter Theory. This Theory is based on the idea that the functional
logic of small states is different; these states seek shelter from larger states and for this,
they emphasize international cooperation.48
Gigleux (2017) uses role theory to analyze small state behavior. He argues that
small states have multiple self-understandings which are shaped by the perceptions,
demands, and expectations of other actors in the system.49 Role theory suggests that the
international policies of small states are largely reflective of national identity. In another
work, David Styan uses the case study of Djibouti to analyze its strategies as a small state.
He takes issue with the Alliance Shelter Theory and argues that his case study, Djibouti,
has not adopted policies that reflect the ‘safety in numbers’ approach propagated by the
theory.50 Rather, Djibouti has maintained cordial relations with its much larger neighbor,
Ethiopia, which in return relies heavily on its smaller neighbor for access to oceanic trade

Alyson J K Bailes, Bradley A Thayer, and Baldur Thorhallsson, “Alliance Theory and Alliance
’Shelter ’: The Complexities of Small State Alliance Behaviour Small State Alliance Behaviour,” Third
World Thematics: A TWQ Journal 1, no. 1 (2017): 21.
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lanes. It also showcases no desire to become part of a coalition of small states, as inferred
by the Alliance Shelter Theory.
Other works on non-western small states include that of Kadira Pethiyagoda. He
makes the case for Sri Lanka’s importance to China, the US, and India, given its strategic
location in the busy Indian Ocean sea lanes. His write-up argues that small states are
capable of alliance formations with regional or global powers i.e. changing international
political dynamics or as the author points, the emerging multipolar world has widened the
room for smaller states to diversify their partnerships.51 Pethiyagoda adds that, “In the
future, small states, particularly with strategic relevance like those around the Indian Ocean
and the Middle East, will have more options to switch between multiple poles. Great
powers will have less leverage.”52 Pethiyagoda’s argument rests on Sri Lanka’s case, where
he highlights the transition from a pro-China government under Mahinda Rajapaksa to a
more pro-US and pro-India government of Mathila Sirisena. His argument is a novel
perspective in the post-Cold War period and has implications for the study of small states.
He does not simply assume the small state (in this case, Sri Lanka) as merely an extension
of Great Power interactions; rather, Sri Lanka is studied as an actor with agency, capable
of making decisions that have ramifications for Great Powers.
While Pethyagoda touches on the increasing agency of small states in international
politics, Tom Long (2017) creates an analytical framework for assessing the agency of

Kadira Pethiyagoda, “Order from Chaos: Why Small States matter in International Politics: The
Case of Sri Lanka,” The Brookings Institution, last modified September 3, 2015,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/09/03/why-small-states-matter-in-internationalpolitics-the-case-of-sri-lanka/.
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small states. His argument is that small states do not have the means to exercise power in
the same manner as Great Powers. Given this impediment, small states use nonconventional means wherein military force becomes less acceptable; instead, there is
greater emphasis on interdependence, norms, and institutions.53 While Gibert and
Grzelczyk (2017) criticized the limits of studying small states within institutional
frameworks, Long conceptualizes such behavior as an expression of the small states’
agency, which is extremely limited outside of institutional frameworks that are guided by
interdependence and norms.
Experts of small states, including the likes of David Vital, Robert Rothstein and
Niels Amstrup, have all presented contending analytical structures to classify and
understand such states. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been an inherent push to
study small states. While much of the literature on such states is focused on those that
belong to the European Union, work on non-Western small states have garnered some
attention. The likes of Kassimeris, Bailes et al., Gigleux, and Pethiyagoda have put forth
novel means of assessing non-Western powers in the international system. But none of
these endeavors provide any detailed account on the behavior and analytical utility of
buffer states. While ‘small state’ as the object of study has garnered some traction within
academic circles, the attention to buffer states remains scant. Nevertheless, there is a very
small group of academics who have written on the subject, including relatively novel
approaches to assessing the role of buffer states. These works are extrapolated in the
following section.
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On Buffer States
Any discussion on buffer states needs to address its roots in Geopolitics54 given that
its political meaning is derived from its geographic disposition. Geopolitics developed as
a novel discipline in Europe just before World War I. Deliberations over the political utility
of studying geography led to the development of the field. In its early stages, Geopolitics
sought to make sense of the influence of geography on the human political realm. The
erstwhile focus of the discipline of Geography on the physical topography of the Earth was
reaching its limit of utility. Also, geography was increasingly seen as an innate aspect of
human civilization. Friedrich Ratzel, the pioneer thinker in Geopolitics, attempted to bridge
the gap between pure geography55 and history. Translation of Ratzel’s work from German
to English by Ellen Churchill Semple was the first analytical attempt at linking what was
until then two disparate disciplines. In Ratzel’s own words, “the national history of any
state is influenced by local climate, soil, rivers, and boundaries of mountains or deserts.”56
Thus, he deemed it necessary to include human interactions amongst themselves and with
nature when studying geography. Early geopolitical writings such as Ratzel’s and Semple’s
argued for a causal linkage that promoted a deterministic view of geography; they argued
that human interactions, including innovation and culture, were shaped by the topography
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that they resided in.57 This deterministic approach has long been criticized for being too
simplistic and narrowly conceptualized. Nevertheless, it cannot be discounted that Ratzel
pioneered a new avenue for analyzing state behavior – one that considered geography as
an important aspect of statecraft, which had immense implications for the study of buffer
states. Thus, the discipline of Geopolitics emerged to analyze how geography influences
state policy i.e. how a state’s geographic disposition impacts its role conceptualization and
the subsequent policies that it adopts as part of its statecraft. It formalized the study of
geography and its links to the political realm of human civilization.
Other classical geopolitical writers, including Halford Mackinder, Robert StrauszHupe and Richard Spykman further pursued the linkages between geography and foreign
policy of states. Given that the very existence and purpose of the buffer state is defined by
its geographic disposition between larger powers, this linkage between geography and
foreign policy remains of utmost importance for its study. Mackinder’s Heartland Theory
provided strategists with a unique means of assessing political strategy; an approach that
emphasized the control of the Eurasian Heartland as key to the establishment of a global
empire.58 Mackinder moved beyond the deterministic linkages between geography and the
political realm of humanity; he emphasized a more nuanced approach to the discipline of
Geography, one that sought to explain the political behavior of humans. Mackinder
revolutionized Geography from a discipline strictly concerned with the topography of the
world to one that accounted for how it can be related to humanity; essentially, Mackinder
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developed Ratzel’s conceptual foundations even further and established Geopolitics as a
separate sub-field. Topography no longer remained apolitical as it took on political
significance and meaning.
Robert Strausz-Hupe took Mackinder’s argument further by not only emphasizing
the importance of the Heartland for strategic value but the very importance of living space,
which remained an integral part of German Geopolitik and later contributed to the Nazi
concept of the Lebensraum.59 Thus, the living space as a conception was political as it was
geographic; its usage during the Second World War was tragic.
The crucial importance of geographic space for state development had become a
quintessential aspect of classical geopolitics but it was Nicholas J. Spykman who directly
linked geography with foreign policy making. He argued that geography was one of many
factors that determined foreign policy of a state. Spykman adds that:

“topography affects strength because of its influence on unity and internal
coherence. Climate, affecting transportation and setting limits to the possibility of
agricultural production, conditions the economic structure of the state, and thus, indirectly
but unmistakably, foreign policy.” 60

In essence, he undermined the deterministic aspect of geopolitics that dominated
the earlier years of the discipline. But not unlike his predecessors in Geopolitics, Spykman
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asserts that topography does influence economic relations and subsequently, the political
structure and foreign policy-making of states. Geographic layout has implications for state
development and its overall capacity to transform its material potential to capability.
Spkyman modified classical Geopolitics from a purely deterministic discipline to a more
complex and multilayered approach in understanding the links between geography and
politics. Geographic difficulty was gradually overcome due to technological innovation,
but topography could not be ruled out of politics. Geographic location played an important
role in strategy of states and it was especially important for dispersion of technology, which
would in turn lead to increased overcoming of geographic remoteness.
Discussing buffer states requires acknowledgment of the fact that the concept is an
ancient form of state strategy, particularly used by Empires or other forms of Great Powers.
The political strategy of using buffer zones as cushions for the political core from external
threats, such as barbarians and other major powers, can be traced back to the era of the
Roman Empire. Utilizing march states61 and wastelands to demarcate and secure their
boundaries, the Romans were one of the earliest to deploy the concept of buffer zones.62 In
the Middle Ages, Britain and Germany used this concept in the form of march lords, who
controlled the march states but had time and again successfully asserted their own
independence.63 In the 10th and 11th centuries, Normans established lordships on the border
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between England and Wales; called the marcher-lords, they were independent barons who
could wage war, erect castles and hold courts without reference to the crown. 64 These
marcher-lords were responsible for protecting the frontiers of English territory, protecting
the core from external attacks.65 Thus, the idea of frontier regions in areas of contention is
not modern and has a long history rooted in the security strategies of empires. Nevertheless,
it must be noted that it was the formalized study of Geopolitics and its eventual
development as an analytical framework that allows us to analyze these old strategies from
a modern academic lens.
Despite its existence for an elaborate period of human history, the modern day
concept and nomenclature of the buffer state as a geographic space separating larger
powers or serving as territorial discontinuities between them, was only used in 1876 while
the buffer state as a distinct political terminology emerged in 1883. 66 In the context of the
modern international system, the British were the first to employ the concept of the buffer
state in Afghanistan to separate British and Russian spheres of influence during the Great
Game.67 It would not be a stretch to ascertain that the concept of the buffer state emerged
out of European geopolitics and was widely employed by Britain throughout its imperial
interests, most importantly in the areas around British India, its Crown Jewel.68
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The deployment of the buffer state concept as a form of state strategy was
widespread in the British Empire. Apart from Afghanistan, Britain deployed the concept
in Nepal and Tibet as well. It is explicitly demonstrated in rhetoric, both in Nepal and
Britain. Nepal’s founder, King Prithvi Narayan Shah, in his collection of policies related
to Nepali statecraft called the Dibyopadesh (दिव्योपिे श),69 highlighted his country to be a
“yam sprouting between two huge boulders.”70 It is most explicitly implied at the
conclusion of the Anglo-Gorkha71 (Nepal) War. While the British won the conflict against
the Gorkha Empire,72 they did not annex its territory “fearing contiguity with Tibet, a
Chinese protectorate, which would spark off border clashes.”73 The British attitude towards
Nepal is evidence of the deployment of a classical buffer state conception of the latter. As
defined by Chay and Ross, buffer states are “countries geographically and/or politically

situated between two or more large powers whose function is to maintain peace between
the larger powers.”74 British acknowledgement of Chinese sensitivities in Tibet vis-à-vis
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Nepal showcases the fact that both Tibet and Nepal acted as buffers between the erstwhile
Great Powers, Imperial Britain and China. It is Britain’s ascertaining of Chinese interests
in Tibet that affirms the buffer system between Britain, China and the two smaller powers
-- Nepal and Tibet.
British acknowledgment of the independence of the Kingdom of Nepal is another
factor that reaffirms its approach to keeping Nepal as an independent buffer state. The
central theme of the buffer system rests on the premise that it maintains its independence,
even though it is highly susceptible to intrusion from the buffered states. A letter sent on 1
April 1916 by the then Prime Minister of Nepal, Chandra Shamsher Rana, to British
Colonel Manners Smith addresses the British commitment to Nepal’s independence. Prime
Minister Rana, acknowledging British support for Nepali sovereignty, writes the following:

“I am also very thankful for the reiteration of the assurance given in
1911 impressing on us the earnest desire of the Government of India to
scrupulously respect the status of Nepal as an independent kingdom. I am
no less thankful for the king promise of the sympathetic consideration of
any complaints or suggestions we might have to make at any time in that
connection and I am very sensible of the friendly spirit which dictated it. As
an indication of the cordial feelings which the Government of India
entertain towards us, we do certainly value all these quite as much as we
do our friendship with them.”75
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The Government of Nepal under Chandra Shamsher was aware of Britain’s
preponderance in India and Nepal’s vulnerabilities as a small buffer state between much
larger powers. As such, the status of Nepal as an independent kingdom was reiterated to
ensure its autonomy while also appearing to be in an asymmetric relationship with the
British. The Nepal-UK relations largely stemmed from mutual security concerns; while
Nepal maintained a semblance of geographic security for British India, the UK was
concerned over Russian interests in Tibet and the possible spillover into Nepal – an
extension of the Great Game that was taking place in Central Asia.76 As for Nepal, it was
concerned about the activities of several political outfits operating in India that sought to
oust the Rana regime.77 Thus, the alliance between Nepal and British India was natural as
both states had security concerns that could translate into an opportunity for issue linkage.
Despite the asymmetric nature of the relationship, Nepal’s buffer status was maintained;
Britain’s main concern regarding the country was rising Russian interests, coupled with
fears for spilling of such threats into Nepal – a country that was geographically contiguous
with British India. Thus, British India followed the “forward policy” that integrated the
mountain kingdoms of Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan into the defense system of the Empire;

76

Madan Kumar Bhattarai, Diplomatic History of Nepal (1901-1929): A Critical Appraisal of
Nepal-British-Indian Relations (New Delhi, India: Ashoka Printers, 1990), 8. Accessed at the Ministry of
Archaeology, Kathmandu, Nepal on June 10, 2016.
77

The Rana Regime of Nepal (1846-1950) was the absolute rule of the Rana oligarchs, who reduced
the Shah monarchy to mere figureheads. Several political outfits, including the Nepali Congress Party, had
initiated armed revolts against the Ranas. Before the departure of the British from India in 1947, Nepal had
time and again appealed for the quelling of democratic armed forces based in India. In 1950, King Tribhuvan,
who was under house arrest, fled to the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu and subsequently to India to seek
asylum. The King’s departure was followed by armed attacks by Nepali Congress launched across Nepal,
resulting in Nepal’s emergence as a constitutional monarchy;
Krishna Kant Adhikari, “The Status, Powers and Functions of Rajas and Rajautas during the
Nineteenth Century Nepal in the Light of Contemporary Documents,” Contributions to Nepalese Studies
VIII, no. 1 (1980).

39

such a move prevented the area around British India from external control or subjugation.78
Essentially, the British used the “forward policy” as a means to create a buffer zone
encompassing Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim –nominally independent smaller countries in the
northern periphery of the Empire.
The British conception of the buffer system in the region maintained its relevance
even after the independence of India. The post-independence Indian administration
inherited the British colonial apparatus including its geopolitical conceptualization of the
region. Nepal continued to serve as a buffer state; Tibet acted as a buffer state too but very
briefly. Nepal’s buffer role became especially pronounced since Tibet’s incorporation into
the People’s Republic of China.79 New Delhi sought to maintain the “Himalayan frontier
policy” in Nepal, by keeping it under India’s sphere of influence.80 The first Prime Minister
of independent India, Jawaharlal Nehru, highlighted Nepal’s importance to India’s
security. His rhetoric affirmed Nepal’s sovereignty yet showcased concerns regarding
Chinese activities in Tibet; Nehru iterated that “India would not tolerate any invasion of
Nepal from anywhere.”81 On December 7, 1950, Nehru’s speech initiating the debate on
foreign affairs in the Indian Parliament, highlighted Nepal’s significant role for the security
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of post-independence India. Titled “Peace or War,” Nehru highlighted the following points
regarding Nepal’s importance to Indian security:

“We (India) recognize Nepal as an independent country and wish
her well. But even a child knows that one cannot go to Nepal without
passing through India…We wished to treat Nepal as an independent
country but, at the same time, saw that, unless some steps were taken in the
internal sphere, difficulties might arise…During the last fortnight, some
new developments have taken place in Nepal. Our interest in the internal
conditions of Nepal has become still more acute and personal, because of
the developments across our borders, to be frank, especially those in China
and Tibet. Besides our sympathetic interest in Nepal, we were also
interested in the security of our own country. From time immemorial, the
Himalayas have provided us with a magnificent frontier. Of course, they
are no longer as impassable as they used to be but are still very effective.
We shall not allow that barrier to be penetrated because it is also the
principal barrier to India. Therefore, much as we appreciate the
independence of Nepal, we cannot allow anything to go wrong in Nepal or
permit that barrier to be crossed or weakened, because that would be a risk
to our own security…”82
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Nehru’s speech reinforces India’s conception of Nepal as a buffer state – one that
became even more prominent with Tibet’s incorporation into the People Republic of China.
It highlights the predicament of the buffer state that it may not truly enjoy external intrusion
as its geopolitical position makes it susceptible to the security concerns of its neighbors.
The long border shared between Tibet and Nepal made the latter very sensitive to Indian
security concerns as the former ceased to exist as a buffer. Thus, Nepal retained a
prominent place in Indian foreign policy; in fact, its importance as a geopolitical buffer
increased after the 1950 incursions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into Tibet, a
continuation and perhaps, exacerbation of Nepal’s importance for India’s own geopolitical
security.
Tanisha M. Fazal offers a very different perspective on the buffer state. Her book
State Death: The Politics and Geography of Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation has a
whole section on the buffer state concept within the context of demise of states. Fazal
comes to the conclusion that buffer states will be in a higher risk group for violent state
death; her exception is that in the post-1945 period, a state is 92 per cent more likely to
survive than a state did in the pre-1945 period.83 In summary, the chances of destruction of
a buffer state (or any other state for that matter) becomes almost nil in post-1945 period,
showcasing the strengthening norm of territorial integrity and sovereignty. Of course, this
does not take into account territorial disputes that have endured in the post-1945 period but
the idea of a whole state disappearing is unthinkable in the present context. Nevertheless,
her research emphasizes the shift in international norms pre- and post- 1945; the end of the
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Second World War and the beginning of decolonization entrenched sovereignty and severe
negative sanctions in forceful change of territorial status-quo. However, Fazal maintains
skepticism of the viability of the buffer state. She states that:

“states engaged in enduring rivalries form security dilemmas
around the states that lie between them—buffer states. And it seems that
these buffer states are born to lose. Each rival fears the possibility that its
opponent will take over the buffer. This fear produces a strategic imperative
that leads to a fatal outcome: buffer state death.
Buffer states are likely to die because surrounding rivals are
typically unable to make credible commitments not to take them over. But
in certain, atypical situations, the security dilemma can be resolved such
that buffer states survive. If rivals’ resources are simultaneously
constrained, they cannot take over buffer states. If rivals must become
temporary allies in another theater, they prefer not to sap each other’s
resources by fighting over buffer states. And if a more powerful third party
intervenes to protect the buffer state, rivals will refrain from conquest
because costs will exceed benefits.”84
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Fazal’s work offers a historical perspective of buffer states and their precarious
existence. She does acknowledge that buffer states have survived since before 1945, as is
the case for Nepal (and Bhutan). Her research infers that balancing by buffer states has not
always led to their survival; additionally, buffer states can rarely make alliances because
of the very fact that they are buffer states – their precarious position between two rival
powers does not allow them to choose favorites without the risk of irking one of the
powers.85 Overall, Fazal offers a historically grounded analysis of buffer states and their
propensity towards state death. Yet, her work does not explain buffer states in the present
international political context. She explains the entrenchment of the norm against conquest
and state death after 1945 but her work does not include the present role of buffer states.
Fazal’s observations enrich the buffer state literature; yet, the scope of her work is to assess
survival/death trajectories of states. It is not to explain the relevance of buffer states in
contemporary international politics and their role in regional security.
The classical geopolitical thinkers opened up a new avenue of political thinking
with implications for International Relations. Classical geopolitical thinkers did not
directly deal with buffer states. Nevertheless, their emphasis on the political nature of
geographic space and the influence of topography on foreign policy paved the way for the
emergence of a more detailed analysis of buffer states. Geopolitics divulged a new line of
analysis focused on strategic importance of space, a fact that was not novel in military
strategy but was groundbreaking as an analytical tool. The emphasis of Geopolitics on the
political utility of geographic space and implications of natural topography led to academic
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discussions on the topic. Buffer states became subjects of study as well but to a limited
extent. The literature on small states seems to be more developed due to its wider scope
and is thus, discussed here due to its implications for buffer states

On Sub-Systemic Powers, Rivalry, and Geographic Contiguity
The very existence of buffer states is tied to the behavior of sub-systemic powers.86
While buffered states may not always be Great Powers, they maintain substantial regional
influence. As such, it is pertinent to include the literature on sub-systemic powers and their
patterns of behavior due to the relevance on how they impact buffer states. Just like buffer
states, there is no singular definition of a sub-systemic power. Stewart-Ingersoll and Frazier
(2010) classify such powers based on four parameters: the region under study, superiority
of power capabilities in the respective region, possession of the largest power share in the
region, and them exercising some kind of influence in the region. 87 Regional powers are
also defined as materially preponderant actors relative to other actors within the same
region.88 While some sub-systemic powers can certainly also be systemic powers (i.e. Great
Powers), not all of them are. Nevertheless, sub-systems are characterized by regional
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hierarchies, wherein regional powers maintain preponderance within their respective
regions.89
Material capability is an important factor in deciphering the behavior and influence
of sub-systemic powers. Nevertheless, some authors argue that ideational factors matter.
Regional powers attempt to shape the aspirations of their respective regions, including
regional agendas and outcomes of their regional settings. 90 Apart from the greatest share
of power within a region, sub-systemic powers use their asymmetric advantage to provide
public goods.91 Such public goods could be institutionalized at the regional level or
enforced through bilateral means; either way, regional powers have the capacity to design
regional agenda. Thus, the buffer state maintains a precarious position given that it is likely
to find itself in contrasting regional designs; buffer states are geopolitically situated in areas
where two or more sub-systems convene. The congruence of contending regional
aspirations of sub-systemic powers makes the existence of buffer states precarious. It is
worse for buffer states that are in between rising sub-systemic powers, as change in power
dynamics are highly likely in such sub-systems.
While sub-systemic powers are the most powerful and influential players in their
respective regions, intent of such states should be considered. According to Myriam Prys,
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not all regional powers are alike; some of them are active in regional agenda making while
others are apathetic. Her typology of regional powers includes three variations:

1. Dominant Regional Powers: Regional powers that promotes its own private goods
provision and dominates over public goods provision of the region and uses force if need
be.
2. Regional Hegemons: Regional powers which promote regional stability and promotes
some common goods for the region without usage of force.
3. Detached Regional Powers: Regional powers that focus on international roles rather than
local ones.92

In the buffer system, regional powers are invested in regional affairs, while extraregional interests may remain concurrent. The buffer state is based on the logic of
contending interests of competing regional powers. Prys’ third typology does not apply to
the buffer system as the buffered states are locally active. Contending regional powers may
view inactivity in regional affairs as concessions, weakening the influence of the regional
actor that does not focus regionally.
Interstate rivalry has been a consistent facet of international system since the
initiation of its study. Since a buffer state is situated between larger rival powers, the notion
of rivalry requires contextualization and extrapolation of the concept. Thus, the nature of
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the buffer system makes it pertinent to touch on rivalry and its connection to geographic
contiguity. The preliminary approaches to rivalry centered around what is considered
“strategic rivalries.” These rivalries are measured based on the number of conflicts that
occur between two states within a specific period of time.93 One such approach based on
dispute density is that of Diehl and Goertz (2000); two states are considered rivals if they
militarily clash at least six times over the period of twenty years.94 Rivalry is clearly defined
here in terms of a military conflict, within a specified period of time.
D. Scott Bennett highlights a similar approach used by Wayman and Jones (1991),
which also put forth a similar operationalization based on reciprocated militarized
conflicts. It includes three main conditions: first, there must be at least thirty days each
between two states; second, there must be at least twenty-five years between the outbreak
of the first dispute and the termination of the last dispute; third, if the gap between any two
militarized disputes exceeds ten years, an enduring rivalry continues only if the territorial
domain and issues remain unresolved and there is at least one militarized dispute within a
period of twenty-five years.95 But, this approach is seen as rather constricting the utility of
studying rivalry and its impact on conflict scenarios; similar to Diehl and Goertz’s
argument, Thompson provides a stable initiation in the study of rivalry but it lacks the
ability to explain rivalries that do not entail military conflict.96
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Another perspective on the factors determining rivalry deals with threat perception.
Rivals are usually dyads with equal capability, as they cannot impose each other’s will on
the other, further spurring conflict of interests.97 Thus, there is a conscious
conceptualization of what rivalry with another state entails. Mitchell and Thies (2011)
present a two-dimensional measure of rivalry: an issue dimension that includes the number
of distinct diplomatic issues between a dyadic interaction and secondly, a military
dimension that includes the number of militarized attempts to settle a particular issue.98
Multiple conceptions of rivalry imply that it is not just limited to militarized issues but also
broader policy objectives – a rivalry, more often than not, entails a military dimension. The
predicament of the buffer state can be conceptualized within this notion of rivalry, wherein
rivalrous relationships beyond militarized conceptions play a role in dyadic Great Power
or Middle Power interactions.
Analyzing the buffer state within the context of rivalry requires the inclusion of
geographic contiguity, as buffer systems are sets of geographically contiguous states.
Adding the nuance of geographic contiguity in assessing spatial rivalry brings forth the
importance of studying interactions at the border frontiers between powers. Although
militarized rivalries may not be the only expressed form of a rivalrous relationship between
powers, it is important to note that territorial dispute could pose as a source of serial
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episodes of conflicts.99 Diehl argues that if a dispute is contiguous by land, the likelihood
of escalation of violence is increased.100 It is due to the fact that geographic contiguity
provides a setting amenable to conflictual interactions.101 Contiguous states simply do not
enter into a conflict (be it military or diplomatic) due to their contiguity. Such states have
to see an opportunity – identify a policy of interaction within its means, while at the same
time be willing to pursue such policies.102 Thus, territorial contiguity remains an important
aspect of interstate rivalries. Given the importance of contiguity in rivalries, it is pertinent
to assess the buffer state’s predicament within this context. Nevertheless, the impact of
geographically contiguous rivalries on buffer states cannot be understated.
The nexus of geographic contiguity and rivalry can be assessed through the lens of
the emerging importance placed on the sub-system. Sub-systems or regions, by definition,
are geographically contiguous or proximate blocs of states. The inherent geopolitical nature
of a buffer system makes it a concept that is strongly bonded by geographic contiguity,
which can sometimes manifest in the form of a rivalry. The condition for rivalry is
especially more pronounced if the two geographically contiguous states are rising powers,
which have increasing capabilities.
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On the Continued Relevance and Utility of the Buffer State Concept in
International Relations
As aforementioned, the concept of buffer states is not a new one. Its conceptual
utility remained prevalent since the time of the Roman Empire. Nevertheless, academic
endeavors on the concept only began in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As Geopolitics
emerged as a separate academic discipline, so too did the buffer state become relevant as a
concept with analytical utility. Mary Gear’s work remains one of the first to directly
address the buffer state as an analytical concept. She categorized buffers into three
categories: natural, politico-natural, and political buffers.103 Her affirmation that buffer
states are products of politics alludes to the strategic nature of such states; they fulfill a
political function in the strategy of states. Gear goes to the extent of mentioning that buffers
can change roles with changes in regional power levels; that such states can transform from
a purely natural buffer to politico-natural buffers as well as purely political buffers. But
Gear only merely mentions this without any details on how changes in the type of buffer
state occur; what dynamics are inherent within the buffer state when such changes occur?
How does change in neighboring power capabilities lead to changing of roles of the buffer
state? These are some questions that Gear does not address in her short but novel work on
buffer states.
While Gear narrows down the conception of buffer states, Michael Greenfield
Partem further develops it. Pointing to the limitation of Trygve Mathisen’s definition of
buffer states as any small state lying in between two larger states, often rivals, Partem
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introduces more qualifications to identify such states, namely geography, capability
distribution, and foreign policy orientation.104 While Mathisen addresses the predicament
of the buffer state within the context of the role of small states in the strategy of larger
powers, his assessment is limited to defining the buffer state. Mathisen offers very little in
his book on the nuances related to buffer states, without references to their role in regional
security dynamics. As for Partem, he asserts that geography entails the fixation of the
buffer state’s geopolitical significance, a fact that remains a reality for all of that state’s
existence.

Partem also operates Bueno de Mesquita’s framework for analyzing the

calculations of rational unitary actors during conflict situations. Basically, the argument he
is forwarding rests on relative capability distribution; through probability and utility
calculations, a state’s likelihood of initiating conflict can be measured.105 A more specific
indicator of a buffer state’s existence is the relative disparity in capability between the
buffer state and the two buffered states it separates. The buffer state is simply “smaller”
than the two larger buffered states while assessed relatively.
Partem adds a critical nuance to the literature on buffer states: the notion of
deutilization. It entails the conscious effort by the buffer state to remain comparatively
weak to ensure that any action against it was viewed as a blatant act of aggression in the
international arena.106 In addition, the utility of a buffer is framed in the wider context of
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the larger powers’ strategic calculations - a buffer state might become highly important for
the larger powers if it fulfills their strategic needs. Partem’s third characteristic of buffer
states rests on foreign policy orientations. His characterization rests on alliance formation;
buffers can remain aloof of involvement between the larger powers or choose a side. What
the buffer chooses to pursue determines the military strategy of both of the larger buffered
states. Nevertheless, buffers do recognize the dangers inherent in choosing a side – the
reason why many of them declare neutrality.
As for buffer diplomacy, Afghan king Amir Abdur Rahman compared his country
to a swan on a lake, with a bear on one shore and wolves on the opposite shore. 107 The
metaphor of Afghanistan as a swan poetically captures the delicate balancing act inherent
in buffer state diplomacy. However, buffers do not always maintain neutrality and that
factors such as changes in capability of the buffered states, domestic upheavals, and intense
regional rivalries can push buffers to lean to one side. Overall, Partem elaborates on Gear’s
definition of the buffer state, providing more nuance to its regional predicament and foreign
policy. Despite these additions to the literature, Partem does not provide a detailed account
of how rivalries between the buffered states unravel within the buffer state; he does
mention the changing stance of buffer to changes in capabilities of the buffered states but
Partem does not elaborate on how such changes take place.
The earliest book on the specific topic of buffer states is titled Buffer States in World
Politics edited by John Chay and Thomas E. Ross. This work probes the conditions,
problems, and prospects of buffer states and buffer zones. The book further seeks to
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address the nature, characteristics, structure, and operation of a buffer state. The major
objective of the edited volume rests on its attempt at explaining problems experienced in
politically troubled areas, through the study of the structure and operation of the buffer
state. Thomas E. Ross extends the definition of the buffer state, linking it to how it could
be explained from the perspective of a geographer. Ross furthers the case that geographic
location is paramount despite technological advancement but from the perspective of
geography; he asserts the primacy of geography, particularly hostile terrain as being critical
in the designation of a buffer state.
As for the buffer’s foreign policy, Joseph Maila argues that it espouses the notions
of sovereignty, autonomy, neutrality, and freedom. In another chapter by Philip Kelly, it
is argued that buffer states contribute to regional political dynamics and such states remain
permanent fixtures despite political changes in the region. What Kelly does not incorporate
is the changing nature of the buffer state’s role in the regional setting. How does the change
in capability of vicinal powers affect its the behavior? This question remains unanswered
in his analysis. Despite the limits on the evolution of buffer’s role and its relation to subsystemic changes, Gerald L. Ingall’s chapter does acknowledge the changing nature of
buffer states. Furthermore, he concisely rounds up the literature section of the chapter by
addressing the systemic requirement of a buffer system – that the buffered states need to
be significantly more powerful than the buffer itself and they need to be able to maintain
some degree of sovereignty. Overall, Chay and Ross’s work provides a much needed and
detailed definition of a buffer state, including its systemic role and an explanation for why
many of the troubled regions in the world are buffer systems.
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Despite this groundbreaking work on buffer states, the book provides little to no
explanations for the changing roles of buffer states. Phillip Kelly does touch on regionally
stabilizing role played by buffer states but none of the authors in the edited volume address
how changing regional power capabilities in the vicinal states lead to transformations
within the buffer state. What accounts for buffer states titling from one power to neutrality
or vice-versa as well as how the competition between regional powers plays out in the
buffer state is important to decipher their roles in regional security. These questions are not
directly addressed in any of the chapters in the book. In essence, the authors do not account
for changes in power capabilities and how they affect the status of the buffer state, a crucial
point in maintenance of its relevance in contemporary International Relations.
Lawrence Ziring approaches the topic from a perspective that emphasizes the
military-political conditions of the international system, which is in line with the Classical
Geopolitical approach towards buffer states. According to him, buffer states are not buffers
by choice; it is thrust onto them by a hostile international environment. 108 Such states are
“extensions of balances of power, not international law” – it is implied that buffer states
are outgrowths of necessities borne out of peculiar conditions in military and political
relations. He adds that buffer states are usually the first victims due to the virtue of their
geographic disposition; their status oscillates between a loss of national pride on one hand
and extinction on the other. In essence, Ziring presents a rather bleak diagnosis, one that is
mired with lack of prospects of agency for the buffer state. While Ziring’s approach to
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buffer states was relevant during the 18-20th centuries when borders changed constantly, it
may not hold much weight in the post-WWII period. It is even more unlikely after the end
of the Cold War. The emphasis on national sovereignty and the norm of non-interference
largely make the extinction of the buffer state an exception rather than a norm. As such,
the context surrounding buffer states has changed. They may be small states in precarious
geopolitical predicaments, but they do have limited agency to influence the interplay of the
buffered states. Ziring’s typification of buffer states renders them to be passive players in
interstate politics and does not adhere to the norm of upholding territorial integrity, while
sidelining the agency (albeit limited) of buffer states in the buffer system.
Another book, which is the most recent one exclusively dealing with the concept of
the buffer state is Tornike Turmanidze’s Buffer States: Power Policies, Foreign Policies,
and Concepts.109 He provides a good review of the limited literature on the concept of the
buffer state but also adds to it. His work extends the concept of a quasi-buffer – a buffer
state that only fulfills the security function of one of the bigger power it shares borders
with. These are states that are not entirely buffers as they hold strategic significance for
only one of the two powers it separates. While Turmanidze offers a concise and compressed
review of the majority of the authors discussed in the preceding paragraphs, his work
mainly seeks to further the concept of the quasi-buffer while distinguishing it from the
traditional buffer state. It is a short book that mainly reiterates already existing literature
on the buffer state. As for the foreign policy of buffer states, Turmanidze asserts that
neutrality is the preferred policy, especially during conflicts between the buffered states.
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Turmanidze argues that quasi-buffers go against the notion of neutrality by allying
themselves with one of the two larger powers. But what seems to be lacking is the notion
of changes in power capability – what happens to the quasi-buffer if the power against
which it is allied raises its power capability? There is a high possibility of the rising
buffered state to increase its influence in the buffer, which no longer remains what
Turmanidze calls a quasi-buffer. Thus, he does not account for the dynamic nature of subsystems and the sub-systemic interactions within the buffer state. Also, very little is
touched on how such role conceptions of buffer change with changing sub-systemic power
capabilities. The dynamic nature of the interactions of larger powers in the buffer state is
also untouched by Turmanidze’s work.
Martin J. Bayly writes a refreshing piece on the buffer state concept. His work is
perhaps the latest one that seeks to tackle the predicament of buffer states. Bayly offers an
alternative to the structural-functionalist approach to buffers that renders them to be heavily
dependent on the great powers for maintaining any semblance of relevance.110 He proposes
using ontological security i.e. moving beyond just physical security to security of the self
when analyzing buffer states. He categorizes such structural-functionalist approaches as
ahistorical and limited to understanding the buffer system in terms of “two rival powers
straining over an intervening state, a classic security dilemma in which neither wishes to
provoke war, yet where both are weary of each other making strategic gains.”111 Bayly’s
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deployment of ontological security as a lens for analyzing buffer systems promotes their
representational forms as ‘zones of competition’ or as ‘imaginative geographies.’ In
essence, Bayly’s process takes into account the identities of states, including British
ontological insecurity in Afghanistan which resulted after failed routinization attempts.
While Bayly’s argument adds a fresh perspective to the slim amount of literature on buffer
states, it does not take the material forces into account. Ontological security does figure
profoundly in the foreign policy of the buffer states as well as the buffered states, but both
material and rhetorical forces are important in deciphering the dynamics of relations. While
identity could be a prelude to the occurrence of political maneuvering, it is quintessential
in accounting for the importance of rhetoric and the usage of material forces for strategic
gain.
The buffer state concept has maintained its relevance in international politics in
more than one form. Paul Poast uses buffer states as test cases for assessing whether
alliance commitments are credible.112 His argument is that buffer states have contentious
existence given their proneness to invasion and occupation; while this may not hold true in
totality in the contemporary normative structure of international politics, his argument is
focused on whether issue linkages bolster treaty obligations. His findings allude that buffer
states in alliances with trade provisions experience fewer willful violations of alliance
obligations, fewer attacks, and almost no experience of invasion and occupation than those
do not have trade provisions.113
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The literature on buffer states covers a wide variety of arguments, but a majority
are concerned with defining the buffer state itself. Due to the relative lack of theoretical
attention to the concept, much of the preceding decades have been spent on providing a
sound conceptual basis for the buffer state. Chay, Ross, and Partem have delved deeper,
attempting to foster a deeper understanding of the buffer state. Foreign policy orientations
as well as centrality of state contextualization at the regional level have been covered. But
a major gap in the field pertains to the changing role of buffer states; while the definition
of the buffer does not change due to its vicinal geography, its political meaning and
importance can change. A buffer may be within the security umbrella of one of the powers,
but such political tilting could change, pertinent to increase or decrease in power capability.
Endeavors in linking changes in capabilities of buffered states to the changing importance
of buffer state remains limited to mere descriptions and lacks analytical depth. In addition,
not much has been attempted in how such changes in capability of one of the buffered
states plays out in the buffer state. Since the buffer state is based on regional power
competitions, it is highly likely that the same could play out in the buffer state as well.
Thus, this proposed dissertation seeks to bridge that gap; it seeks to provide
contextualization to the buffer state by linking its changing political role and significance
to sub-systemic power changes. It takes the dynamic interactions of material and rhetorical
forces of the buffered states in the buffer state.
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CHAPTER III: RESEARCH DESIGN, CASE SELECTION, & METHODOLOGY

This chapter lays out the research design, case selection, and methodology of this
dissertation. First, the chapter provides a brief synopsis of why mixed-methodology was
used for this study and how it is tied to the research question. Secondly, the rationale for
the usage of the India-Nepal-China Buffer System (INCBS) is extrapolated; this subsection also ties in the implications of India’s and China’s rise on sub-systemic relations,
including implications for the buffer state in question, Nepal. Finally, the chapter provides
a detailed lay-out of the methodology used in the study, including details on the convergent
parallel design, and the tools for qualitative and quantitative data collection and analyses.
Overall, Chapter III provides the methodological framework for the dissertation and why
the INCBS was chosen.

Research Design
The nature of the research question of the dissertation requires a mixed-method
research design. The research question seeks to ascertain the relevance and importance of
buffer states by linking them to sub-systemic changes in power capabilities of the buffered
states. The increase/decrease of sub-systemic rivalry in the buffer state is central to the
research problem; buffer states maintain strategic relevance through this dynamic of the
buffer system. Increase or decrease in relevance is operationalized as increase or decrease
in rhetorical and material engagement with the buffer state; intensity of such engagement
can be measured positively (through increase) or negatively (through decrease). The
operational hypothesis is that if the buffer state has elevated relevance, there should be
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increase in the rhetorical importance extended by the buffered states; additionally, such
intensified rhetoric needs to be coupled with increase in material aid extended to the buffer
state. Thus, to capture the increased/decreased competition of the buffered states in the
buffer state requires the analyses of the rhetoric being utilized as well as backing of that
rhetoric through tangible means such as economic aid or investment, which are considered
hard data due to their quantifiability. For a comprehensive analysis of both rhetorical
engagement and material engagement, the mixed-method is best suited for the study. As
Creswell and Plano state:

“As a methodology, it (mixed-methodology) involves philosophical
assumptions that guide the direction of the collection and analysis of data
and the mixture of qualitative and quantitative approaches in many phases
in the research process. As a method, it focuses on collecting, analyzing,
and mixing both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study or series
of studies. Its central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative
approaches in combination provides a better understanding of research
problems than either approach alone.”114

Thus, the study is based on the idea that a mixed-methodology approach
provides a more comprehensive explanation for the research problem. Quantitative
data coupled with qualitative data would help in ascertaining whether higher/lower
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sub-systemic rivalry between buffered states will result in greater or lesser
competition in the buffer state; the rationale of this research design is to capture
how the sub-systemic competition of the buffered states plays out in the buffer state.
Using both quantitative and qualitative data aids in a more complete understanding
of increase/decrease in intensification of rivalry in the buffer system. The following
sections lay out the rationale for the case selection and detailed framework of the
methodology used for this dissertation.

Case Selection
Given the multitude of countries that fit the definition of a buffer state, the proposed
study seeks to focus on only one buffer state, Nepal. Due to constrains in time and
resources, the most prudent course of action for this dissertation was to conduct a withincase analysis of the India-Nepal-China Buffer system (INCBS). The within-case analysis
entails “in-depth understanding and description of the phenomenon under study” wherein
a single case is used as a standalone entity.115 The case’s unique attributes and patterns are
brought to the fore before attempting to locate general patterns and themes that exist across
other cases i.e. other buffer systems. Within-case analysis “can be used initially to develop
a standalone description of each case and then to conduct a cross-case comparison to
identify what each case has in common, as well as what attributes about each case are
unique. It can also be used to develop an initial coding tree.”116 As such, this dissertation
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is an endeavor to create an analytical framework that can be used to assess and analyze
other buffer systems. The within-case analysis used in this dissertation identifies several
data points in the case study chosen, which are analyzed using a mixed-methodology; these
data points, called historic critical junctures, are briefly introduced in the following subsections. They are fully elaborated in Chapter IV.
For the within-case analysis, this dissertation uses the India-Nepal-China buffer
system, whereby Nepal is the buffer state while India and China are the buffered states.
The rationale for using this case study is based on the increased interest in regions as units
of analysis in International Relations coupled with the rising status of China and India in
the international system. In the aftermath of the Cold War, regional approaches to security
studies have garnered increased attention.117 As ideologically motivated bipolar bifurcation
gave way for regional powers to assert themselves in their respective regions, avenues for
sub-systemic analyses opened up as well. While systemic level political interactions still
garner extensive attention, there has been a marked increase in the study of regional subsystems; this is especially true for the study of the role of regional powers in shaping their
respective sub-systems.118 One such avenue that has dominated the discourse in security
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studies has been the rise of China, which is a major motivation for choosing the INCBS.
Domestic reforms in China since Deng Xiaoping’s time as Premier, accelerated China’s
economic growth and subsequently, its political clout. Regional approach to security
studies provides sub-systemic context, which remains an important aspect for analyzing
China’s rise. The impact of the rise of a regional power is evidently felt in the immediate
region. Thus, the study of the rise of China remains critical in the study of sub-systemic
power dynamics. Furthermore, China increasingly showcases systemic relevance; it has
soared to become the second largest economy in the world in a mere three decades.
Substantial debates are occurring among International Relations scholars who seek to make
sense of China’s rise. The INCBS is part of China’s critical role in the international system;
its analysis is timely for a wholesome understanding of Chinese strategic behavior. The
inclusion of India in the study allows for further extrapolation of China’s strategic
maneuvering in smaller states when another larger power is involved.
The swift rise of China has garnered extensive academic interest. One of the most
prominent voices in the field, John J. Mearsheimer, provides a pessimistic account of
China’s emergence as a global power, arguing that China will seek to establish regional
hegemony in Asia -- a region which already has the presence of another regional hegemon,
the United States.119 Thus, conflict is inevitable as the status-quo regional hegemon will
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use what is within its means to ensure that another regional hegemon does not emerge in
the international system.
Stephen Walt’s stance is somewhat similar to Mearsheimer’s; he argues that
significant security competition between China and the US is inevitable, with implications
that will impact the entire international system.120 Thus, the rise of China will pose threats
to the current system in place, as Walt projects China to make it increasingly dangerous for
the U.S. to operate its security maneuverings in East Asia. He further argues that China
may seek to distance America’s neighbors through “divide and conquer” tactics.
Charles Glaser presents a more optimistic Realist approach by positing the idea that
conflict is not predetermined. The outcome of China’s rise depends more on how the
American and Chinese leaders manage the situation rather than on the pressures generated
by the international system.121 Thus, there are a variety of perspectives presented by Realist
thinkers of International Relations regarding China’s rise.
In contrast, prominent liberal institutionalist scholar Gilford John Ikenberry
presents a perspective rooted in neoliberal institutionalism, whereby China is adhering to
the norms of the system rather than challenging them as it has gained substantially from
the system in place.122 Ikenberry argues that China’s rise is not threatening to the statusquo system as it has successfully utilized the norms and institutions in place after the
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Second World War to secure its material ascent, which has started to translate into greater
prestige and military capability in the system. Alastair Iain Johnston presents a middle-ofthe-road argument regarding China’s status as a revisionist or status quo power. He posits
that, “The Chinese leadership does not appear to wish to pay much in terms of its economic
development interests or its relationship with the United States. In other words, the wish to
be richer and more powerful has not translated into a concerted military effort to replace
the United States as the pre-dominant state regionally or globally.”123
China’s rise in the international hierarchy of states certainly impacts systemic
configurations of power but its long-term implication is a subject of considerable debate.
Consequently, regional power dynamics are impacted as they are inadvertently tied to such
changes. Within the context of China’s rise, India is the only other rising power that is
touted to present the most credible regional (and potentially, global) challenges for China
in the upcoming decades, mainly due to its demography and growing economy.124 India is
set to become the world’s most populous state and has been experiencing significant
economic growth since the commencement of economic liberalization in the early 1990s.
Additionally, other powers such as Japan and the United States, both wary of a rising China,
have increasingly sought to court India as a counterweight to China.125 Despite implications
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for regional and global security, there is a limited but growing literature on Sino-Indian
interactions. Analysis of how this rivalry manifests itself in the smaller states of Asia, a
region both rising powers share, is even more limited.
The rise of China is causing sub-systemic changes as it asserts itself regionally. The
rivalrous Sino-Indian dyad qualifies as the best case for this proposed dissertation, as subsystemic power changes in the form of China’s rise is aggravating Sino-Indian relations.
The Sino-Indian relationship can be characterized as a rivalrous one, which can be traced
back to the brief border war in 1962. The status over Arunachal Pradesh and Aksai China
remain contentious as these border issues have yet to be resolved.126 Furthermore, India
has housed the Dalai Lama since the failed Tibetan uprising in 1959, who is claimed by
Beijing to be a separatist.127 In essence, the Sino-Indian relationship can be considered a
rivalry when using Mitchell and Thies’ framework;128 the issue dimension has largely been
the border disputes between the two countries. As for the military dimension, the two states
fought a war in 1962; recent incursions into the Doklam Plateau by the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) of China caused tense military standoff between the India and Chinese
militaries in the disputed region between China and Bhutan.129 This rivalrous relationship
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is set to intensify as both China and India are undergoing extensive economic growth and
modernization of their militaries.
This intensified contentious relationship between India and China is impacting
smaller states in the region, including South Asia. As part of the buffer system with Nepal,
changes in Sino-Indian power dynamics present an opportunity to extrapolate how subsystemic changes provide relevance to buffer states through political competition within
such states. The triadic buffer system consisting of India, Nepal, and China fits the scope
of the study given the intense sub-systemic rivalry between India and China, including their
increasingly intense competition within Nepal. Additionally, there is some literature on
how India and China are courting Nepal130 – a tell-tale sign of the relevance of Nepal as a
strategically important state for both of its neighbors. Thus, the India-Nepal-China buffer
system is a reasonable fit as case study for this dissertation as its relevance is bound to
increase due to the intensification of contrasting interests of India and China.
In addition, most of the literature on the triadic relations between India, Nepal, and
China lack significant depth. Literature on the topic does exist.131 However, the most recent
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Sino-Indian relations through the conceptual framework of the security dilemma but no linkage of the security
dilemma to the buffer state concept; Manish Dabhade and Harsh V. Pant, “Coping with the Challenges to
Sovereignty: Sino-Indian Rivalry and Nepal’s Foreign Policy,” Contemporary South Asia 13, no.2 (2004) –
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book on the subject by Sanjay Upadhya does not incorporate the conceptual framework of
the buffer state.132 Rather, his work details China’s increasing interest in Nepal, which is a
state that has traditionally been considered to be under India’s security umbrella. Although
rich in detail, Upadhya does not deploy the analytical framework of the buffer state. Thus,
there is a significant lack of academic effort in situating the changing role of buffer states
in regional security, particularly when it comes to changes in sub-systemic power
capabilities and the implications for buffer states. The within-case analysis of the INCBS
is appropriate for this study as it allows for a comprehensive explanation for the research
question of this dissertation, including additional development of the theory related to
buffer states.133 Furthermore, much of the work on the triadic India-Nepal-China
relationship has been contextualized within the mainstream theories of International
Relations, which pay scant attention to buffer states. Thus, there is a lack of in-depth
explanations on the role played by buffer states in the international system, particularly in
sub-systems that are characterized by enmity.
The rationale for the usage of the India-Nepal-China buffer system is a culmination
of several factors. The rise of regional sub-systemic approaches to security studies,

Dabhade and Pant approach the trilateral relationship between India, China, and Nepal through an offensive
realist perspective without the buffer state concept being tackled. Literature related to Sino-Indian rivalry
touches mostly on security concerns between the two larger powers, with little attention paid to the conceptual
framework within which the buffer system operates.
132
Sanjay Upadhya, Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between India and China (New York,
NY: Routledge, 2012) – Upadhyaya’s book is rich in detail and history of this triadic relationship but it does
not incorporate the concept of the buffer state and also does not touch on the transformative nature of the
sub-systemic relationship, particularly when it comes to the changing context of geopolitical concepts
including that of the buffer state.

Andrew Bennett, “Case Study Methods: Design, Use, and Comparative Advantages,” in Cases,
Numbers, Models: International Relations Research Methods, eds. Detlef F. Sprinz and Yael Wolinsky (Ann
Arbor, MI: Michigan University Press, 2004), 38.
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increased attention to rising regional powers China and India, and the limitations in buffer
state literature all contributed to why the INCBS was chosen as the case study for the
dissertation. As it seeks to rekindle the importance of buffer states in regional security
dynamics, INCBS is a strategic and timely choice for the study. It is a dynamic case that
has a lot to offer the scant literature on buffer states and can be developed as a prototype
analytical framework which can be used to assess other buffer states. In addition, the
INCBS is precarious given the contending interests of China and India. Figure 3 showcases
the depiction of the INCBS while Figure 4 depicts its geographic representation.
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Figure 3: The India-Nepal-China Buffer System

Sub-system

71

Figure 4: Map of the India-Nepal-China Buffer System134
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Google Maps, 2017, Asia, accessed January 12, 2017,
https://www.google.com/maps/place/Asia/@30.136028,74.6637773,4.25z/data=!4m5!3m4!1s0x3663f18a2
4cbe857:0xa9416bfcd3a0f459!8m2!3d34.047863!4d100.6196553.
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Methodology
The proposed research design will be mixed method, incorporating elements of
qualitative and quantitative analyses. As Creswell and Clark (2011) posit, mixed
methodology’s “central premise is that the use of quantitative and qualitative approaches,
in combination, provides a better understanding of research problems than either approach
alone.”135 Both types of collected data, when analyzed together, contribute to better
understanding of the research problem. The rationale for using a mixed methodology rests
on complementarity as well as efforts to elaborate, enhance, illustrate, and clarify results
from one method with the results from the other method.136 A mixed methodology allows
the inclusion of multiple perspectives or more complete understandings of a research
problem; it helps in explaining quantitative data, which may not make sense when analyzed
as a standalone.137 Addressing the changing relevance of buffer states requires qualitative
work – the rhetoric utilized by the buffered states while addressing their neighboring states
as well as joint agreements signed by the buffered states with the buffer and foreign policy
statements of all states in the buffer system need to be analyzed to understand the changes
in their relations. This aspect of the mixed-methodology is henceforth titled Rhetorical
Engagement.
Apart from the Rhetorical Engagement aspect of the design, there needs to be
substantiation of the rhetoric emanating from the buffered states. To capture the
manifestation of such rhetoric in the buffer system, particularly in regard to the political
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competition within the buffer state, quantitative data was incorporated. Rhetoric itself is an
important aspect of diplomacy; nonetheless, its substantiation solidifies commitment. Such
reassurance may be in the form of monetary aid or tariff reduction, which greatly increases
the stake of the relationship. Quantitative data is essential in ascertaining the
increase/decrease in intensity of sub-systemic interactions in the buffer system. The
quantitative data collection and analysis portion of this mixed-methodology is part of the
Material Engagement aspect in the buffer system. The reinvigoration of competition and
the emergence of the buffer state as a competitive political space does not occur in a
vacuum; the rhetoric as well as ideational contextualization (Rhetorical Engagement)
occurs simultaneously or before/after Material Engagement in the buffer state. In essence,
a mixed methodology would allow for the comprehensive study of qualitative rhetorical
analysis of Rhetorical Engagement supported by tangible quantitative data of Material
Engagement; it helps in the explanation of how the buffered states use both material and
rhetorical means to interact with the buffer state.
The mixed method design best suited for the proposed research problem is the
convergent parallel design. It requires concurrent collection of quantitative and qualitative
data. Both data sets are analyzed independently followed by a combined interpretation.138
Quantitative and qualitative data are collected together and then analyzed separately; then,
the analyzed data are related and compared, followed by a collective interpretation.139 The
comparing and relating process is called Convergence/Divergence, which requires both
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data sets to be compared, contrasted, and synthesized. Finally, the Interpretation will
include the summarization and interpretation of the separate results in a combined form; it
will include discussions on the extent of convergence and divergence of the two data
analyses; the rationale for a combined interpretation is to produce a more complete
understanding of the research problem.140
The mixed-method approach in the form of a convergent parallel design fits this
study as the rhetoric (qualitative data/Rhetorical Engagement) might not always match
externalizations (quantitative data/Material Engagement); while officially addressing
harmony, the buffered states could possibly engage in competition in the buffer state or
vice-versa. In another case, the official rhetoric might concur with operationalization of
power in the buffer state. Thus, the convergent parallel design would help account for
rhetorical and material trajectories, while also providing a more complete set of tools for
interpretation. Figure 5 showcases the process of the convergent parallel design.
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Figure 5: The Convergent Parallel Design141

The purpose of the convergent parallel design rests on acquiring different but
complementary data,142 an exercise that is central in tracing and explaining the changing
role of buffer states. The qualitative data will allow the extrapolation of rhetoric associated
with sub-systemic power dynamics and how changes in such dynamics increase or decrease
the relevance of buffer states. Using the case study, the Sino-Indian dynamics is analyzed
through the major critical junctures and how they influence the role of Nepal as a buffer
state. Such critical junctures are “events that set processes of institutional/policy change in
motion.”143 Such critical junctures consist of “a crisis, ideational change, and radical policy
change.”144 In essence, critical junctures are set points in historical trajectories that set into
motion changes in policies. Within the context of this dissertation, critical junctures denote
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historical events that are used to assess changes in foreign policy behavior of the three
states that consist of the India-Nepal-China buffer system. These critical junctures are used
to usually denote higher levels of strategic concern for the buffered states due to
developments in the buffer state. In essence, critical junctures signal points of time that
entails increased strategic relevance of the buffer states for its neighbors. Such junctures
are characterized by shifts in policies of the buffered states towards the buffer state.
Given the limitation of space and time, the period between 1990145 to 2017 will be
analyzed in the dissertation. The aim is to collect qualitative and quantitate data (elaborated
in the succeeding sections) regarding Sino-Indian relations and their impact on Nepal’s
precarious positioning as a buffer state. It seeks to take into account major events in the
regional security environment, centering on the buffer state and whether these events had
any impact on the buffer role of Nepal i.e. how the buffered states reacted to these subsystemic dynamics that had major implications for the buffer state. Table 1146 highlights
these important critical junctures in Nepal that have implications for the ICNBS.
The years between 1990 to 2007 are characterized by highs and lows in Sino-Indian
relations but with immense domestic implications within Nepal. The year 1990 marked the
beginning of a constitutional monarchy in Nepal. The liberalization of political space
introduced a new set of institutions of governance, including new political actors.147 Thus,

145
The year 1990 is chosen as the starting point as it is the year Nepal became a multiparty
democracy with a constitutional monarchy. The democratization of political space also allowed the
emergence of a more transparent polity, allowing the push and pull factors in foreign policy to be more
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the years between 1990 to 2007 are heavily focused on domestic political developments in
Nepal; given the changes in political configurations within the country, implications for
the INCBS are immense. The King of Nepal was traditionally seen as a “balancer” of
Chinese and Indian influences in the country, having repeatedly sought Chinese support as
a strategy against Indian influence. On the contrary, domestic political parties during this
era were backed by New Delhi. Democratization was largely seen as a victory for Indian
influence in the country, with immense implications for the precarious INCBS.
The year 2008 marked the year that led to intensification of Chinese interest in
Nepal, a development associated with the riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region
(TAR).148 Thus, 2008 is the milestone year that marked an increase in Chinese interests in
South Asia and China’s attempts at wooing states that were traditionally considered within
the sphere of influence of India; the new adventurism of Beijing in South Asia can be traced
to China’s increased power capability. Coupled with increased Chinese interests, the year
2008 marked the shift of Nepal’s political status from a kingdom to a secular republic. 149

Political control of the government shifted from the monarch to popularly elected representatives
of political parties;
Jeffrey Reeves, “China’s Self-Defeating Tactics in Nepal,” Contemporary South Asia 20, no. 4
(2012): 526–27;
Reeves discusses several arguments regarding the strategic value of Nepal for the People’s Republic
of China (PRC). The first one rests on Nepal’s historic, cultural, and economic ties with Tibet; the PRC wants
to ensure that Nepal is not used as a base for anti-Chinese efforts. A second perspective promotes the idea
that Nepal’s importance rests on its ability to serve as a source of economic growth and development in the
TAR; Nepal could serve as a transit economy between TAR and the rest of South Asia. A third line of thinking
links Nepal’s untapped hydroelectricity potential with the prospects for TAR based companies to invest in
the country. Finally, Nepal’s role as a buffer prevents India from fostering anti-PRC forces in the TAR and
as such, holds immense strategic value for China.
148

Thapa and Sharma, “From Insurgency to De mocracy: The Challenges of Peace and DemocracyBuilding in Nepal.” 215;
In 2008, the first Constituent Assembly of Nepal abolished the monarchy, formally ending the rule
of the Shah dynasty and the monarchical tradition in the country.
149

78

Extended details on the periodization and the historical critical junctures are provided in
Chapter IV.
In the convergent parallel design, the quantitative data showcases whether the
qualitative rhetoric is coupled with tangible approaches used by the buffered states (India
and China) in the buffer state (Nepal). This section covers how the critical junctures,
explained as part of the qualitative data collection, appears in regard to actual policy
outcomes; as part of the quantitative analysis, this section includes the three socioeconomic
indicators: trade, foreign direct investment, and foreign aid. Analyzing the quantitative
aspect of the sub-systemic dynamics showcases how the qualitative rhetoric of changes in
sub-systemic dynamics plays out in the buffer state. It seeks to decipher the manner in
which increase/decrease of sub-systemic rivalry plays out in the buffer through tangible
indicators.
Overall, this mixed method study addresses the relevance of buffer states by
connecting the concept to changing sub-systemic power capabilities; changes in regional
power capabilities have implications for changing roles of buffer states, from one-sided
buffers to highly competitive political spaces for the buffered states. Through the singlecase study of the buffer system consisting of Nepal, India and China, this study examines
Nepal’s continued but changing role as a buffer between larger powers. A convergent
parallel design is utilized to analyze the rhetoric of political leaders as well as governments
of the states under study through qualitative data collection; concurrently, quantitative data
is analyzed to discern the physical manifestations of the rhetoric used, including whether
there is increased competition in the buffer state. Further details on the type of qualitative
and quantitative data collection are discussed in the following sections.
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Table 1: Historical Critical Junctures in Triadic Relations between India, China, and
Nepal
Date
1990
2001
2005
2008
2015
2017

Event
Democratization of Nepal
Nepalese Royal Family Massacre
Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy in Nepal
Riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region
End of the Nepalese Monarchy
The Nepal Earthquakes
Blockade of Nepal
Nepal’s Entry into China’s Belt & Road Initiative

Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis
Quantitative data collection also covered the time frame between 1990 to the
present. Three indicators were compared to ascertain how Sino-Indian competition in
Nepal plays out: trade (export and import figures in USD), Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI), and foreign aid. These are contextualized as tools for influencing the buffer state
and are used to decipher whether the relevance of the buffer state (i.e. Nepal) is heightened;
intensified competition with regards to the four aforementioned indicators showcase
heightened relevance of the buffer state for the buffered states. The data for the five
indicators were collected for the following years: 1989, 1990, 1991, 2000, 2001, 2002,
2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017. These years are based
on the historic critical junctures; it includes the years of these junctures as well as a year
before and after them. This data collection allows the deciphering of whether there were
substantial changes during critical junctures when compared with the pre- and post- critical
juncture periods. The before and after dates are included to decipher whether the critical
junctures saw spike/dip in the four indicators chosen.
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The usage of quantitative data rests on the parallel convergent design of this
proposed research; it seeks to ascertain whether changes in rhetoric (when they do take
place) during or after critical junctures are supported by tangible support from the buffered
states. The three indicators utilized as part of the quantitative data collection are used to
analyze how Sino-Indian competition plays out in Nepal’s role as a buffer – do critical
junctures lead to increase/decrease in these indicators? How do these changes in the usage
of material tools relate to the rhetoric analyzed under the qualitative section of this
research? The usage of these indicators aids in answering such questions directly connected
to the research question. Changing patterns in material and rhetorical relations during
critical periods and a comparison of the before/after levels of these indicators at critical
junctures help in explaining the dynamic nature of the buffer system. In addition, it also
aids in showcasing how changes in power capabilities, could allow the buffered states to
exert more influence in the buffer state against their contender.
To analyze the quantitative data, the Kruskal-Wallis Test was carried out to
measure the variance in means between the pre-, during, and post- critical juncture period
for the three dependent variables chosen. The Kruskal-Wallis Test is chosen to assess the
variance of trade, FDI, and aid, in the pre-, during, and post-critical juncture years. SPSS
22 is used for the quantitative analyses. This Test is the most suited quantitative test for the
study as it is a non-parametric test suitable for testing statistical significance between two
or more groups of an independent variable (pre-, during, and post-critical juncture periods)
on a continuous dependent variable. For example, the Kruskal-Wallis Test operates using
variances in mean figures for trade between Nepal-China and Nepal-India to find statistical
significance in the pre-, during, and post- critical juncture periods. Here, the independent
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variable (IV) is sub-systemic rivalry and the dependent variable is the buffer state’s
political relevance beyond just a geographical discontinuity, expressed in the form of trade,
foreign direct investment, and foreign aid. Furthermore, due to the limited quantitative data
used for this study, the Kruskal-Wallis Test (KWT) is the best suited nonparametric
alternative to the one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) that measures statistical
significance between two or more independent groups.
For the purpose of the study, the Independent Variable (IV) is divided into three
groups: pre-, during, and post-critical juncture. These are categorical designations coded
accordingly (for example, pre-critical juncture as 1; during critical juncture as 2; and postcritical juncture as 3). The Dependent Variables (CV) include trade, FDI, and foreign aid,
i.e. these three variables are dependent on the increase/decrease of sub-systemic rivalry
(IV). As for the qualitative data, the DV is based on the total number of official statements
from India and China regarding Nepal and the themes of positive and negative
affirmations.150 For example, if the critical juncture for 2008 is chosen, the KWT is carried
out to assess the DV in the pre-, during, and post-periods of the critical junctures. The KWT
aids in deciphering whether critical junctures impact the increase/decrease in
intensification of buffered state interactions in the buffer state through quantitative
analysis. Because critical junctures are points of contention in the buffer system, they are
considered to be periods of increased sub-systemic rivalry. Additionally,
Non-parametric correlations are carried out in conjunction with the KWT to assess
the trajectories of the dependent variables. These correlations allow the assessment of
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overall changes in the material engagement of India and China with Nepal over time. In
essence, the correlations were conducted to further assess increase or decrease in trade
(exports and imports), foreign direct investment (FDI), and foreign aid over time (pre-,
during, and post- critical juncture).

Based on the discussions of the variables, the overarching hypothesis of the
dissertation is as follows:

H1: If sub-systemic rivalries among Middle or Great powers envelop a small, buffer state,
then this rivalry will recover the buffer state’s political relevance beyond a simple
geographical discontinuity among rivalrous powers.

Based on the specification of the variables, the following hypotheses are tested:

H2: At critical junctures, trade figures will intensify between Nepal-India and Nepal-China
due to increase in sub-systemic rivalry.

H3: At critical junctures, FDI figures will intensify between Nepal-India and Nepal-China
due to increase in sub-systemic rivalry.

H4: At critical junctures, foreign aid figures will intensify between Nepal-India and NepalChina due to increase in sub-systemic rivalry.
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H5: At critical junctures, rhetorical engagement will intensify between Nepal-India and
Nepal-China due to increase in sub-systemic rivalry.

The hypotheses are formulated based on the assumption that critical juncture points
are periods of critical importance for the buffered states i.e. India and China; as such, there
will be intensification in both material and rhetorical engagement between Nepal and its
two neighbors. Here, intensification could mean increase or decrease, as these years can
also be points of lull in relations. Also, the dependent variables used in this study showcase
that the tools used by the buffered states are beyond the conceptualization of the buffer as
a geographic discontinuity. They are included to showcase that buffer states’ political
relevance is beyond just a geographic discontinuity; that interactions of Middle/Great
Powers in the buffer states showcase dynamic interactions using both material and
rhetorical tools.

Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis
The collection of qualitative data between 1990 to 2017 rests on major events
during this time frame, presented as critical junctures in the buffer system. Table 1151
illustrates the major critical junctures in each period, with implications for sub-systemic
dynamics between India and China. It includes events that had severe implications for the
internal political predicament of Nepal. Events of domestic political change include
changes in dynamics of Nepal’s relations with its two neighbors. As such, these events as
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included in the list as Nepal has attempted to balance its neighbors or sought to tilt to one
neighbor during such critical junctures. In essence, these critical junctures are chosen based
on their importance to Sino-Indian interactions pertaining to Nepal. While the riots in the
TAR did not occur in Nepal, the event had implications for political interactions between
India and China. The domestic security upheaval in the PRC had direct implications for its
foreign policy towards Nepal. Beijing took a more strident stance regarding the activities
of Tibetan refugees in Nepal after the event.152 Thus, this event is an exception as a critical
juncture, because it occurred outside of Nepal, but had implications for it within the larger
context of Sino-Indian interactions.
The emergence of a Sino-Indian competition can be traced back to the incorporation
of Tibet into the People’s Republic of China, an act that was highly resented by India.
Apart from the 2001 Nepalese Royal family massacre, all other events have involved a
shuffling of power capabilities (or perceptions thereof) at the regional level. The qualitative
data collection focuses on these major critical junctions as points of inference – it seeks to
analyze whether these events with sub-systemic implications led to increase/decrease in
rhetoric from India and China towards Nepal. Furthermore, these rhetorical statements are
evaluated to decipher patterns of change. These changes are analyzed based on whether
there were rhetorical differences in the pre-, during, and post- periods emanating from India
and China.
Qualitative data were collected for the following: intergovernmental agreements,
joint/unilateral foreign policy statements, official press releases, media briefings, and
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memoranda of understanding (MoUs). The data points used include the critical junctures
and a year before and after the critical juncture; the before and after years are included to
showcase whether there are changes (increase or decrease) in the three data sets collected
as part of the qualitative data analysis. The three time periods are included to ascertain
whether or not there have been any changes during the critical junctures. These analyses
were supplemented by archival data wherever possible. In the context of this research,
documents including treaties, press releases, and foreign policy statements153 were
considered for qualitative analysis. Such data helped to decipher the dynamic triadic
relations as well as whether there had been changes in rhetoric, especially during the critical
junctures presented in Table 1. The qualitative data collected were analyzed using the
process of content analysis. NVivo 11 is used as the tool for the qualitative research
analysis. This part of the mixed method will focus on the rhetorical engagement aspect of
the buffer system.
Joint intergovernmental agreements include bilateral cooperation on any field
pertaining to China-Nepal and India-Nepal relations. While not all bilateral agreements are
put into action, they signal rhetorical affirmation of closer ties or the attempt to bolster
bilateral ties. These joint agreements were collected from the respective departments of the
countries that deal with foreign affairs. Joint agreements included a wide variety of bilateral
issue areas such as trade or security. This variable only accounted for official joint
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Treaties, newspaper articles, and foreign policy statements pertaining to Sino-Indian, SinoNepalese, Indo-Nepalese, as well as the trilateral nexus of India-Nepal-China are included, given that
dynamics of Sino-Indian relations largely define their role in Nepal. Although most treaties and newspaper
articles pertaining to the aforementioned dynamics are available online, access to older foreign ministry and
embassy statements are supplemented by archival work.
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statements/agreements that the Government of Nepal has signed with the Governments of
India and China that are made available to the public.
Foreign policy statements include rhetorical reaffirmation of bilateral ties,
including the position of a state regarding developments in another state. Thus, foreign
policy statements included public position paper of a government regarding another
county. Furthermore, such statements included declarations of policy change (explicit or
implicit). This variable for the dissertation entailed foreign policy statements issued by
India and China regarding Nepal during the critical juncture years presented in Table 1.
Additional materials such as media briefings and statements from official spokespeople as
made available via the official websites of China and India on their relations with Nepal
were also included for the qualitative analysis part of the convergent parallel design.
Once the qualitative data was collected, content analysis was carried out using
NVivo 11. Content analysis is “the systematic, objective, quantitative analysis of message
characteristics.”154 Broadly, it is a method where the content of the message forms the basis
for drawing inferences and conclusions about the content.155 The content analysis aided in
analyzing whether there were trends in the qualitative data collected, including the
intensification of rhetoric based on the timeframe of Table 1. The increase or decrease in
the interest of China and India were operationalized based on several variables explained
below. NVivo 11 aided in deciphering general trends in rhetoric as well, categorizing them
based on whether or not they signaled a change in the significance of the buffer state in

154

Kimberly A. Neuendorf, The Content Analysis Guidebook, 2nd ed. (Thousand Oaks, CA:
SAGE Publications, Inc., 2017), 1.
155
David Nachmias and Chava Nachmias, “Content Analysis,” in Research Methods in the Social
Sciences (UK: Edward Arnold, 1976), 132–39..

87

relation to the critical junctures. As such, the qualitative analysis carried out using NVivo
11 complemented the quantitative analysis by providing rhetorical affirmation or
invalidation of the change in the role of the buffer. For this dissertation, Kimberly A.
Neuendorf’s typification of content analysis research that is included in her book titled The
Content Analysis Guidebook was used. Figure 6 showcases Neuendorf’s approach to
content analysis.
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Figure 6: Neuendorf’s Approach to Content Analysis156
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Neuendorf’s approach to content analysis provides a step-by-step process to carry
out content analysis. The rationale for the conduct of this study and the theoretical
framework are discussed in prior chapters. The next step entails conceptualization, which
was already discussed in the form of the research question and the hypothesis.
Content analysis is the qualitative aspect of the mixed-method research design used
for this dissertation. As the qualitative analysis seeks to analyze the intensity of subsystemic competition, the operationalization of the variables was based on the independent
variable: the sub-systemic rivalry between China and India. The study is based on the logic
that at critical junctures that are chosen, the competition intensifies and perhaps, leads to
increases in the immediate aftermath. Thus, the increase or decrease in intensity of subsystemic interaction in Nepal are operationalized.

Increase in intensity:
Increase in the overall number of the measures from India and China included in
the qualitative analysis. Increase in intensity of sub-systemic rivalry can include both
positive and negative affirmations.157

Decrease in intensity:
Decrease in the overall number of the measures from India and China included in
the qualitative analysis. Decrease in intensity of sub-systemic rivalry can include both
positive and negative affirmations.

157

Negative and positive affirmations are discussed on page 93.
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To accurately capture the increase or decrease in rhetorical intensity of subsystemic rivalry, two custom dictionaries are created using NVivo 11. A custom dictionary
is “a set of words, phrases, parts of speech, or other word-based indicators constructed by
the researcher to be used for search of texts.”158 While the total number of qualitative
artefacts may signal the increase or decrease in the intensity of relations, it is pertinent to
analyze whether it was positive or negative to assess if an increase in positive Indo-Nepali
reports is coupled with an increase in negative Sino-Nepali reports and vice-versa. To
assess whether an increase in positive interactions between India and Nepal was
accompanied by any lull in China-Nepal relations and vice-versa, two separate dictionaries
were created. The two dictionaries were used to decipher how interactions between NepalIndia and Nepal-China are presented in pre, during, and post-critical juncture periods.
The first dictionary, called “positive affirmation,” focuses on the theme of positive
bilateral relations; it is used to decipher if there is an increase/decrease in positive reports
on Nepal-India and Nepal-China relations before (pre), during, and after (post) the critical
junctures. It includes the following set of words and phrases, which are further explained
in the qualitative data analysis section of Chapter V:
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Positive affirmation:159
coop*

agree*

friend*

help*

aid*

dona*

“people to people”

affinity

engag*

connect*

assist*

collaborat*

partner*

harmony

recipro*

alliance

ally

As for negative affirmation, the focus is on rhetoric that is perceived as negative or
critical of the other party. Negative affirmation does not signal the decrease in
intensification of relations – it is used to assess whether positive affirmation in one dyadic
relation (say Nepal-India) is coupled by increased negative affirmation in the other dyadic
relation (say Nepal-China). This adds nuance to the usage of qualitative analysis and helps
to explain the nature of official rhetoric. The dictionary for negative affirmation includes
the following words and phrases:

Negative affirmation:
critic*

condemn*

cancel*

disapprov*

rebuk*

reprehen*

denounc*

castigat*

autocrat*

"oppose"

disappoint*

rebuttal

"human rights abuse"

"deeply concerned"

"gravely concerned"

decry

sanction*

159
* signifies iterations of the root word. For example, the word dona* in the dictionary includes
numerous possible iterations of the base “dona” including donations, donated, donating, and donate.
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These two dictionaries were applied through the Text Search Query in NVivo 11,
which helped in deciphering whether the rhetorical statements used for the dissertation
were positive or negative in their disposition. To complement the qualitative analysis, the
Word Count Query was also run on NVivo 11. This Query assessed the top five themes in
rhetorical statements in the pre-, during, and post-critical juncture periods.
The sampling for the qualitative aspect of the convergent parallel design, is the
buffer system of India-Nepal-China. The within case study uses the timeline of 1990-2017
to assess the historical critical junctures highlighted in Table 1. The sampling consists of
foreign policy statements, press briefings, official news from the respective Ministries and
Embassies, and joint agreements. These are discussed in detail in Chapter V.
The sampling set was assessed using the two custom dictionaries – positive
affirmation and negative affirmation. Word frequency tests were also carried out to
decipher if there was an increase or decrease in rhetorical engagement in the three time
frames chosen for this study. The results are reported in Chapter V. They are discussed in
Chapter VI in conjunction with the results of the quantitative analysis. Both analyses are
discussed and interpreted together as part of the conjunction of both methodologies through
Convergence/Divergence.
Overall, the research design for the dissertation is a mixed-method approach that
includes quantitative analysis in the form of the Kruskal-Wallis Test for the three chosen
dependent variables. The qualitative aspect of the research design includes the conduct of
content analysis using NVivo on the qualitative data that is collected. When both analyses
are carried out, the results are first organized in Chapter V, along with; Chapter VI includes
the individual analysis of the quantitative and qualitative results. It will also include the
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convergent discussion of both analyses and their collective interpretation. Figure 7
showcases the pictorial depiction of the convergent parallel design used for the analysis of
the INCBS in this dissertation.

Figure 7: Convergent Parallel Design used for the India-Nepal-China Buffer System

Qualitative Data Collection:
- Joint/unilateral foreign policy
statements
- Official press releases
- Media briefings
- MoUs

Content Analysis
• Word frequency
query
• Text search query
Convergence/Divergence

Historical Critical Junctures
(1990-2017)

Compare and Relate

• Kruskal Wallis Test
• Correlations

Quantitative Data Collection:
- Trade (exports/imports)
- Foreign Direct Investment
- Foreign aid
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Interpretation

CHAPTER IV: CRITICAL JUNCTURES IN THE INDIA-NEPAL-CHINA BUFFER
SYSTEM
The study of critical junctures is an ongoing academic endeavor with many
contextual definitions and uses. One of the earliest uses of the concept was by David
Collier, who defined it as “(1) a major episode of institutional innovation, (2) occurring in
distinct ways, (3) and generating an enduring legacy.”160 Historical critical junctures are
“events that set processes of institutional/policy change in motion.”161 They are points
within a timeframe which lead to changes in policies or strategies. A critical juncture
usually consists of a “crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change.” 162 Such crisis
situations lead to the creation of contexts where “change agents contest extant ideas and
the policies based upon them.”163 Figure 8164 depicts Donnelly and Hogan’s conception of
critical junctures, which is the base model for the modified conception of the critical
junctures used for this dissertation.
Another perspective considers critical junctures as “choice points when a particular
option is adopted from among two or more alternatives. These junctures are ‘critical’
because once an option is chosen, it becomes progressively more difficult to return to the
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initial point when multiple alternatives were still available.”165 The logic behind the critical
juncture concept rests on the idea that any shocks or aberrations in the system, directly or
indirectly, lead to changes in policies or strategies. Such critical junctures are points in
historical trajectories wherein states are faced with critical policy choices. In essence,
policy change remains an inherent part of these definitions as institutions are impacted by
critical junctures.
Critical junctures tie into the hypothesis of the dissertation, wherein the level of
strategic rivalry dictates the increased or decreased strategic value of the buffer state.
Additionally, critical junctures aid in understanding whether there are differences in
material and rhetorical changes before and after these junctures, which are reflective of the
interests of the buffered states vis-à-vis policy changes towards the buffer state. The critical
juncture concept is particularly applicable in buffer systems as the buffered states engage
in dynamic political interactions. As the buffer state is a highly contested geopolitical
space, frequent strategic calculations are pertinent to ensure the other buffered state does
not have an upper hand.
In the context of this dissertation, critical junctures are operationalized as policy
choice points in the timeline of the buffer system. The buffer system is highly dynamic and
as such, using the institutional change approach will require a focus on a long-time frame,
which is beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, the critical junctures in this dissertation are
timepoints in history that are characterized by ideational or policy changes, emanating from
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the buffered states. These critical junctures include events in the buffer system that had the
probability of triggering policy or strategic changes.
A modified version of Donnelly and Hogan’s conception of critical junctures as
historical points consisting of crisis, ideational change, and radical policy change is used
in this dissertation as it is the most prudent conceptual structure to analyze bilateral rivalry
of the buffered states and the conundrums of the trilateral buffer system. Figure 9
showcases this modified approach to Donnelly and Hogan’s model of critical junctures.
For the purpose of this dissertation, radical policy change is altered to just policy changes
as any radical changes in the buffer system are highly dangerous and highly unlikely to
occur. The focus of such changes is on the buffered states as they are materially more
powerful than the buffer state; additionally, it is the buffered states that are in competition
in the buffer system. Thus, attention is paid to historical events that had the potential to
shift interests or disrupt the “normal state of affairs” within the buffer system.
Table 1 in Chapter III166 illustrates the critical junctures chosen for this study. These
events between 1990 to 2017 highlight not simply changes within Nepal that warranted
attention from its contiguous neighbors India and China. The 2008 riots in the TAR is also
included as a critical juncture due to its implications for altering the political dynamics of
the buffer system. Specifically, the 2008 riots bolstered China’s interest in Nepal, given
the country’s shard land border with the Tibetan Autonomous Region. Thus, this chapter
provides details on the critical junctures chosen for the dissertation with discussions on
Nepal’s role as a buffer state between China and India.
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Figure 8: Donnelly and Hogan’s Conception of Critical Junctures

Crisis

Ideational change

Radical policy
change

Figure 9: Modified Conception of Critical Junctures

Crisis

Ideational change

Policy change

The years between 1990 and 2007 were characterized by internal political upheaval
in Nepal. This time period set the stage for Nepal’s emergence from centuries of
monarchical rule. The democratization process began in 1990, when “Jana Andolan I” or
“People’s Movement I” forced King Birendra to institute parliamentary democracy with
the monarchy as a figurehead. The early years of democratic governance were marred with
political infighting and popular discontent. Years of political disenchantment culminated
into the emergence of a Maoist rebellion in 1996.167 The massacre of King Birendra’s
family in 2001 followed, which was succeeded by the coronation of his brother,
Gyanendra, as the King of Nepal. The new monarch increasingly consolidated power,
leading to “Jana Andolan II” or “People’s Movement II”, which led to the abolishment of
the monarchy in 2008 and the emergence of Nepal as a secular republic that same year.
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This section describes in detail the four historical critical junctures between 1990 and 2007,
which are chosen for analysis in this dissertation. Each juncture entails domestic political
changes occurring in Nepal with implications for its relations with India and China.

Democratization of Nepal
Long isolated, Nepal opened its borders to the outside world in 1951. Following
the end of the autocratic rule of the Rana family, Nepal’s first experience with democracy
began in the same year. The erstwhile King of Nepal, Tribhuvan, successfully ended the
Rana Regime by going to exile in India and only returning after Indian pressures led to the
ouster of the Rana Prime Minister.168 The new democratic government, headed by the
Nepali Congress (NC) Party, was the country’s first experience with democratic rule. Lack
of institutional support and the absence of democratic political norms gave way to the
monarchy under Tribhuvan’s son Mahendra usurping power in 1960.169 King Mahendra’s
absolute monarchy, also called the panchayat system, was characterized by the lack of any
public space for political parties. The Nepali monarchy, since the time of King Mahendra,
had long been considered the institution that checked India’s influence in Nepal. The
appeal to China as a check against what were considered Indian political interference was
even accorded a name – the China Card. This entailed using China as a bulwark against
Indian interests in the country. The 1990 Jana Andolan I witnessed Indian pressure on King

168

Thapa and Sharma, “From Insurgency to Democracy,” 207.

169

Ibid.

100

Birendra to hand over power to the political parties, while China refrained from
commenting on the domestic developments in Nepal.
After his coronation as the King of Nepal in 1955, Mahendra sought extensive ties
with China.170 Mahendra bolstered Nepalese nationalism given his country’s precarious
geopolitical position between two much larger powers. As such, he sought to reduce
Nepal’s dependence on its traditional partner, India, and increase his country’s interactions
with China.171 Mindful of India’s preponderance, Mahendra was careful not to antagonize
India. He solidified the concept of “equidistance” in Nepali foreign policy. It manifested
itself in Nepal’s neutrality during the Tibetan uprising in 1959; Mahendra asserted the
following:

“Nepal is a test case as to whether a small country situated between two
big countries (India and China) can in the realities of power relations in
the mid-twentieth century would preserve its independence, freedom and
sovereignty in its own way and manner.”172

Mahendra’s son, King Birendra, ascended to the throne in 1972 after King
Mahendra’s death. He continued the absolute rule of his father but agreed to hold a national
referendum in 1980; the contentious results of the referendum supported the continuation
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of the partyless panchayat system.173 It was only in 1990 that King Mahendra’s son
Birendra ushered in Nepal’s second experience with democracy. Nepal’s democratization
in 1990 was initiated as a non-violent movement, spearheaded by the Nepali Congress.174
The movement, called Jana Andolan I, was called off only after King Birendra’s
announced the end of the ban on political parties. The King was faced with extensive public
pressure,175 which led to Nepal’s transition from an absolute monarchy under King
Birendra to a constitutional monarchy.
The democratization period is essential in understanding Sino-Indian dynamics in
Nepal. It was the 1988-89 border blockade by the Indian administration under Rajiv Gandhi
that exacerbated democratic aspirations in Nepal.176 Additionally, India had long supported
democratic forces in Nepal, including one of its oldest political parties – the Nepali
Congress.177 The Nepalese monarchy, especially King Mahendra, had long sought to check
Indian interests in Nepal. However, the initiation of democratic governance under a
constitutional monarchy changed the domestic political context within Nepal. India’s
commitment to democracy in Nepal had long contributed to the monarchy’s tumultuous
relationship with India. As such, the democratization of Nepal is a critical juncture in the
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buffer system as the opening up of political space and the curtailing of power of the
monarchy with its pro-China bent, had implications for the country’s relations with its two
neighbors. The crisis in this instance was the call for democratization of the political space
in Nepal. The ideational change was the shift from an absolute monarchy to a constitutional
monarchy, which heralded significant democratization in Nepal. The policy changes were
largely tied to the shift of power from the monarchy to political parties. The political parties
were supported by New Delhi while the monarchy had time and again played the “China
Card.” As such, the democratization of Nepal was an instance of critical juncture in the
India-Nepal-China buffer system as the political parties of Nepal were viewed as more proIndia than the monarchy.

Nepalese Royal Family Massacre
On June 1 2001, Nepal faced its first major political crisis since the Jana Andolan
I of 1990. The erstwhile Crown Prince Dipendra massacred over a dozen members of the
royal family, including King Birendra and Queen Aishwarya. King Birendra’s brother,
Gyanendra, had survived the murderous rampage due to his absence from the weekly
dinner during which time the massacre occurred.178 As such, Gyanendra was crowned the
13th King of united Nepal.179 The backdrop of Nepal’s raging Maoist rebellion made the
royal family massacre a politically sensitive and disastrous development. The government,
already weakened by a Maoist guerrilla group that controlled more than half of the country
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by 2001, found itself in a precarious position given that King Birendra enjoyed immense
support from the populace.180 King Gyanendra was not very popular amongst the Nepalis;
his son Paras, who was soon to be Crown Prince, much less so.181 Paras had long been
known for disregarding public law and also killing a famous musician in a hit-and-run
case.182 As for Gyanendra, he was long considered to be disgruntled with Birendra over the
cessation of power to the civil political parties.183 Gyanendra and his son did not enjoy the
goodwill that was extended to Birendra; this led to the speculation that the monarchy faced
a tumultuous future in Nepal.
The shift of the largely ceremonial role of the King of Nepal from Birendra to
Gyanendra is a critical juncture as it highlighted the shift in the role of the Nepali Army.
Since the democratization of Nepal in 2001, the monarch had ceded power to a
democratically elected parliament. Yet, the Nepali Army was still under the control of the
King of Nepal.184 The situation was more complicated as a civil war launched by the
Maoists was raging during the massacre of the royal family. The Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist), unhappy with the Nepali Congress led government, announced a “People’s War”
in 1996; it sought to establish a “people’s republic” by abolishing the monarchy.185 It grew
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as a move to address vast inequities in Nepal’s socioeconomic landscape. King Birendra
had long refused to deploy the Royal Nepal Army, arguing that he could not mobilize the
Army against his own subjects.186 The end of King Birendra’s reign had serious
implications for the Nepali Civil War; King Gyanendra had the predisposition to use the
armed forces against the Maoists, which he did after being crowned the King of Nepal in
2001.187 Thus, the Nepali royal family massacre had implications that had the ability to
impact the stability of the country. As such, both of its neighbors, India and China, had
paid close attention to the situation. The monarchy was seen as the one institution in Nepal
that had time and again turned to China to balance India’s preponderance in the country.188
On the contrary, the political parties, particularly the Nepali Congress, had long enjoyed
the support of India, which had time and again expressed dissatisfaction with the Nepali
monarch.189 Thus, the change in the monarch in Nepal would have implications for the
whole buffer system.
The crisis for this critical juncture was the abrupt ending of King Birendra’s reign
and the plunging of Nepal into political turmoil. It was a crisis given the prospects of shifts
in internal security dynamics and foreign relations of Nepal. The ideational change that
accompanied the royal family massacre was the political disposition of the new monarch.
The willingness of Gyanendra to utilize the Royal Nepali Army against the Maoists and

186

Hutt, “Monarchy, Maoism and Democracy in Nepal,” 96.

John Mage, “The Nepali Revolution and International Relations,” Economic and Political
Weekly 42, no. 20 (2007): 1835.
187

188

Rama Kant, “Nepal’s Foreign Policy and China,” 206.

189
Sinderpal Singh, India in South Asia: Domestic Identity Politics and Foreign Policy from
Nehru to the BJP (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), p.41.

105

his dissatisfaction with his brother’s acquiescent to democratic reforms signaled a change
in the ideational outlook of the monarchy, which would have ramifications for the buffer
system given that the monarchy had a history of using the “China Card” and the political
parties enjoyed support from India. Thus, the policy changes after the royal family
massacre were tied to domestic politics in Nepal, namely changes towards the Maoists.
Gyanendra had long favored the use of a military solution to the civil war, which would be
a stark departure from Birendra’s refusal to mobilize the Royal Nepali Army.

Suspension of Parliamentary Democracy in Nepal
Following the royal family massacre of 2001, King Gyanendra came to power. The
Maoist rebellion that was raging across Nepal’s hinterlands had severe implications for law
and order of the country, which was exacerbated by the crisis in the royal palace. Unlike
King Birendra, Gyanendra disposition was to quickly mobilize the Royal Nepali Army
against the Maoists.190 King Gyanendra, wary of the performance of the democratically
elected government against the Maoists, dissolved parliament in 2002.191 The reasoning
behind the dissolution of parliament was the failure of the civilian government to negotiate
with the Maoists.192 A new Head of Government was instated, but constitutional
democracy had been severely weakened due to the concentration of power in the monarchy.
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Subsequently, in 2005, King Gyanendra assumed absolute power, ending the era of
constitutional monarchy established in 1990.193 The King not only dissolved elected
representatives; he sought to curtail the freedom of the media. According to an interview
with Julia Heming of the Columbia Journalism Review’s online CJR Daily, Kunda Dixit,
one of Nepal’s most prominent journalists and the founding editor of the Nepali Times
stated that, “for the first two weeks (after the coup), there were actual soldiers in the
newsroom with guns, especially in radio stations, TV stations, internet service providers
and daily newspapers.”194 Thus, the 2005 coup witnessed the suspension of all forms of
civil rights accorded by the 1990 constitution; Nepal effectively became an absolute
monarchy. On 1 February 2005, in his proclamation to the nation, King Gyanendra
declared:

“Nepal’s independence, national unity and sovereignty are best safeguarded by the intimate relationship between the King and people. An
institution of monarchy ever devoted to the country and people and a people
with an innate love for their land is the glorious history of the kingdom of
Nepal, its present and also its future.”195
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India found itself in a difficult predicament. It feared that the Maoist rebellion in
Nepal would spill across the border and form ties with its own homegrown Naxalite
movements.196 On the other hand, India has had historical ties with Nepal’s democratic
political parties, particularly the Nepali Congress. The coup was met with intense criticism
from the Government of India, which had long supported the establishment of democracy
in Nepal.197 On the contrary, China had explicitly stated that the royal coup was an internal
matter of Nepal, and thus, not condemning usurpation of power by the monarch.198 In fact,
China was one of the first countries to distance itself from the Maoists; Beijing refused to
recognize them as “Maoists.”199 Thus, the suspension of parliamentary democracy in Nepal
witnessed two very divergent approaches from its neighbors. Given the fact that it had
severe implications for Nepal’s role as a buffer, this event is an important historical
juncture for the buffer system under study. Furthermore, King Gyanendra’s pro-China
stance has implications for Nepal’s role as a buffer, especially since it had long been
considered to be under India’s security umbrella.
The crisis in this critical juncture is the royal coup of 2005; it led to a dramatic shift
in Nepal’s domestic political dynamics. The constitutional monarchy was dissolved to give
way to an absolute monarchy with King Gyanendra at the helm. The raging Maoist
rebellion made the situation volatile as fears were growing that Nepal would become a
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failed state. The ideational change during this critical juncture is the shift from a
constitutional monarchy to an absolute monarchy. Similar to the shifts in 2001, the 2005
coup exacerbated the militaristic outlook of the monarchy in solving the civil war. Policy
changes at this juncture could include shifts away from democratic institutions. From the
perspectives of the buffered states, India and China, changing internal political make-up
posed new challenges. Democratic India found itself in a predicament with an antidemocratic monarch who used the China Card previously on one side and the Maoists with
grave internal security threats for its own country. Also, the democratic political parties
that India had long supported found themselves in a difficult predicament. As for China,
growing international concerns regarding King Gyanendra’s growing authoritarianism and
the change in Nepal’s domestic politics posed new policy challenges, that would
necessitate policy changes.
Beginning with the riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) of China in
2008, subsequent years have witnessed intensified efforts by Beijing to bolster ties with
Nepal, much to the chagrin of India. The period between 2008 and 2017 includes
contentions in Indo-Nepali relations, especially in the form of a full blown economic
blockade in 2015.

Riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region
Riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) of the People’s Republic of China
in 2008 were the worst protests to hit the region since the Tibetan Uprising of 1959. It
erupted in March 2008 after protests by supporters of Tibetan Buddhist monks, arrested for
celebrating the conferring of the US Congressional Gold Medal to the Dalai Lama,
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escalated into full-fledged riots.200 It coincided with the 49th anniversary of the failed
Tibetan Uprising in 1959, which eventually led to the departure of the Dalai Lama from
Tibet to India. The riots were a public relations disaster for the Chinese government as they
were hosting the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. The riots coincided with numerous
disruptions during the Olympics torch rallies by pro-Tibetan groups throughout the world,
highlighting serious charges of human rights abuses in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.201
The situation in the TAR in 2008 was the gravest for Beijing’s internal security
since the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. The Government quickly deployed riot police
and took control of the provincial capital Lhasa; it included the deployment of tanks and
soldiers as well the blocking of all lines of communication with the city. 202 The riots also
assumed an ethnic dimension, as tensions rose between the ethnic Tibetans and the Han
Chinese. The riots spread outside of the TAR into other provinces with ethnic Tibetan
populations, namely Sichuan, Qinghai, and Gansu.203 Many of the protests were led by
Buddhist monks, who were placed under strict surveillance after the riots subsided. The
Chinese Communist Party (CCP) took the riots seriously, given that the Olympic Games
were to be held the same year in Beijing. The internal security situation in the TAR had
implications beyond the region; Chinese authorities banned climbers from the northern side
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of Mount Everest.204 While it was obvious that the administration in Beijing would enforce
such a temporary policy in the TAR, the 2008 riots were to change its relations with its
much smaller neighbor to the south, Nepal. Following the climbing ban from the northern
side of Mount Everest, the government in Kathmandu followed suit. Nepalese authorities
dispatched two dozen armed security personnel, enforced a climbing ban above 6,500
meters, and banned laptops and satellite and internet communication from Everest Base
Camp.205 It is pertinent to decipher Beijing’s pressure on Kathmandu for a proper
understanding of the inner workings of the buffer system.
Nepal is home to the second largest Tibetan refugee population in the world.
Numbering over 20,000 individuals, the Tibetan refugees in Nepal have long garnered
China’s concerns.206 Since the establishment of diplomatic ties, China had long used the
set of policies called the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence towards Nepal; just like
its interactions with other developing states, China had maintained preference for noninterference.207 Despite its global commitment to a “no strings attached” diplomacy, China
had become wary of the substantial Tibetan refugee population in Nepal, who had
increasingly become vocal in their protests. Beijing sought to pressure the Government of
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Nepal to curb the political activities of Tibetan refugees. In 2005, the Nepali monarch,
King Gyanendra, had effectively shut down two major Tibetan organizations: the office of
the Dalai Lama’s representative in Nepal and the Refugee Welfare Office.208 The shutting
down of the Refugee Welfare Office was a severe blow for the Tibetan refugees in Nepal
as it was the last organization to help them get identity cards and prevent their forcible
repatriation to China. The riots of 2008 further exacerbated these concerns; Chinese
officials sought to adopt a hardhanded approach to the tumultuous relationship with ethnic
Tibetans, be it within the TAR or neighboring states. Thus, 2008 was the watershed year
for Sino-Nepali relations; it is considered a critical juncture in the context of this
dissertation as it highlighted a significant shift in foreign policy of China towards Nepal.
Beijing had long maintained an arm’s distance in dealing with Kathmandu. The
aftermath of the 2008 riots in TAR witnessed a more active foreign policy approach. For
the first time in bilateral relations between China and Nepal, the Embassy of China in Nepal
arranged USD 10 million to be granted to the Nepali Police for purchase of Chinese riot
shields and batons.209 This move is evidently tied to periodic protests by Tibetan groups in
front of the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu. Additionally, coordination between the
security apparatus in China and Nepal became closer; the evidence of this is the number of
Tibetans fleeing from TAR into Nepal. Between 1991-2008, the number of Tibetan
refugees fleeing into Nepal averaged 2,200 individuals per year; the number had dropped
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to 171 individuals per year between 2008-2013.210 Thus, the year 2008 represents a major
critical juncture in the buffer system, as China increasingly projected its interests in Nepal.
Operationalizing the critical juncture variable in this case, it is evident that there
was an ideational change, particularly regarding China’s conception of Nepal in its foreign
policy. The crisis was the riots in China, which set off a scurry of concerns for China and
emanated into increased interests in Nepal due to its large Tibetan refugee population. The
ideational change was largely connected to China’s perception of Nepal as a country of
strategic security concern, due to its proximity to the TAR. This ideational change
culminated in policy changes, wherein China’s pledges to Nepal increased substantially
and the curbs on Tibetan refugees became more intense. Nepal gained importance in
China’s foreign policy objectives, as it was integral to the TAR’s stability due to its
geographic contiguity with the country.
Thus, the year 2008 was a critical juncture in the INCBS as the riots in the Tibetan
Autonomous Region sparked policy changes. Such changes in China’s foreign policy
towards Nepal has implications for the INCBS as China’s increasing interests in Nepal are
considered a security challenge to India’s preponderance in the country. As the traditional
power to maintain almost absolute influence in Nepal, the rise of China’s interests in the
country was definitely a critical juncture for the buffer system as a whole as ideational
changes occur in Nepal and India as well. India’s ideational changes were tied to its
increasing concerns over China’s interests in Nepal. As for Nepal, the shift signifies its
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growing importance in Sino-Indian interactions and an alternative to India’s
preponderance.

End of the Nepali Monarchy
While the riots in the TAR had severe implications for Chinese policies towards
Nepal, the internal politics in the country was far from stable. Since the dissolution of
elected parliament in 2005 and the beginning of absolute monarchy, King Gyanedra had
managed to isolate himself inside and outside Nepal. India was critical of the suspension
of democratic rule in Nepal; other international actors such as the US and the EU criticized
his move as well and postponed military support that they had offered to fight against the
Maoists.211 The suspension of democracy by Gyanendra spurred collaboration between the
civilian political parties (called the Seven Party Alliance or SPA)212 and the warring
Maoists. The concentration of power in the monarchy brought together factions that were
long separated by ideological cleavages. Briefly after King Gyanendra’s coup in 2005, the
second-in-command of the Maoists, Baburam Bhattarai declared:
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“A brief recapitulation of the incessant struggle between the
monarchy and democracy since the 1950s in the country should leave no
one in any doubt that without the complete abolition of the archaic
institution of feudal monarchy and its puppet army, no form of democracy
can be secure and institutional in Nepal.”213

In 2005, both parties met in New Delhi to join forces to end autocratic rule by the
monarchy.214 The royal coup encouraged both democratic forces and the Maoists to
collaborate in ousting the monarchy. Subsequently in April 2006, over three million Nepali
people out of a total population of 23 million took part in Jana Andolan II – the second
mass uprising for democracy.215 The movement permeated beyond political parties and
included extensive participation from the public. On 28 April 2006, given enormous
domestic and international pressure, King Gyanendra conceded and handed power back to
the Parliament that was dissolved by him in 2005. 216 Lack of military support from external
powers such as India, the US, and the UK meant that Gyanendra found himself isolated.
He could not maintain military superiority against the Maoists without external support.
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Internally, almost all domestic institutions, save the Royal Nepal Army, had turned against
the King.
Following the success of Jana Andolan II, the Maoists laid down arms and joined
the political mainstream becoming a prominent player in Nepal’s post-civil war multiparty
democracy. The movement not only led to the end of the Nepali civil war; a strong wave
of anti-monarchy fervor was present and political parties acted on its behest. The
Parliament, specifically, the lower house called the House of Representatives proceeded to
remove the “royal” from all institutions associated with the state. The House issued
proclamations that removed the words “His Majesty’s” and “Royal” from all organs of the
state; “His Majesty’s Government of Nepal” became “the Government of Nepal”; and the
only state institution still loyal to the King until his last days as absolute monarch, the
“Royal Nepalese Army” became “the Nepal Army.”217 The democratic parties and the
Maoists had reached a deal to curtail the monarchy’s political power, which it maintained
through the control of the national army.
The interim parliament, which Gyanendra restored, drafted an interim constitution
on 24 August 2006.218 The interim constitution had one crucial omission: the mention of
anything related to the monarchy. It also fixed the first Constituent Assembly election to
be held on 10 April 2008.219 The Government of Nepal further curtailed the rights of the
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monarch by revoking all of his powers and declaring Nepal a secular state in 2006.220 In
November of the same year, the SPA and Maoists signed the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA), officially ending the civil war; Maoist weapons were placed under the
supervision of the United Nations (UN).221 The first Constituent Assembly elections in
Nepal resulted in the surprise victory of the Maoists, who won 30% of the popular vote.222
With the Maoists leading in the first Constituent Assembly polls, the question of the
monarchy became even more precarious. As expected, the May 28, 2008 convening of the
Constituent Assembly of Nepal voted to abolish the monarchy; 560 out of the 575 members
of the CA voted for its abolishment.223 Thus, the Hindu Kingdom of Nepal became a
secular, federal, democratic, and republican state.224
The end of the Nepalese monarchy is a major critical juncture in this buffer system
as Nepal’s domestic political institutions changed significantly with the abolishment of the
monarchy. As stated earlier, the monarchy had long been considered a strong actor for
maintaining a balance between India and China. With the abolishment of that institution,
the dynamics for change within Nepal were obvious as all of the political parties that
contested the first Constituent Assembly elections had forged a deal in New Delhi in 2005,
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under the behest of the Government of India.225 While China had backed King Gyanendra
citing it as an internal matter of Nepal, it did tacitly support the monarchy by providing
limited military support to the Royal Nepali Army.226 With the new secular and republican
system of governance, both India and China had to reformulate their foreign policy
objectives in a radically different domestic political context in Nepal.

The Nepal Earthquakes
The other major critical juncture in the buffer system was the set of earthquakes
that struck Nepal in 2015. On 25 April 2015, an earthquake measuring 7.8 on the Richter
Scale struck Nepal; the epicenter was the district of Gorkha in central Nepal.227 The country
was already one of the most impoverished in the world with weak infrastructure and
institutional capacity. The second earthquake occurred on 12 May 2015, further
exacerbating concerns over recovery efforts. India and China were swift in deploying
disaster relief. Natural disasters have the potential to change the nature of relationships;
thus, such occurrences are potential critical junctures.228 Both India and China sought to
extend their influence through this critical juncture; the earthquakes presented both the
buffered states with the opportunity to bolster their influence in the buffer. Despite
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humanitarian concerns, the underlying strategic competition tied to disaster diplomacy
cannot be ignored in this case.229
In the immediate aftermath, China deployed a 62-member International Search and
Rescue Team; alongside, Beijing arranged for emergency relief materials, including 20million-yuan worth of tents, blankets, and generators.230 India’s response was swifter and
was the largest of any country that responded to the disaster. Named “Operation Maitri,”231
India mobilized 295 members of its National Disaster Response Force (NDRF); it was also
the first responder to the disaster.232 As for technical support, India deployed over 13
military aircrafts, including one C-130J, two C-17s, and one IL-76.233 As for active
personnel, China and India had 370 and 962 members respectively.234 A notable absence
was that of Chinese military aircraft; while India deployed its air force without much delay,
China’s relief operations largely relied on cargo planes. This could perhaps be a function
of India’s sensitivities regarding China’s activities in Nepal. Nevertheless, political
maneuvering was inherently tied to the relief efforts. Kathmandu rejected teams from
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Taiwan from aiding in the relief efforts but did accept medical relief.235 Both China and
India made pledges for Nepal’s long-term reconstruction as well. At the International
Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction held on June 25, 2015 in Kathmandu, India pledged
$1 billion and China $500 million for the long-term reconstruction efforts in the country.236
Thus, India’s response was much larger, and its pledges were more prominent than China’s.
Despite India’s responses being much larger than China’s, the benefits from such
maneuverings were limited. Directed at the Indian media outlets for crude conduct and
overstepping professional conduct, the hashtag “#GoHomeIndianMedia” trended in Nepal
during the relief efforts.237 The Indian relief effort was the largest contingent among all the
countries that participated in the relief efforts; nevertheless, the public backlash against the
Indian media houses undercut much of the goodwill garnered from disaster diplomacy. On
the other hand, China quietly reaped the benefits of its quiet diplomacy, despite investing
less than India in the rescue and reconstruction efforts in Nepal.
The Nepal earthquakes presented themselves as possible points of departure for the
states in the buffer system; it was a prime opportunity for the buffered states to woo the
buffer. It is a critical juncture as the natural disaster was the crisis that had the potential to
set-off ideational change, particularly regarding strategic gains made by India and China
in Nepal. While India approached it in terms of quantity, China strategically used disaster
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diplomacy to its advantage. As such, prospects for policy change from the Indian side is
paramount as investment in disaster diplomacy did not the reap the intended benefits.

Blockade of Nepal
The earthquakes in Nepal posed serious challenges to state capacity and legitimacy
of the democratic forces. These earthquakes exacerbated the internal political issues within
the country as public anger grew against government ineffectiveness in the face of a major
natural disaster. The political parties in Nepal had failed to promulgate a new Nepali
constitution following the declaration of the country as a federal republic in 2008. The
Constituent Assembly elected in 2008 failed; thus, a second one was called in 2013, which
had largely failed to follow through with the delivery of a new constitution. The
earthquakes served as a motivation for completing it, which the parties did.
The Nepali Constitution of 2015 that was passed by the new Constituent Assembly
was not accepted by all sectors of Nepali society. The ethnic groups residing in southern
Nepal, collectively called the Madhesis, expressed their concerns regarding the new
constitution. Decentralization was a major theme of the new federal structure adopted in
2008; the new constitution failed to accord proportional representation of all of Nepal’s
ethnic groups, most prominently the Madhesis.238 The southern Nepalis have largely been
accused of “Indian agents” by the mostly high caste Hindu hill elites due to the affinity of
Madhesis with Indians across the border. Thus, the new constitution was perceived by
Madhesis as a means of maintaining the dominance of Nepal’s hill elites; the new
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constitution demarcated provinces in such a way that hill groups were still dominant in
almost all of them. Additionally, naturalized citizens – including those with mixed Indian
and Nepali parentage (which a significant portion of Madhesis share) – were barred from
running for a range of public positions, including the presidency and the heads of security
agencies.239 The adoption of the new constitution prompted Madhesi based political parties
to form the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), which led waves of agitations
against the promulgation of the new constitution. Citing domination from the hill elites,
the UDMF sought to champion the rights of marginalized Madhesis in southern Nepal.
On September 20, 2015, the second Constituent Assembly in Nepal adopted the
new constitution. As soon as it did so, India expressed displeasure; it “noted” the adoption
of the new charter.240 India urged the political parties in Nepal to make the new constitution
as inclusive as possible. Nevertheless, the lack of enthusiasm in New Delhi was perceived
as covert Indian interference in Nepal. The UDMF launched agitation in the south,
crippling the movement of goods and services across the Indo-Nepali border. Nepal relies
almost exclusively on India for trade. As such, the agitation by Madhesi groups led to
widespread shortage of gas, diesel, kerosene, and cooking gas in all of Nepal’s’ hilly and
mountainous regions – areas already severely impacted by the earthquakes in April of
2015.241 India rejected claims that it was orchestrating an economic blockade on Nepal,
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instead blaming the Madhesi parties for the stoppage of economic activities. While the
Madhesi groups launched agitations throughout southern Nepal, the Indian security
personnel prevented cargo trucks from crossing into Nepal.242 The standoff prompted a lull
in bilateral relations between India and Nepal, touted as being at its worst in decades.
The blockade led to widespread shortage of essential fuels in major cities across
Nepal. The economic hardship during this period prompted the Nepali government to
reduce its dependence on India. In December 2015, the Government of Nepal announced
plans to construct three fuel depots, each with a capacity of 6,000 kiloliters of petrol with
the aid of the Chinese government.243 The Nepali Government also requested Beijing to
expand the Araniko Highway which connects the two countries.244 While Nepal was
increasingly looking to China for respite, the humanitarian crisis within the county
exacerbated. Due to shortages in essential vaccines and medications, the United Nations
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) projected over three million children under the age of five to
be adversely affected.245 Risk of hypothermia and malnutrition existed, especially in the
immediate aftermath of the devastating earthquakes of April and May. Goodwill for India
garnered during the earthquake relief efforts evaporated; a whole new generation of
Nepalis were faced with the reality wherein their day to day activities were disrupted due
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to the Indian efforts to dictate its way into Nepal’s constitution (albeit using the proxy of
the Madhesi groups). Rajan Bhattarai, a member of parliament and a Central Committee
member of the UML party in Nepal, stated the following:

“We have a rich, multidimensional relationship with India as a result of our
shared geography, culture and history, and we want to continue it. But India
must recognise that we are two different sovereign nations. We have a right
to choose our own constitution, which was passed by an overwhelming
majority. India cannot demand an amendment. We will decide what’s best
for us.”246

The blockade by India brought to the fore the perpetual question in Nepal – that of
overdependence on India. Nepal turned to China to alleviate some of its problems with fuel
shortages. Beijing agreed to provide 1.3 million liters of gasoline to Nepal, the first time
that such a supply was delivered.247 It was only on 8 February 2016, after five months of
its initiation, that the UDMF lifted the blockade and officially ended shortages of essential
fuels in the country. The blockade cost Nepal $5 billion in financial loss, on top of the $7
billion damage caused by the earthquake.248 While India and Nepal moved forward to mend
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ties, the damage was apparent. In October 2015, Nepali Oil Corporation and PetroChina –
both state-run companies – signed a memorandum of understanding of future trade, which
would break India’s 40-year old monopoly on Nepal’s oil imports.249 Thus, the blockade
of Nepal was a significant departure, particularly over the question of fuel transportation.
There was an inherent realization in Nepal’s political elites of its vulnerability to Indian
pressures; further integration with China, albeit more challenging due to topographic and
demographic considerations, would prove fruitful for decreasing reliance on Indian
preponderance in Nepal.

Nepal’s Entry into China’s Belt and Road Initiative
The One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative, later renamed the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), is a massive undertaking of economic integration led by China.250 The
Government of the People’s Republic of China calls it the New Silk Road, although it also
includes maritime trade routes.251 The Initiative was launched in 2013 by Premier Xi
Jinping, with an initial pledge of $40 billion.252 The BRI sought to connect road and sea
routes between China and the countries in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and Europe, with
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South Asia being included later. As of June 2017, the PRC has committed $1.4 trillion to
the initiative, which seeks to integrate trade links in Eurasia by the development of
infrastructure including roads, rail, airports, ports, pipelines, and communications.253 The
BRI incorporates two components: the land-based “Silk Road Economic Belt” and the
seagoing “21st Century Maritime Silk Road.”254 Figure 10 highlights the magnitude of this
massive undertaking.
The economic rationale for the BRI largely rests on China’s long-term strategic
goals. It is currently dependent on its eastern seaboard and the Malacca Strait near
Singapore, which is a possible strategic bottleneck.255 As depicted in Figure 11,256 Titled
the “Malacca Dilemma,” Beijing has long sought to reduce its reliance in the sea routes
passing through Malacca Straits and the BRI is designed to do just that. The China-Pakistan
Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the development of Gwadar Port in Pakistan is a means of
circumventing the Malacca Straits; China is doing the same in energy-rich Central Asia by
integrating land-based trade routes.257
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Figure 10: China’s Belt and Road Initiative

The BRI was institutionalized through the Belt and Road Forum (BRF), which
convened for the first time on 14 May 2017. Over fifty countries sent their heads of states
or government representatives to the Forum, including Nepal. Just two days before on 12
May, Nepal had signed a memorandum of understanding with China to participate in the
BRI.258 The Government of India strongly objected to Nepal’s joining of the BRI,
particularly since India has refused to become a part of the BRI. 259 India also refused to
send official delegates to the first BRF. Thus, Nepal’s entry into the BRI was a major
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critical juncture as it joined the initiative despite India’s security concerns. Since the entry
of Nepal into BRI, China has committed to expand high-speed railway line up to Nepal’s
border and expand it into the country’s south, to Lumbini, which is Buddha’s birthplace
and a major site of the religion’s pilgrimage circuit.260 The prospects of such an extension
of railroad is problematic for India, as Lumbini is less than an hour away from India’s
border.

Figure 11: The Malacca Straits261
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The BRI is a major strategic undertaking of China with extensive importance for
the buffer system under study. China is the initiator of the BRI; India has refused to become
a part of it citing security concerns;262 Nepal, on the other hand, joined the Initiative after
its experience with the blockade in 2015. Thus, the entry of Nepal into BRI is a major
critical juncture that showcases its maneuvering in the sub-systemic discord between India
and China. Table 2 summarizes the critical junctures detailed in this chapter. It provides
the crisis that set off ideational changes which in turn led to policy changes in the specific
years chosen as critical junctures.

Table 2: Mapping of the Critical Junctures in the India-Nepal-China Buffer System
(1990-2017)
Critical Juncture
Democratization
of Nepal

Crisis
→
Ideational change
→
Policy change
Pressure against the Transformation of Nepal
The monarchy had
panchayat system
from an absolute
long used China as a
(absolute
monarchy to a
“balance” against;
monarchy); political constitutional monarchy
change of domestic
parties launch street
make-up of Nepal
protests
meant that
democratic forces
supported by India
had appeared
triumphant. China
had to reassess its
foreign policy
towards Nepal

Nepalese Royal
Family Massacre

Death of the royal
family; beginning of
Gyanendra’s reign;
civil unrest and
raging civil war

The military is seen as the
solution to the civil war;
departure from Birendra’s
non-military confrontation
with the Maoists

Shift of security
policy from
Gyanendra to
Birendra: Usage of
military means to
solve the civil war

262
As part of CPEC, China is investing in roads that run through the disputed territory of Pakistani
administered Kashmir.
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Suspension of
Parliamentary
democracy in
Nepal

Royal coup –
establishment of
absolute monarchy

Riots in the
Tibetan
Autonomous
Region (2008)

Eruption of riots in
the TAR

End of the
Nepalese
monarchy (2008)

Massive protests
against authoritarian
rule of King
Gyanendra

From democratic
governance to
authoritarianism;
prospects for growing armed violence
Beijing’s extensive
presence in the TAR;
Nepal emerges as a
country that is of
significant importance to
stabilize the TAR
From monarchy to a
republic; from unitary
government to a federal
one

The Nepal
Earthquakes
(2015)

Two major
earthquakes in
Nepal

Potential for strategic gain
through disaster
diplomacy

Blockade of Nepal
(2015)

Lull in Indo-Nepali
relations;
humanitarian crisis
in Nepal

Realization of over
reliance on India –
vulnerability to Indian
pressures

Nepal joining the
BRI (2017)

No crisis per se;
Nepal’s attempt to
reduce its reliance
on India

Joining of the BRI – focus
on economic benefits of
joining the initiative
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India: authoritarian
govt vs. Maoists vs.
political parties
China: noninterference?
Increasing Chinese
interests mean
increased aid that
seeks to constrain the
Tibetan refugee
population in Nepal
Toppling of a
traditional balancer
in Nepal’s relations
with India and
China; prospects for
political shifts; India
major player in
brokering peace;
reformulation of
foreign policy
needed for China
who had supported
the King
Despite more
investment, India
reaped less than
China, particularly in
terms of garnering
goodwill in Nepal;
prospects for policy
change – how to
garner benefits from
investments (like
China did)
Crisis mitigation
with India – but also,
integrating with
Chinese endeavors in
the political economy
of Eurasia; first
instance of supply of
fuel from China.
Affirmation of
China-Nepal
relations; security
concerns for India –
ramifications of the
blockade.

CHAPTER V: DATA ANALYSIS AND ORGANIZATION

Chapter V deals with the analysis and organization of the collected qualitative and
quantitative data for the convergent parallel design. It includes the conduct of qualitative
and quantitative data analyses, their comparison, and the convergence of both approaches
to decipher whether the political rhetoric distilled from the qualitative data is in
convergence with the quantitative data. The convergence of both analyses will be
interpreted in Chapter VI.
The first section of the chapter focuses on the quantitative data analysis of the
mixed design. The quantitative data that is gathered for all the critical junctures are
organized to ascertain whether such junctures have led to the increase or decrease in the
four indicators: trade (export/import figures in USD), Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),
and foreign aid. Quantitative analysis was then conducted on the collected data. This
includes the Kruskal-Wallis Test (KWT) of the data collected for trade, foreign direct
investment (FDI), foreign aid, and cultural exchanges and scholarships. The KWT is used
for the study as the three indicators are separately used as the dependent variable (DV),
while there is one independent variable (IV) that is expressed in the form of two or more
categorical factors. The data sets are divided into three disparate groups based on the pre-,
during, and post- critical juncture periods for a more nuanced analysis. Each indicator used
in the quantitative analysis has separate forms of identifying factors, which are discussed
in their corresponding sections in this chapter. Additionally, nonparametric correlations
were run using the same data.
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The second section of the chapter deals with qualitative data analysis, which
focuses on the content analysis of sampling that consists of joint intergovernmental
agreements (between India-Nepal and China-Nepal), foreign policy statements (from India
and China concerning Nepal or from Nepal concerning its neighbors). Both negative and
positive assertions are deciphered pre-, during, and post-critical juncture periods to assess
rhetorical changes at these points in time. As part of content analysis, the qualitative data
will be organized on the basis of whether the buffer’s role changed or remained the same
before and after the historical critical junctures, while contextualizing it within intense or
dampened Sino-Indian competition. Thus, a comparative framework is used for this section
wherein pre- and post- critical juncture years are compared to analyze rhetorical changes
due to critical junctures and decipher if rhetoric is reinforced by actual material flows from
the buffered states (China and India) to the buffer state (Nepal).
In the third section of the chapter, the analyzed data are organized to facilitate the
process of convergence/divergence and collective interpretation of the results. While
quantitative and qualitative analyses are conducted separately, the convergent parallel
design requires a collective interpretation of all analyses carried out, which is covered in
Chapter VI. For this section, the analyzed data is organized for the process of Convergence,
which smoothens the process of joint interpretation. Thus, data organization for the
qualitative and quantitative analyses are done separately but concurrently compared during
the process of Convergence. The analyzed data from the qualitative analysis is organized
and analyzed on the basis of whether there has been a change or not in the perception of
the buffer state at historical critical junctures.
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Overall, the two analyses rest on the increase or decrease in sub-systemic rivalry.
From the discussion on critical junctures, such historical years are points of policy change.
The independent variable of the study is sub-systemic rivalry between middle or great
powers and dependent variable is the buffer state’s political relevance beyond just a
geographical discontinuity. For these analyses, the independent variable i.e. sub-systemic
rivalry is assumed to change significantly in the critical juncture period. As such, to assess
this change, the independent variable is split into three categorical factors: pre-, during,
and post- critical junctures for the quantitative data analysis. The during critical juncture
period is crucial in assessing significant policy shifts as this year signals the disjuncture.

Quantitative Data Analysis
The three indicators, namely trade, FDI, and foreign aid are used for the quantitative
analysis. Data for a year before the critical juncture (labeled as pre-critical juncture), during
the critical juncture (labeled the same), and a year after the critical juncture (labeled as
post-critical juncture) are collected for each indicator. Details on the sources of data and
coding for the indicators are discussed below. As for the development variable, the buffer
state’s political relevance for the quantitative analysis is operationalized as significant
changes in trade, foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign aid. In essence, the analyses
are carried out to assess whether there are significant changes in the political relevance of
the buffer state (operationalized as trade, FDI, and foreign aid) when sub-systemic rivalries
change (captured by the changes in time period based on the idea the critical junctures
foster policy shifts). For example, sub-systemic rivalries are considered intense when there
are significant changes in foreign aid during critical juncture period i.e. the critical
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junctures, given their designation as important markers of policy shifts, should showcase
upticks in foreign aid from India and China as they are points of contention. Such
precarious points of contention should showcase intense competition between India and
China in their foreign aid to Nepal. In essence, the quantitative data analysis includes the
material engagement aspect of the buffer system interactions.

Trade
Trade, defined as the totality of goods and services exported and imported, is the
dependent variable used to assess whether critical junctures impact economic exchanges in
the buffer system. This is particularly true for Indo-Nepali relations as India has used
economic blockade as a tool for arm-twisting Nepal. In 1990, Rajiv Gandhi’s government
instituted an economic blockade protesting Nepal’s purchase of anti-aircraft missiles from
China;263 again in 2015, the Modi government instituted an unofficial blockade as a sign
of discontent with Nepal’s newly promulgated constitution.264 Thus, trade relations are
delicate, particularly for buffer states that are geopolitically disposed to heavily depend on
the buffered states for economic relations. As such, trade is included as a quintessential
part of the buffer system dynamics due to its strategic value and the heavy implications for
the buffer state’s economy, as showcased by Nepal’s experience with the blockades in 1990
and 2015.

“Nepal Says Committed to Major Projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative,” The
Hindustan Times, 2017, http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/nepal-says-committed-to-majorprojects-under-china-s-belt-and-road-initiative/story-JKn508Fvg2xRdjKICdhSdP.html. 960-61.
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Trade data was collected from the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC)
(https://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/). To decipher whether there are changes in trade patterns
before (pre-), during, and after (post-) the critical juncture years, The Kruskal-Wallis Test
(KWT) was carried out. The KWT is the nonparametric counterpart of the Analysis of
Variance (ANOVA), which allows for comparison of more than two populations. As the
quantitative analysis of this dissertation has three DVs (trade, foreign direct investment,
and loan) as well as one IV (sub-systemic rivalry between India and China), the KWT is
the most suitable statistical test given that the data set is not large enough for a parametric
test such as ANOVA. The goal is to decipher if there are significant differences in patterns
of trade before (pre), during, and after (post) critical junctures i.e. whether trade changed
during and after the critical juncture points when compared to the pre-juncture periods.
SPSS 22 was used for the analysis. For further clarity, the dependent variable in this case
is trade; it is assumed that there will be noticeable patterns of change in trade across the
three timeframes of the critical juncture points. The independent variable is intensity of
sub-systemic rivalry between India and China. For the sake of further clarity, the
independent variable is coded into three categorical factors:

1. Time: It is expressed as “juncture point.” The IV is coded to represent the three time
frames (pre-, during, post-), which are represented as numbers 1, 2, and 3 respectively;
2. Country: It is expressed as “China Imports”, “China Exports”, “India Imports”, and
“India Exports.” The designations depend on whether they were imports into Nepal or
exports from Nepal to India and China. For example, Nepal’s exports to China is
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designated “China Exports”; similarly, Nepal’s imports from India is designated “India
imports.”
3.

Export or Import: It is expressed as “Totalimports” and “Totalexports.” This

includes the total trade figured between Nepal and its buffered states, India and China.

The IV is expressed in three categorical factors to analyze the links between time
(pre, during and post critical junctures), or trade partner country (India or China), and
export or import on the DV (trade). To put it simply, this test seeks to quantitatively analyze
whether there are significant patterns of change for trade at critical junctures; whether there
are significant differences in trade patterns between Nepal-China and Nepal-India; and
whether there are significant variations in export or import at the critical junctures. As such,
critical junctures should showcase increase in sub-systemic rivalry i.e. trade needs to
change during such periods.
The Kruskal-Wallis Test was run on SPSS 22 with the data collected for trade. First,
the KWT was run for total trade data represented by “Totalimports” and “Totalexports.”
Second, another KWT was run collectively for “China Imports”, “China Exports”, “India
Imports”, and “India Exports” along with the figures for foreign direct investment and
foreign aid. The results of the first KWT showcase that there is no statistical significance.
The significance for “Totalimports” and “Totalexports” across time i.e. juncture points are
.975 and .650 respectively, which are way above the statistical significance threshold of
.05. As such, the KWT for total trade yields statistical insignificance.
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The KWT for “China Imports”, “China Exports”, “India Imports”, and “India
Exports” also yield no statistical significance. Respectively, .779, .522, .997, and .650 are
the significance levels for trade across time, which are statistically insignificant.265
Referring to the Descriptive Statistics for Trade in Appendix 3, India’s mean export
levels are as follows: 530.0678 (Pre), 773.2170 (During), and 790.0378 (Post). As for
China, they are 168.5210 (Pre), 183.0311 (During) and 90.6511 (Post). It showcases slight
changes for India, as trade seems to show an uptick during critical junctures and increase
very slight after it. As for China’s mean data, there isn’t any significant changes. Figures
12-15 showcase the trends in mean trade figures between Nepal-China and Nepal-India.

Figure 12: Trade between India and Nepal

265

Refer to Appendix 2: Results for Kruskal-Wallis Test for all Variables for detailed results.
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As showcased in Figure 12, the mean trade figures between India and Nepal is
heavily skewed towards Nepali imports from India. While statistically insignificant overall
in terms of changes across the pre, during and post periods, the mean difference between
pre and during critical juncture periods for imports from Nepal is approximately 45.8%,
which is a notable increase and needs to be noted. As such, sub-systemic rivalry can be
deciphered to have increased given that mean figures of trade took a significant uptick
during the critical juncture; the important exception to point out is that this is limited to
imports from India into Nepal, which may not hold much political relevance given that
Nepal relies heavily on India for trade, showcased in Figure 14.

Figure 13: Trade between China and Nepal
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The descriptive statistics for trade showcase that imports from China fell by
approximately 42 percent, which is a pretty significant drop in imports. As for pre and
during critical juncture periods, import figures remained stable overall. As for exports,
the overall trend is heavily skewed by Nepali imports from China.
Figures 13 and 14 display India and China’s standing with regard to their trade
with Nepal. As discussed, Nepal’s import of Indian goods rises at critical juncture points
while it drops for the case of China. For export figures, Nepali exports to India pick up
slightly in critical junctures but decrease by 31 percent approximately in the post-critical
juncture period. As for Nepali exports to China, the figures are much lower and as such,
slight changes may lead to significant percentage changes. Nevertheless, Chinese
imports into Nepal fell in the post-critical juncture period, while imports from India
increased slightly during that same period.

Figure 14: Imports from India and China to Nepal
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Figure 15: Exports from Nepal to India and China

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI)
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) defines
FDI as “an investment made to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of
the economy of the investor. Furthermore, in cases of FDI, the investor´s purpose is to gain
an effective voice in the management of the enterprise.”266 In essence, FDI indicates the
total investment made by business enterprises outside of the host economy. This is
important for the dissertation as Indian companies have long maintained a foothold in
Nepal. Additionally, FDI showcases whether there is tacit support for them to be used as a
tool of influence. For example, Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SoEs) have long been
perceived as strategic players in gaining influence abroad; some scholars point to the fact
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that Chinese SoEs are primarily supporting China’s geopolitical and mercantilist
interests.267 As such, the FDI data flowing into Nepal is analyzed here to decipher whether
there are patterns of changes (i.e. increase/decrease in sub-systemic competition) at critical
junctures.
Not all critical junctures could be analyzed for FDI. Complete official records are
available only after 2003 for the data on FDI flowing into Nepal from India and China. The
data for FDI inflows post-2003 into Nepal from India and China was consolidated from the
following sources: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD);268
Nepal-India Chamber of Commerce & Industry;269 Reserve Bank of India (RBI);270 ExportImport Bank of India;271 and Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China,
National Bureau of Statistics of People’s Republic of China, and State Administration of
Foreign Exchange.272
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“Going for the Jugular,” The Economist, 2004, http://www.economist.com/node/2752802.

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),”
2017, http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/Foreign-Direct-Investment-(FDI).aspx.
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United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, “Country Fact Sheet: India,” 2017,
http://unctad.org/sections/dite_dir/docs/wir2017/wir17_fs_in_en.pdf.
Figures for these data were in Nepali Rupees (NRs.). The figures were converted based on the
selling exchange rate for January 19, 2018: USD 1 = NRs. 102.47.

Nepal-India Chamber of Commerce & Industry, “Top 5 Countries of FDI Commitments in
Nepal - Fiscal Year and Country Wise,” 2017, http://www.nicci.org/pdf/Top 5 countires of FDI
Commitments in Nepal-FYwise and countrywise for 5 years +9months - 2011-12 to 2016-17 (9
months).pdf.
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For the Kruskal-Wallis test for FDI, the variables are categorized as follows:
1.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): FDI from China is coded as “China FDI”; FDI
from India is coded as “India FDI.”

2.

Time: The three times periods were assigned the following – 1 for pre-, 2 for
during, and 3 for Post-critical juncture. Time is coded as “juncture point.”

In this test, the FDI depended upon the IV (sub-systemic rivalry) expressed in the
form of categorical variable time expressed as juncture point. The basic logic of using this
test is to decipher if there are changes in FDI patterns between India and China pre, during,
and post critical junctures. Since FDI as an indicator for this dissertation only includes FDI
inflows into Nepal from China and India, the categorical factor with reference to direction
as used for trade is not necessary.
The KWT was run on SPSS 22 with FDI as the dependent variable, with time
(expressed as juncture point) as the independent variable. The results of the KWT for FDI
show non-significance. The differences in FDI from India and China into Nepal over the
years of the critical junctures is not statistically significant. As per the detailed results in
Appendix 2, the p-value for China FDI is 0.581 and that for India FDI is 0.689. As such,
FDI is not statistically significant when comparing its inflows into Nepal from China and
India before, during, and after the critical junctures.
Despite no statistical significance, Figure 16 reveals a peculiar trend for FDI. One
aspect of the study revealed that the means of FDI for India and China during the three
time periods, specifically that India’s mean investment pattern during the critical juncture
is higher that the pre- and post- periods. Referring to the Descriptive Statistics for FDI in
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Appendix 4, India’s mean for FDI for the “During” period is 90.3100, which is noticeably
higher than the means for the Pre (21.10) and Post (8.01) periods. As for China, it
showcases a steady pattern without any marked changes in FDI outflow into Nepal; the Pre
(33.89) mean is slightly higher than the During (23.85) and a bit more than the Post (20.96)
means for FDI inflows into Nepal. Nevertheless, it supports the idea that India is perhaps
concerned regarding increased Chinese influence and is responding through increased FDI.

Figure 16: Indian and Chinese FDI in Nepal

Figure 16 displays the patterns in means of FDI between India and China in Nepal
during the three time periods. Although China’s FDI patterns are not starkly noticeable,
India’s FDI to Nepal rose by approximately 328 percent from the pre to the during critical
juncture period. It dropped off in post period by 91.1 percent. The pattern in FDI showcases
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that India’s FDI strongly peaks during critical juncture periods and is a peculiar trend
within this variable while China’s FDI decreases slightly during the critical junctures.

Foreign Aid
Foreign aid, which is a broad concept, entails facilitation of economic development,
alleviation of poverty, and improvement of human welfare.273 The Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines Official Development
Assistance (ODA) as “government aid designed to promote the economic development and
welfare of developing countries. Loans and credits for military purposes are excluded. Aid
may be provided bilaterally, from donor to recipient, or channeled through a multilateral
development agency such as the United Nations or the World Bank.”274 Broadly speaking,
ODA includes development assistance from economically developed states to those that
are considered developing states. It excludes military assistance, which can sometimes be
packaged as foreign aid. For the purpose of this dissertation, foreign aid will exclude
military assistance, as is usually case for calculating ODA. Additionally, security
allocations are extremely sensitive in Nepal’s case given its proximity to both India and
China. Additionally, “softer” forms of military aid can translate to uses that have

Ministry of Commerce of People’s Republic of China, National Bureau of Statistics of People’s
Republic of China, and State Administration of Foreign Exchange, 2011 年度 中国对外直接投资 统计公
报 2011 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment (China Statistics Press, 2012),
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“Net ODA,” OECD Data, 2017, https://data.oecd.org/oda/net-oda.htm.
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implications for more “harder” forms of military action.275 As such, military aid is not
included in the analysis.
Just like FDI, foreign aid can be tied to numerous motives. While humanitarian in
nature, foreign aid can be used for strategic purposes. The Marshall Plan after WWII
entailed rebuilding European partners such as Germany, Italy, and France to enhance trade
between the US and those countries; as such, US motivations for foreign aid were not
exclusively borne out of humanitarian necessity.276 Strategic interests of the US
underpinned its foreign aid initiatives. In 2002, President George W. Bush increased the
ODA by 50 per cent in core development assistance – an annual increase of $5 billion; the
logic was to promote a development “from the bottom up” to stem recruitment for terrorist
groups.277 While the US, Japan, and the European Union states have been at the forefront
of foreign aid, be it in the form of direct or indirect ODA, the economic growth of China
and India have led to their increasing interest in the strategic use of foreign aid.
China is now considered part of the “emerging donors” group that is making inroads
into areas of the developing world that had long depended on multilateral aid and loans
from organizations such as the IMF and the World Bank. What China offers is a new line
of debt and many times, debt forgiveness; this is especially true for countries in Africa

Reeves, “China’s Self-Defeating Tactics in Nepal,” 527;
In 2010, the Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu arranged a $10 million grant for the purchase of riot shields
and batons (from China) to bolster the riot control capabilities of the Nepali Police. The Nepali Police has
long been at the front lines in the control of Tibetan refugees living in Nepal who routinely protest in front
of the Chinese embassy in Kathmandu. The grant was provided to provide better equipment for the Nepali
Police but the true intent was to bolster the capability of the personnel to control protesting Tibetan refugees.
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where China has made immense investments in oil, gas, and mineral extraction activities.278
China has increasingly styled itself as a non-interventionist development partner – the “no
strings attached” approach focuses on commercial ties and does not underpin aid to
domestic political contexts, which had long been a major hallmark of ODA from the
West.279
The most glaring evidence of massive Chinese foreign aid is the Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI). It includes a $1 trillion commitment in Eurasia, spanning more than 60
countries.280 In Pakistan alone, the investment commitments from China is projected to be
around $46 billion. The BRI is a major strategic plan of China as it seeks to promote the
old Silk Road and maritime routes; it entails major FDI into states in Eurasia but also
includes foreign aid and loans. Nepal’s entry into the BRI in 2017 is projected to lead to
an increase in Chinese aid and investment into the country, tied to Nepal’s economic
diversification efforts and its push to graduate from being a least developed country (LDC)
to a middle-income country before 2030.281 In essence, Chinese foreign aid in Nepal is in
the upswing and remains a major factor in deciphering how it impacts the buffer system;

“Presidents Bush, Chirac Announce Recent Increases in Aid to Conference on Financing
Development,” United Nations Press Release, 2002, http://www.un.org/press/en/2002/dev2388.doc.htm.
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this is especially important for India as it was outdone by China for the first time in its
ODA commitment to Nepal.282
India, too, has maintained a strong regional regime of foreign aid in South Asia, a
region it has long considered its strategic backyard. Given this predicament, India’s foreign
aid in South Asia has been largely strategic with assistance focusing on technical and
economic cooperation. In 2015-16, about 74.6 percent of India’s total foreign aid budget
was pledged for Bhutan, followed by 9.1 percent for Afghanistan, 6.6 percent for Sri Lanka,
4 percent for Nepal and 2.8 percent each for Bangladesh and Maldives.283 It continued to
favor South Asian states as the destination for a majority of its foreign aid in 2016-17, with
Bhutan still maintaining first position.284 In essence, India’s foreign aid is tied to its
strategic interests in its neighborhood, a factor that is crucial in understanding the dynamics
within the buffer system.
For the dependent variable relevance of buffer state, “foreign aid” is used as one
indicator;285 the independent variable sub-systemic rivalry is coded into two categorical
factors:
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For the Kruskal-Wallis test for foreign aid, the variables are categorized as
follows:
1.

Foreign aid: FDI from China is coded as “China Aid”; FDI from India is coded as
“India Aid.”

2.

Time: The three times periods were assigned the following – 1 for pre-, 2 for
during, and 3 for post-critical juncture periods. Time is coded as “juncture point.”

Due to the sensitive nature of foreign aid in the INCBS, pledges of foreign aid are
used instead of actual disbursement due to the public nature of announcements of the
former. Accurate data on actual disbursement was hard to obtain due to the lack of
oversight of the projects covered by the foreign aid.
The Kruskal Wallis Test for foreign aid, just like Trade and FDI, did not yield any
statistical significance. The test showcases that there is no statistical significance for aid.
The significance values of 0.953 for China Aid and 0.784 for India FDI, as per Appendix
2, showcase that the KWT for foreign aid are not statistically significant. These
significance levels are higher than the p-value of 0.05, which renders them statistically
insignificant. Overall, foreign aid is statistically insignificant when it comes to variations
across time.

Vipul Vivek, “India Gives Most Foreign Aid to Bhutan, Bot Its New Priorities Afghanistan and
Africa,” Scroll, 2017, https://scroll.in/article/835481/india-gives-most-foreign-aid-to-bhutan-not-its-newpriorities-afghanistan-and-africa.
Agence France-Presse and Staff, “Nepal Donors Pledge $3bn for Rebuilding in Aftermath of
Earthquakes,” The Guardian, 2015, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jun/25/nepalearthquakes-3bn-aid-pledge-international-donors-kathmandu.
“Narayani Basu, “Nepal-China-India: Three’s a Crowd?,” The Diplomat, 2017,
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Despite the statistical insignificance of foreign aid figures, Figure 17 showcases a
dynamic pattern based on descriptive statistics.286 The pre- and post-critical juncture
figures have a sharp uptick for China, while there is an upward trend for the during critical
juncture period for India. This showcases trends in foreign aid that showcase fluctuations
in figures related to India and China. It is particularly important to note that Chinese figures
for foreign aid overshadow Indian commitments. While India’s trends are more or less
steady, China showcases extensive activity around the critical juncture points.

Figure 17: Foreign Aid from China and India for Nepal
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This pattern deciphered from foreign aid showcases that there is indeed interactions
at the critical juncture; while China’s aid dips at the critical juncture, India’s increases.
Also, there is a sharp increase in the post-critical juncture period for China’s foreign aid
into Nepal. As such, intensification of sub-systemic rivalry cannot be ruled out given the
dynamic decrease and increase in China’s foreign aid into Nepal.
The quantitative data analyses carried out for trade, foreign direct investment, and
foreign aid showcase no statistical significance. The non-parametric Kruskall Wallis Test
for the datasets reveal that there are no statistically significant variations in the pre-, during,
and post-data for the three indicators when they are split into sub-datasets for India and
China. To simply put, the statistical significance for the Kruskall Wallis Tests carried out
for each of the indicators is above the p-value of 0.05. This renders them statistically
insignificant. However, a closer look at the descriptive statistics of the indicators reveals
patterns that are not captured through the significance levels. As showcased in Figure 18,287
the patterns for data for trade, FDI, and foreign aid showcase significant dynamics in data
between India and China’s engagement with Nepal. This is particularly pronounced for
FDI and foreign aid, which show interacting effects and as such, important dynamics for
their role in deciphering the research question.

287

For Figure 18, refer to page number 151.
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Figure 18: Comparative Trends in Analysis of Material Engagement

The mean figures for trade, foreign aid, and FDI pre-, during, and post-critical
junctures are not statistically significant when the data are tested by KWT. However, it can
be deciphered from Figure 18 that the extent to which Nepal trades with India is much
more substantial than its trade with China. As for FDI, the mean figure “during critical
juncture” for India is much higher than pre and post periods; it will require backing of the
qualitative data to ensure that India is indeed active during critical junctures in Nepal’s
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affairs. As for China, the changes in FDI with time are not substantial. The plot for foreign
aid in Figure 18 displays a fascinating dynamic; here, China’s means for aid show dynamic
changes along the time periods. There is substantial mean difference between the during
period and the pre and post periods. The important aspect of this dynamic is that these are
based on foreign aid commitments and not disbursements; as such, the data needs to be
complemented with the other half of the Convergent Parallel Design to ensure that there
are intensified Chinese activities in the pre and post periods of the critical junctures.

Non-Parametric Correlations
The results for the non-parametric correlations conducted in SPSS are characterized
by patterns of change that may signal increased strategic interest in Nepal from China and
India, particularly in terms of material engagement.288 The variables are coded as the
following:

1.

Trade: Nepal’s imports from China is coded as “China Imports”; Nepal’s exports
to China is coded as “China Exports”. Similarly, Nepal’s imports from India is
coded as “India Imports”; Nepal’s exports to India is coded as “India Exports”.

2.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): FDI from China to Nepal is coded as “China
FDI”; FDI from India to Nepal is coded as “India FDI”.

3.

Foreign Aid: Foreign aid from China to Nepal is coded as “China Aid”; foreign aid
from India to Nepal is coded as “India Aid”.
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4.

Time: The pre-, during, and post-critical juncture periods are collectively coded as
“Juncture Year”.

The results are characterized by several statistically significant correlations. The
correlations between “China Imports” and “India Imports”, “China Imports” and “India
Exports”, “China Imports” and “India FDI”, “China Imports” and “China Aid”, “China
Imports” and “India Aid”, as well as “China Imports” and “Juncture Year” were
statistically significant. “China Exports” did not display statistical significant in
correlations with any of the other variables used. The correlations between “India Imports”
and “India Exports”, “India Imports” and “India FDI”, “India Imports” and “China Aid”,
“India Imports” and “India Aid”, as well as “India Imports” and “Juncture Year” showcase
statistical significance.
Additionally, correlations between “India Exports” and “China Aid” as well as
“India Exports” and “Juncture Year” display statistical significance. The correlations
between “India FDI” and “China FDI” and “China FDI” and “Juncture Year” are
statistically significant. Furthermore, correlations between “India FDI” with “China Aid”,
“India Aid” and “Juncture Year” are statistically significant. Correlations between “China
Aid” and “India Aid” as well as “Juncture Year” are statistically significant. Finally,
correlation between “India Aid” and “Juncture Year” is statistically significant.
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Qualitative Data Analysis
As the main logic of using qualitative data analysis is to decipher whether there is
increase/decrease in rhetorical engagement by India and China in Nepal, data released by
India and China were used for this dissertation as they signaled their increased (or
decreased) interactions with the Government of Nepal (GoN). As such, Nepal’s official
statements are not included; instead, official rhetorical statements from India and China
concerning their relations with Nepal were analyzed.
The qualitative data analysis includes official documents published by India and
China regarding their relations with Nepal. They included the following data from the
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) of the Republic of India, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the People’s Republic of China (MoFAPRC), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal (MoFAN):

-

Unilateral statements from India or China regarding their relations with Nepal or
developments within Nepal; these included official press releases and media
briefings organized by the respective institutions in India and China that deal with
foreign affairs.

-

Joint agreements/statements/treaties/Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
signed between Nepal-India and Nepal-China.

-

Official statements or speeches released by the respective institutions of China and
India
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For India, the data were collected from the Media Center of the Ministry of External
Affairs, the Government of India and the Embassy of India in Kathmandu, Nepal.289 The
data included all qualitative data available from the Ministry and Embassy’s website
available as of February 2018, including press releases, bilateral/multilateral
documents/declarations, treaties and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs), and media
briefings.
For China, the data were collected from the website of the Embassy of the People’s
Republic of China in the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal and the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China (MoFA).290 Just like for India, the
qualitative data for China-Nepal interactions included all the materials collected from the
MoFA and Embassy’s website, including press releases, media briefings (in the form of
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson’s Remarks), bilateral/multilateral documents/declarations,
treaties, and Memoranda of Understanding.
As part of the Content Analysis process, the collected qualitative data were
analyzed using the Word Frequency Query and the Word Search Query. The Word
Frequency Query helped in deciphering overarching themes and their patterns of change
in the pre-, during, and post-critical juncture periods. The Word Search Query, on the other
hand, helped decipher whether the rhetorical engagements between India-Nepal and China-
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Media Center, Ministry of External Affairs: Government of India, http://mea.gov.in/index.htm;
Embassy of India in Kathmandu, Nepal, http://www.indianembassy.org.np/.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/;
Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal,
http://np.china-embassy.org/eng/
290
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Nepal were based on positive or negative affirmations. The collected qualitative data were
coded based on their source country i.e. India and China; further coding was conducted by
designating the statements based on their pre, during, and post-critical juncture years. Thus,
this component of the convergent parallel design incorporates the rhetorical engagement
aspect of sub-systemic dynamics.

Word Frequency Query
The collected qualitative data were uploaded to NVivo 11, a powerful analytical program
for qualitative research. Simple word count queries were run initially to provide a sense of
the overarching themes in the pre-, during, and post-critical juncture periods. These queries
relayed and emphasized specific rhetorical patterns based on recurring terminologies and
themes. To further streamline the process, “the Word Stop List” was applied, which is a
feature of NVivo used to leave out words that added no significance to the project.291
Additionally, the word frequency query was run using the specific “with synonymous
group” mode to ensure that words with the same or similar meanings were lumped together
to prevent redundancy. The five most frequently used terms are displayed in Table 3, based
on weighted percentage.
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The Word Stop List includes proper nouns, propositions, and pronouns.
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Table 3: Results of the Word Frequency Queries292

All data

India-Nepal

China-Nepal

PRE
Cooperation
Development
Visit
Cultural
People
Cooperation
Development
Joint
Visit
Cultural
Cooperation
Support
Development
People
Relations

DURING
Development
Assistance
People
Relations
Cooperation
Development
Assistance
Projects
Issues
Visit
Cooperation
Development
Friendly
People
Relations

POST
Development
Visit
Assistance
Cooperation
People
Development
Visit
Assistance
Projects
People
Development
Visit
Assistance
Projects
People

OVERALL
Cooperation
Development
Visit
People
Economic
Cooperation
Implementation
Visit
Development
Affairs
Support
Cooperation
Development
Relations
People

Table 3 highlights the top five results of the word frequency queries that were run
on NVivo. The table includes the top five words based on weighted percentage, which is
defined as the frequency of a word relative to the other words counted during the query. In
essence, each terminology includes the term itself and its synonyms, which are counted
together to prevent redundancy. The data reveals an overwhelming emphasis on the
importance of cooperation and development, which affirms the self-portrayal of both India
and China as close cooperative development partners with Nepal.
In the overall data, cooperation dominates the overall discourse, followed by
development, visit (which includes diplomatic exchanges), people (referring to people to
people exchanges and the emphasis on the goodwill of the people), and economic ties.
Overall, the qualitative data from official sources in India and China showcase a strong
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Refer to Appendices 7-18 for the Word Clouds for Table 3.
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emphasis on bilateral cooperation, which includes the significant role of development
concerns given Nepal’s heavy reliance on external donors.
The word frequency queries of data coded into the pre-, during, and post- periods
of the critical junctures also showcased similar results. The qualitative data from the precritical juncture period showcased the same trend as the results for overall data; cooperation
and development were the two major themes in the rhetoric. Interestingly, it was the only
time period that “cultural” was one of the top five frequently used terms when compared
to other words. Nevertheless, cooperation and development were central in pre and during
critical juncture periods, with “visits” becoming more prominent in the post-critical
juncture period.
For the data dealing with Indo-Nepali relations, the overall emphasis was once
again, on cooperation but implementation was also emphasized. The comparison of the
word frequencies in the pre-, during, and post-critical juncture periods showcase the
importance of development and cooperation as well as assistance. However, a consistent
term that appeared in the top five was “visit” given India’s longstanding exchange of
official visits with Nepal. The word becomes more prominent in the post-critical juncture
period and takes a dip in the during-critical juncture period. It can be deciphered that the
emphasis of official visits become more prominent after the critical juncture has passed,
perhaps to recuperate India’s interests in Nepal; this is supported by the fact that “visit”
drastically jumps in the post-critical juncture period as compared to during such periods.
While it does not appear in the overall word frequency query, the word “cultural” appears
in the pre-critical juncture period – a reminder of the close cultural affinities shared by
Nepal with India. However, it does not appear to be a strong factor in the other two periods.

158

The word frequency query for the qualitative data for China-Nepal also showcases
similar trajectories to the results for the data on Indo-Nepal relations. Overall, support,
cooperation, and development are heavily emphasized. However, “people” is more
prominently present than in the data for India-Nepal; in fact, it is present in the top five
words for all of the periods assessed. Also, the occurrence of “friendly” during the critical
juncture period is strategic given the volatility of such periods in bilateral relations. The
word “visit” also appears to be significant in the post-critical juncture period, as it is not
found to be extensively used in the pre- and during- periods. As such, it can be deciphered
that China also emphasizes official visits in the post-critical juncture period given that the
other time periods overwhelmingly emphasize cooperation and development.

Text Search Query
After the initial simple word frequency query, the text search query was used. This
query can help decipher the trends in the collected qualitative data. The text search query
used two word dictionaries for positive and negative affirmations to analyze what rhetorical
trends exist in the bilateral relations between India-Nepal and China-Nepal.293 The word
dictionaries are based on similar themes; in this case, they are positive and negative
bilateral interactions. The idea is to decipher if there are differences in trends in interactions
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Dictionary for positive affirmation: coop* OR agree* OR friend* OR help* OR aid* OR dona*
OR "people to people" OR affinity OR engag* OR connect* OR assist* OR collaborat* OR partner* OR
harmony OR reciproc* OR ally OR alliance;
Dictionary for negative affirmation: critic* OR condemn* OR cancel* OR disapprove OR
rebuk* OR reprehen* OR denounc* OR "gravely concerned" OR autocract* OR cancel* OR "oppose" OR
condemn OR criticize OR criticism OR disapproval OR rebuttal OR "human rights abuse" OR "deeply
concerned"
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between India-Nepal and China- Nepal; the usage of these dictionaries for this Query will
also help track any changes in rhetorical themes in the three periods associated with the
critical junctures. These queries also include wildcard characters, which are root words that
are incomplete but allow different variations of the same word to be counted in the analysis.
For example, using engag* as a part of the text search query in NVivo for the positive
affirmation dictionary covers words with the root engag, such as engagement, engagement,
engaging, and the like. Figures 19, 20, and 21 showcase the results for the Text Search
Queries.

Figure 19: Results for the Text Search Queries for Positive Affirmations of all Qualitative
Data
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Figure 20: Results for the Text Search Queries for Negative Affirmations of all
Qualitative Data

Figure 21: Comparison of Text Search Queries for Positive and Negative Affirmations
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As per the results of Figures 19, 20, and 21, the positive and negative engagements
of India with Nepal are much more extensive than that between China and Nepal. These
figures display the number of times the terms included in the positive and negative
dictionaries appear in the Text Search Query. The application of the dictionary “Positive
Affirmation” yields the result that the positive rhetorical engagement between India and
Nepal decreases during the critical juncture period and slightly increases after.
Nevertheless, India maintains extensive rhetorical engagement with Nepal when compared
to China.
There are no significant differences in positive rhetorical engagement between
China and Nepal in any of the periods. However, the extent of engagement in terms of the
rhetoric from China is much more limited when compared to the data for the rhetoric from
India, as displayed in Figures 19, 20, and 21.
The application of “negative affirmation” yielded very different results. Negative
rhetorical engagement increased during the critical juncture period for the case of IndiaNepal. As for China, it is almost absent in all of the cases with a slight increase during the
critical juncture. Figure 19 showcases that negative affirmation is significantly lower than
positive affirmation in the overall analysis of the qualitative data, signaling that public
diplomacy is overwhelmingly devoid of direct negative connotation, especially in the case
of India and China’s engagement in Nepal. However, India is more willing to use such
rhetoric, particularly during periods of critical junctures.
Overall, the text search queries showcase that India is more engaged when it comes
to making public rhetorical statements, in instances of both negative and positive
affirmations. Positive affirmations from India subside slightly during critical junctures and
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pick up slightly after. While negative affirmations are fewer, India is more forthcoming in
their usage; such affirmations increase during critical junctures. As for China, its rhetorical
engagement, at least in the public platform, is limited when compared to India. Positive
affirmation does not showcase difference between periods. Notably, negative affirmation
is absent in the pre and post periods, a fact that reaffirms China’s non-interference policy
in the internal affairs of other states, at least publicly.294

Organization of Analyzed Data Results
This section is for the organization of the results of both qualitative and quantitative
data, keeping in mind their connection to the research question and hypothesis. Chapter VI
covers the comparison and combined interpretation of the data analyses in the context of
this dissertation. The organization of the analyzed data results is for streamlining purposes,
readying it for comparison and interpretation in the next chapter.

Quantitative Data Analysis Results
Quantitative data analyses results showcase that despite statistical insignificance,
there are patterns that impact the increase/decrease in interest from the buffered states
towards the buffer state. These patterns showcase differing and unique trajectories of
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"Commentary: Stronger China not to Change its Non-Interference Policy." Xinhua News
Agency, 15 July 2017. General OneFile,
http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A498554258/ITOF?u=miam11506&sid=ITOF&xid=16ed0ae3;
China’s non-interference policy is based on its foreign policy cornerstone that emphasizes
cooperation over interference. The official stance in China’s engagement with other states, particularly
developing states, has been an emphasis on cooperation and development. As such, the official Chinese
stance has always been the “respect for equality, non-interference and sovereignty.”

163

material engagement by India and China with Nepal. Table 4 highlights the overall
quantitative trends. India’s imports from Nepal increases during critical juncture periods
along with Indian FDI to Nepal. As for foreign aid, China’s commitments dip during
critical junctures and India’s spikes slights during the same period. Foreign aid from China
picks up significantly in the post-critical juncture period. Table 4 highlights the major
trends in quantitative data analysis of this study.

Table 4: Overall Results of the Quantitative Data Analysis
Variable

Analysis Result

Trade

Statistically insignificant at the 0.05 pvalue;
- Upward trend for India during
critical junctures
- India’s preponderance as Nepal’s
major trading partner is affirmed

Foreign Direct Statistically insignificant at the 0.05 pInvestment
value;
- Significant increase in FDI
from India at the critical
juncture
Foreign Aid
Statistically insignificant at the 0.05 pvalue;
- Significant interactions in
patterns
- China’s foreign aid is
extensively high at pre and post
periods
- India’s is the opposite; it is
higher during the critical
juncture
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Overall Patterns
- Increase in political
relevance of Nepal
for India during
critical junctures due
to rise in import
figures
- Increase in political
relevance of Nepal
for India during
critical junctures
-

Extensively
interactive trajectory
in the
increase/decrease of
political relevance;
while China’s
interest increases,
India’s decreases
and vice-versa

NonParametric
Correlations

Statistically significant correlations
between
- “China Imports” and “India
Imports”
- “China FDI” and “India FDI”
- “China Aid” and “India Aid”
- “Juncture Year” with all
variables except “China
Exports”

-

-

Extensive increase
in material
engagement of India
and China with
Nepal vis-à-vis each
other with the
exception of “China
Exports”
Overall increase in
material engagement
over time i.e.
“Juncture Year”

Qualitative Data Analysis Results
The qualitative data analyses also showcase interesting patterns in rhetorical
engagements between India-Nepal and China-Nepal. From the importance of diplomatic
visits to the overwhelming emphasis on development and cooperation, the qualitative data
analyses results showcased in Table 5 infer that there are interesting dynamics at play in
the INCBS.
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Table 5: Overall Results of the Qualitative Data Analysis
Content
Analysis Result
Analysis
Word
- Overall emphasis on
Frequency
cooperation and
Query
development.
- In India’s case,
overwhelming usage of
“visit”; its usage increases in
the post-critical juncture
period.
- In China’s case, consistent
focus on “people” as a
central aspect of its bilateral
relations with Nepal; “visit”
becomes significant in the
post-critical juncture period.
Text
- The Query resulted in more
Search
results for India than China.
Query
- Decrease in positive
affirmation at critical
junctures for India, coupled
with increased negative
affirmation.
- China’s positive affirmation
is consistent and its almost
nil negative affirmation.
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Overall Patterns
-

Rhetorically, increased
engagement from India with
Nepal in the aftermath of

-

-

-

critical junctures.
“Visit” is more rhetorically
important for China as it
does not appear
significantly in the pre and
during periods, signaling
the importance of increased
official contact, i.e.
political relevance of the
buffer in the post-critical
juncture period.
Increase relevance of
Nepal given India’s
increase in negative
affirmation and decrease in
positive affirmations at
critical junctures.
Almost nil negative
affirmations from China,
signaling the importance of
positive rhetorical
engagement with Nepal.

CHAPTER VI: COLLECTIVE INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

Chapter VI is focused on the collective comparison and interpretation of the results
from the quantitative and qualitative analyses carried out in Chapter V within the larger
framework of the research question and the hypotheses of the dissertation. This entails a
collective interpretation of the mixed-method approach. This chapter explains the results
of the analyses by combining them and includes the interpretation of the results to provide
an answer to the research question of the proposed study. The combined interpretation is
essential in deciphering whether there is convergence or divergence between the two
analyses. If the results showcase extensive similarities, then there is convergence. If the
results of the two methods showcase significant differences, then it is termed divergence.
Either way, the combined results allow for a more complete understanding of the buffer
system, including its relevance as not just a geographic discontinuity between buffered
states.
First, the results from the two analyses are compared to tease out similarities and
differences in results. Then, this chapter showcases how much of convergence or
divergence there is in the results of the analyses. This section also merges the results; then,
the results are collectively interpreted within the framework of the research question and
hypothesis, highlighting whether changes in sub-systemic rivalry (based on the critical
juncture time periods) will induce changes in the relevance of buffer states
(increase/decrease in dependent variables; increase/decrease in rhetorical engagement).
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Comparison of Qualitative and Quantitative Analyses
The comparison of both analyses deciphers the increase/decrease in sub-systemic
rivalries at critical juncture points. Tables 6 and 7 display the percentage changes in the
material and rhetorical engagements of China and India with Nepal, with a focus on the
critical juncture points (labeled as “during” in the tables).

Table 6: Patterns of Changes in Material Engagement295
Quantitative
Analysis
KWT

Pre
Trade
a) Exports
b) Imports

India
China
India
China

Foreign
Direct
Investment
India
China
Foreign
Aid
India
China

-

-

-

During

Post

+7.87
-31.8
+50.8
-1.36

-31.31
+161.85
+2.3
-42.01

+327.96
-29.64

-91.12
-12.1

+1066.5
-81.02

-90.4
+577.3

All numbers in Table 6 are percentages. The numbers in the “During” column are the percentage
changes for trade, FDI, and foreign aid from the “Pre” to the “During” critical juncture period; similarly, the
numbers in the “Post” column are the percentage changes from the “During” to the “Post” critical juncture
period.
295
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Table 7: Patterns of Changes in Rhetorical Engagement296
Qualitative Analysis
Word Frequency Test (Overall
number of official statements)

India
China

Pre
-

Time
During
+51.6
+94.64

Word Search
Query

Negative
Affirmation

Overall
India
China

-

+100
+75
+100

-37.5
-28.57
-100

Positive
Affirmation

Overall
India
China

-

-24.70
-32.85
+13.33

-3.125
+6.38
-29.4

Post
-34.75
-60.55

Tables 6 and 7 display that the link between sub-systemic rivalry and relevance of
the buffer state is not as straightforward as an increase or decrease during critical juncture
periods. Referring to Table 6, it can be assessed that India’s material engagement with
Nepal showcases a unique pattern -- the exports from Nepal to India (+7.87), imports from
India to Nepal (+50.8%), FDI from India to Nepal (+327.96), and foreign aid from India
to Nepal (+1066.5), all display increases during critical junctures. Coincidentally, the
material engagement of China with Nepal during the critical junctures showcase decreases;
Nepal’s exports to China (-31.8%), Nepal’s imports from China (-1.36%), China’s FDI
into Nepal (-29.64%), and China’s foreign aid to Nepal (-81.02%) all showcase decreases,
albeit the decrease of Nepal’s imports from China is very slight.

296
All numbers in Table 7 are percentages. The numbers in the “During” column for the Word
Frequency Test are the percentage changes for the overall number of rhetorical statements from India and
China regarding Nepal from the “Pre” to the “During” critical juncture period; similarly, the numbers in the
“Post” column for the Word Frequency Test are the percentage changes from the “During” to the “Post”
critical juncture period.
As for the Text Query Test, the percentage changes reflect the changes in the number of
terminologies based on the dictionaries for positive and negative affirmations. The percentage changes reflect
the changes in the overall number of times the terms included in the positive and negative dictionaries change
based on time pre-, during, and post-critical juncture periods.
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As for the post-critical juncture period, there are patterns that are quite the opposite
of what happens during critical junctures. Exports from Nepal to India (-31.31%), FDI from
India into Nepal (-91.12%) and foreign aid from India to Nepal (-90.4%) decrease; imports
from India to Nepal shows a slight increase of +2.3%. Overall, the trends are decreasing
Indian material engagement with Nepal in the post-critical juncture period. During the
same period, exports from Nepal to China (+161.85%) and foreign aid (+577.3%)
showcase massive increases; imports from China (-42.01%), and FDI from China (-12.1%)
decrease. The overall picture for India in the post-critical juncture is that of extensive
decrease in material engagement with Nepal; while for China, there is some engagement
but the ones that showcase increases are massive in percentage changes.
In essence, during critical juncture periods, there are dynamic sub-systemic
interactions; India’s material engagement is positive for all the dependent variables of the
dissertation. Overall, India intensifies its material engagement with Nepal during the
critical junctures. At the same time, China decreases its material engagement during this
period. As for the post-critical juncture period, there is extensive decrease in India’s
material engagement with Nepal. As for China, it does not showcase an increase across the
board but the two variables (foreign aid and exports) display significant increases. These
results may indicate that sub-systemic rivalries do not always manifest during critical
junctures. In fact, the post-critical juncture data analysis reveals that China’s approach to
engaging Nepal heavily focuses on doing so after the critical juncture, as showcased by the
massive increase in foreign aid in the post-critical juncture period.
The results for the qualitative data analyses infer important trends for sub-systemic
interactions. The rhetorical engagement during critical junctures increases for both India
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(+51.6%) and China (+94.64%) and declines in the post-critical juncture period (-34.75%
for India and -60.55% for China). The percentage changes represent the overall changes in
the number of rhetorical statements from India and China regarding their relations with
Nepal.
The application of the dictionary labeled “Negative Affirmation” resulted in
extensive increase for both India (+75%) and China (+100%). However, the small sample
sizes for this measure needs to be considered when drawing inferences (3 for India; 1 for
China). On the contrary, the results for the usage of the dictionary titled “Positive
Affirmation” yields important implications. During the critical junctures, the number of
terminologies that are part of the dictionary highlighting positive rhetorical engagement
decreases by 32.85%; at the same time, those from China increase by 13.33%. The postcritical juncture period experiences a slight increase of 6.38% for India while for China, it
decreases by -29.4%. As such, the occurrence of terminologies in the qualitative data that
are part of the “Positive Affirmation” dictionary increase for India by 6.38% from the
during to the post-critical juncture period. As for China, there is decline for the same by 29.4%.
Comparing both qualitative and quantitative analyses, there are patterns that have
implications for the sub-systemic interactions between India and China. For India, material
engagement with Nepal increases along with increase in negative affirmation and decrease
in positive affirmation during the critical junctures. During the same period, India’s
rhetorical engagement increases; terms such as “development” and “assistance” are heavily
used, while “visit” decreases during the same period. Thus, India’s material engagement
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increases during critical junctures, while rhetorically there is an overall increase, the
increase in negative affirmations is more pronounced.
During the critical juncture, China’s material engagement with Nepal decreases
when compared to the pre-critical juncture period. At the same time, there is also increase
in rhetorical engagement with Nepal; while negative affirmation is almost nil,297 the
rhetorical emphasis on positive affirmation from China increases during critical junctures.
While “cooperation” and “development” are consistent in all time periods, the term
“friendly” appears as the third most common terminology in official Chinese rhetoric,
which does not appear in the pre- and post- periods in the top five most frequently used
terms. In essence, China’s material engagement decreases at critical junctures, but
rhetorical engagement increases during critical junctures. Referring to Tables 6 and 7, it
can be ascertained that trade, FDI, and foreign aid from China decline during critical
junctures. During the same period, rhetorical statements from China regarding Nepal
increased, along with the increase in terms that highlight positive relations between the two
states.
The comparison for the post-critical juncture period yields a rather complex
dynamic. India’s material engagement with Nepal largely decreases after the critical
juncture period. The overall rhetorical engagement dips as well but there is a caveat;
negative affirmations decrease but positive affirmations increase during the same time
period. The term “visit” increases in occurrence during this period. Overall, India’s

297
Refer to Figure 18 on page number 151; the increase for China’s negative affirmation is by 1
while it is totally absent for other periods.
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material engagement with Nepal decrease after the critical juncture years but positive
affirmations increase, along with the term “visit.”
As for China, the post-critical juncture period showcases mixed results. While
exports from Nepal to China increase along with increase in foreign aid to Nepal, other
variables of material engagement decrease. Nevertheless, the increases in exports and
foreign aid are substantial. There is also a sharp decrease in rhetorical engagement by China
with Nepal, with decreases in both negative and positive affirmations. However, the term
“visit” is the second most consistently used term in Chinese official rhetoric regarding its
relations with Nepal, which is absent in the pre- and during critical juncture periods.
Overall, the analyses showcase that China is more willing to engage materially after the
critical juncture but rhetorically engagement decreases; however, “visit” becomes more
prominent.
Referring to Appendix 6,298 the results of the non-parametric correlations add
insights into the dynamic nature of material and rhetorical engagements of India and China
in Nepal. Overall, the increase in imports from China is characterized by increase in
imports from India. Similarly, increases in FDI and foreign aid from China have been
characterized by increases from India as well. All of these aforementioned variables also
showcase increase over time. In essence, both China and India have increased their exports
to Nepal along with FDI and aid over time. While these correlations do not take into
account the differences in the pre-, during and post-critical juncture periods, they shed light
on the increasing material commitment of India and China in Nepal.
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For Appendix 6, refer to page number 218.
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Convergence/Divergence of Analyses and Merging of Results
The analyses showcase trends in changes across the critical junctures. The
comparison of the qualitative and quantitative analyses reveals patterns that are either
convergent or divergent. The assessment of the convergence and divergence of the analyses
is followed by merging of the results of the analyses to prepare for collective interpretation
of the results.
The process of convergence/divergence in the results of the analyses is the last
phase of the convergent parallel design before the collective interpretation of the results.
This section discusses to what extent the results converge and diverge to relate them to
each other.299 While the previous section covers the overall comparison of the two analyses,
this section merges the results.

Results for India-Nepal Engagements
Overall, the results for India-Nepal engagements showcase convergence for both
quantitative and qualitative approaches during and post-critical junctures. Increase in
material engagement is coupled with increase in rhetorical engagement (in terms of overall
diplomatic statements from India regarding Nepal). Thus, the overall material and
rhetorical engagements showcase convergence. There are several caveats when the positive
and negative affirmations are considered. During critical junctures, both overall material
and rhetorical engagements showcase increases i.e. convergence. Positive affirmation
decreases during this period for India-Nepal engagement, displaying divergence; negative
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Creswell and Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research, 79.
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affirmation increases during this period, showcasing convergence. Thus, material
engagement, the total number of rhetorical statements, and negative affirmations in IndoNepali interactions affirm convergence during the critical juncture periods.
For the post-critical juncture period, there is overall convergence; decreases in
material engagement are coupled with decreases in rhetorical engagement in the form of
overall number of official statements from India regarding Nepal. However, there is
divergence in the text search query in the form of positive affirmation; negative affirmation
decreases while positive affirmation concurrently increases in the post-critical juncture
years. This period is also characterized by the increase in the usage of the word “visit” and
the emphasis on the theme “people” which is absent in the pre- and during critical juncture
periods. Thus, material engagement, number of rhetorical statements, and negative
affirmation showcase convergence during this period. Figure 20 depicts the convergence
and divergence in rhetorical and material engagements of India and China with Nepal.

Results for China-Nepal Engagements
During critical junctures, overall material engagement between China and Nepal
decreases while rhetorical engagement in the form of total number of governmental
statements increases. Thus, there is divergence in both qualitative and quantitative
approaches. Positive affirmation contributes to convergence with the overall rhetorical
statements as it increases during this period, while increase in negative affirmation is
almost nil. Thus, the overall results for qualitative analyses showcase convergence within
qualitative indicators. But, there is no convergence between material and rhetorical
engagements during the critical junctures; as such, they showcase divergence.
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As for the post-critical juncture period, the patterns of convergence and divergence
are not clear. The material engagement between China and Nepal showcase divergent
trajectories for trade and FDI when compared to foreign aid.300 There are increases in
exports from Nepal to China and foreign aid from China to Nepal; on the contrary, imports
from China into Nepal and FDI from China into Nepal decrease.301 At the same time, there
is decrease in overall critical engagement between the two states. Additionally, both
negative and positive affirmations also decrease during this period. The term “visit” is used
extensively during this period, which does not appear in the pre and during critical juncture
periods.
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Figure 20: Convergence and Divergence for India-Nepal Engagements
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Collective Interpretation
While the previous sections discuss similar or dissimilar patterns in the analyses
that were carried out, the results need to be properly contextualized within the framework
of this dissertation in the form of collective interpretation. While quantitative and
qualitative analyses have their individual significance, the very design of the convergent
parallel approach is to tap into its potential for a more complete comprehension of the topic
under study, in this case the interactions of the buffered state in the buffer state. The
convergent approach has the purpose “obtain different but complementary data on the same
topic.”302 Using both quantitative and qualitative data has allowed the injection of nuance
in the understanding of how buffered states interact with the buffer state during critical
junctures. The collective interpretation of the results is the final step of the convergent
parallel design, which incorporates both analyses to make sense of the problem as a whole.
The collective interpretation of both data analyses for India-Nepal and China-Nepal
interactions showcase distinct patterns. During critical junctures, there is an overall
increase in India’s material engagement with Nepal; while at the same time, there is a
decrease in China’s material engagement with Nepal. On the contrary, there is an overall
increase in the rhetorical engagement from India while that from China decreases. During
the same period, positive affirmation from India decreases with a significant increase in
negative affirmation (+75%).303 As for China, there is a slight increase in positive
affirmation despite overall decrease in rhetorical engagement, with “friendly” as a
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recurring theme in its official statements which does not appear in pre and post critical
juncture periods. Over time, China and India have increased their material commitments
to Nepal, particularly in the form of FDI and foreign aid.
The interpretation has to be conducted in the context that India has traditionally
been the preponderant power in Nepal, with China making inroads particularly since the
2008 riots in the Tibetan Autonomous Region.304 As such, increased/decreased material
and rhetorical engagements may signal India’s attempts at maneuvering Chinese endeavors
into Nepal. The results from the convergent parallel design showcase two distinct trends
for India and China during the critical juncture period.

During-Critical Junctures
India increases its material engagement with Nepal during critical junctures while
also increasing its rhetorical engagement. It can be interpreted that India utilizes material
engagement to ensure Nepal remains firmly within its sphere of influence, which has long
been the traditional disposition. While rhetorical engagement increase, India also does not
shy away from using harsh rhetoric in its engagement with Nepal during the critical
junctures. Data for India reveal the utilization of material engagement to maintain the close
nature of bilateral relationship, while deploying its rhetorical tool, including a significant
increase in negative affirmation. Coupled with increase in rhetoric infused with negative
rhetoric, there is also an overall decrease in the usage of positive affirmation during critical
junctures. As such, India’s engagement with Nepal during the critical juncture showcases

Vidhi Doshi, “Nepal votes Thursday. China and India are Watching Closely.” The Washington
Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/nepal-votes-thursday-will-china-or-india-comeout-the-winner/2017/12/05/41473934-d550-11e7-9ad9-ca0619edfa05_story.html?utm_term=.4478f7f24ecc
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a strong material basis coupled with the confidence that negative affirmation in rhetoric
will not lead to lull in relations. Given India’s close ties to the political parties in Nepal and
its extensive influence, negative rhetoric lends support to the fact that such public
affirmations may dissuade negative implications for Indian interests in Nepal or to maintain
commitment to democratization of Nepal.
China, on the other hand, engages differently with Nepal. There is an overall drop
in its material engagement with Nepal during the critical juncture. Concurrently, rhetorical
engagement increases, with an increase in positive affirmation. The theme “friendly” also
makes headway into the five most common themes in the rhetorical statements. Thus, it
appears from these analyses that China utilizes an approach that is sharply different from
India’s during the critical juncture. It emphasizes rhetorical engagement that has themes of
mutual friendship firmly engrained in it, while de-emphasizing material relations. Also,
China is careful with negative affirmations; there is only one in the data set, but that too is
not directed at Nepal. As such, China remains wary of using negative affirmations in its
rhetoric. In essence, it emphasizes friendship and cooperation over material engagement
during the critical juncture.
Going back to the fact that India has maintained preponderance in Nepal, China’s
endeavors could be a means of avoiding direct confrontation with India, which emphasizes
material as well as rhetorical engagement. Rhetorical engagement is less risky, and even
more so due to the lack of negative affirmations – China’s overtures in Nepal are delicate
given India’s strategic concerns. Additionally, the hesitance of China to use negative
affirmations bolsters the fact that rhetoric can turn political; China is not willing to gamble
in its efforts to increase its influence in Nepal. Furthermore, it is a possibility that China’s
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hands-off approach to diplomacy is compromised if it uses rhetoric that is sharply critical
of Nepal. Overall, during critical junctures, India and China display different trajectories
in sub-systemic interactions; China’s lack of negative affirmations and focus on friendly
rhetoric infers wooing Nepal during the critical juncture. At the same time, its lack of
material commitment showcases its understanding of India’s traditional preponderance in
Nepal.

Post-Critical Junctures
The post-critical juncture period is characterized by a very different trajectory of
sub-systemic interactions. Contrary to the patterns during the critical juncture period,
India’s material and rhetorical engagement decrease; this is coupled with increase in
positive affirmation and a dip in negative affirmation. The term “visit” increases in
rhetorical engagement in the post-critical juncture period.
India’s post-critical juncture trajectory with Nepal is characterized by relaxation of
both material and rhetorical engagement. India also increases positive connotation in its
rhetoric when engaging with Nepal. As such, India seems to take a more laid-back
approach in material and rhetorical engagements. At the same time, as per the results of
the qualitative analysis, visits figure more prominently after the critical junctures. These
visits refer to diplomatic delegations exchanged between India and Nepal, as per the
official documents from India included in the qualitative analysis. It can be inferred from
the results of the analyses that while official statements and material commitments decrease
after critical junctures, bilateral interactions remain importance. The deployment of
bilateral diplomatic interactions to ensure the critical junctures do not significantly shift
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policies. Despite decrease in overall material and rhetorical engagements, India does seem
to put importance on diplomatic exchange in the form of visits as a means of continuing its
engagement with Nepal in the post-critical juncture period.
In the post-critical juncture period, China increases its material engagement with
Nepal in the form of foreign aid and Nepal’s exports to China. The latter is dependent on
Nepal’s own capacity, but the former could be interpreted as China’s attempts at using
foreign aid as a tool of influence in the post-critical juncture period, as it did in the
aftermath of the earthquakes in Nepal in 2015.305 There is also a decrease in rhetorical
engagement, including decrease in positive affirmation. Based on the analyses, China
prefers to be selective in its interactions with Nepal, focusing on foreign aid instead of FDI
after the critical juncture. Perhaps, the former has a more non-threatening tone in order to
not alarm India, as China has repeatedly affirmed that both China and India need to come
to an understanding over Nepal.306 Nevertheless, just like India, “visit” is a central theme
in rhetorical engagement. Unlike India, which has “visit” appear consistently as one of the
top five themes in its official rhetoric, it only appears in the post-critical juncture period
for China.307 Official visits, captured by “visits” in the Word Frequency Query, become a
prominent feature of China’s relations with Nepal in the post-critical juncture period, so
much so that it becomes the second most important theme after “development.”
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Thus, China’s post-critical juncture approach to Nepal is nuanced. There is limited
material engagement coupled with decrease in rhetorical engagement, but official visits
remain important in order to ensure there is maintenance of diplomatic contact. China’s
post-critical juncture interactions with Nepal also showcase awareness of India’s critical
interests in Nepal; China deploys foreign aid instead of FDI and couples that with visits
rather than official rhetoric. The selective deployment of material engagement by China
supports Beijing’s commitment to ensuring that India’s critical interests in Nepal are
considered.308 Nevertheless, China’s endeavors to increase in Nepal remains a strategic
reality for India.

Interpretation of Overall Patterns
The overall interpretation of the analyses showcases that India and China have
distinct trajectories of engagement with Nepal. The most important inference from the
convergent parallel design study is that both material and rhetorical forces operate and
interact in Nepal’s relations with India and China. While both powers have increased their
FDI, foreign aid, and exports to Nepal over time, they showcase distinct patterns of
interactions with the buffer state, both materially and rhetorically. This is especially true
for China’s interactions with Nepal, as showcased by its decreased material engagement
during critical junctures but coupling that with softer rhetorical engagements and
emphasizing mutual friendship. Both material and rhetorical engagements are
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characterized by fluctuations, signaling the dynamic nature of the buffer system. Overall,
Chinese FDI has increased in conjunction with Indian FDI; the same is true for foreign aid
The patterns of changes in FDI and Foreign aid exhibit the dynamic nature of the
buffer system, given that India’s FDI level during critical junctures shows massive
increase; China’s foreign aid dips during the critical juncture. Another peculiarity is that of
the lack of negative affirmation in Chinese rhetoric, which India is not afraid to deploy, as
it increases during critical junctures as showcased in Figures 19, 20, and 21.309 This is in
line with China’s official non-interference policy in the domestic affairs of other states.
Overall, India is less inhibited about the deployment of both material and rhetorical
resources during critical junctures. It is also unafraid to use negative affirmations, which
may be attributed to its increased material relations during critical junctures and its
historically significant contribution to the Nepalese economy. This can be largely
explained on the basis of Nepal’s heavy reliance on India for trade and access to Indian
port facilities.310 Additionally, the condemnation could largely be a function of India’s
support for democracy in Nepal, which has undergone phases of crisis.311 As such, India
may feel compelled by its status as the world’s largest democracy and its continued support
for Nepal’s democratic forces to condemn lull in democracy in Nepal; the rhetorical
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engagement is based on the fact that the material basis is propped up during the critical
junctures. However, it sharply differs for China as it has not championed itself as a
promoter of democracy in Nepal but has long sought to increase its presence in Nepal.312
Its strategic approach to Nepal is an acknowledgment of India’s traditional preponderance
in the country. Nevertheless, China’s engagement is non-confrontational; it uses positive
affirmation with “friendship” as a central theme during critical junctures, while India’s
rhetoric laden with negative affirmation increases. Also, both states utilize diplomatic visits
after critical junctures, showcasing the opening up of opportunities to either continue
preponderance (as is the case for India) or extend influence (as is the case for China).
The combined interpretation of both analyses showcases that material and
rhetorical engagements can sometimes go hand in hand, as is the case with India’s
interactions with Nepal during the critical juncture when India increased material as well
as rhetorical engagement but also did not shy away from harsh rhetoric during the same
period. Also, they may be used in a balanced manner after assessment of their impact on
bilateral relations. For example, China decreased its material commitment and rhetorical
statements during the critical junctures but increased friendly rhetorical engagement. As
such, Nepal as a buffer state recovers its importance as not just a geographic discontinuity
between India and China. Rather, Nepal is an interactive space for the pursuit of India and
Chinese interests in the form of material and rhetorical engagements. Over time, however,
there is an overall increase in material engagement, as per the nonparametric correlations.
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FDI and foreign aid showcase increase over time. More importantly, increase in FDI from
India is coupled with increase from China; the same holds true for foreign aid and exports
to Nepal.

Conclusion
The usage of the convergent parallel design revealed nuanced trajectories of
interactions of the buffered states within the buffer system. The study affirms that the buffer
system is a dynamic political space for the buffered states to compete in; it includes
dynamic interplay between rhetorical and material forces, as inferred through the analyses.
While the dynamics of the buffer system have been discussed in detail in the chapter, it has
to be noted that there are consistent trajectories in the buffer system as well. While the
number of rhetorical statements as well as the negative and positive affirmations change,
the themes of “cooperation,” “development,” and “assistance” remain consistent in both
India and China’s interactions with Nepal. As such, the rhetoric base is strongly tied to
development and aid, with aims to foster positive perception within Nepal.313 Nevertheless,
the combined quantitative and qualitative analyses showcase sub-systemic interactions,
with noticeable changes in rhetoric and material commitments. As such, although the
rhetorical base is strongly positive, there are fluctuations that occur pre, during and postcritical junctures. The material changes do not exhibit consistency but coupled with
qualitative data, different trajectories of engagement emerge for Indo-Nepali and SinoNepali relations.
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CHAPTER VII: CONCLUSION

The dissertation sought to contextualize the buffer state concept in contemporary
International Relations and decipher its importance in international politics. It linked the
buffer system concept to that of sub-systemic/regional dynamics of politics, with the notion
that smaller states are important in the strategies of larger powers. Additionally, the
dissertation sought to utilize a novel research approach to add to the scant literature on
buffer states. Buffer states, traditionally seen as geographic discontinuities, are indeed
spaces of dynamic political interactions. As showcased by the analyses conducted in this
dissertation, the buffer states are not simply states that exist in the periphery; they are
important political spaces wherein larger powers showcase dynamic interactions based on
increased or decreased sub-systemic rivalry.

Revisiting the Research Question and Hypotheses
The research question, which asked why and how buffer states are relevant in subsystemic rivalries, sought to address their role that is not exclusive to their geographic
function. The main rationale for raising the question was the fact that buffer states are no
longer tied exclusively to their geographic disposition; apart from their geographic
importance, buffer states are important for their role as a dynamic political space for
interactions for the buffered states. The convergent parallel analysis showcased that buffer
states do exhibit roles that are important for contemporary International Relations.
Buffer states maintain relevance in the form of a political space for dynamic
material and rhetorical interactions between buffered states. The case study of the India-
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Nepal-China buffer system showcased these trajectories, as India and China utilized
divergent means of engagement with Nepal during and after critical historical years for the
buffer state. In essence, buffer states are relevant in sub-systemic rivalries given their
geographic disposition between larger powers; but, their utility extend beyond just its
geographic importance. Buffered states maintain the relevance of the buffer state through
dynamic material and rhetorical interactions, during and after critical junctures. The
discussion of the hypotheses will add nuances to how China and India interact with Nepal.

H1: If sub-systemic rivalries among Middle or Great powers envelop a small,
buffer state, then this rivalry will recover the buffer state’s political relevance
beyond a simple geographical discontinuity among rivalrous powers.

The overarching hypothesis is based on the premise that when sub-systemic
rivalries between middle or great powers intensify, then the buffer state’s political
relevance increases as well, and not just tied to its geographic function as a spatial
discontinuity. Thus, sub-systemic rivalries are assumed to intensify at the critical junctures,
given their implications for changes in policy during such periods. The results for the
measures of political relevance for the buffer state showcase mixed results. In essence, the
hypothesis can be largely accepted in the case of the India-Nepal-China buffer system as
quantitative as well as qualitative measures of relevance show increases/decreases
(increased relevance) during critical junctures. The political relevance for Nepal is
heightened for India during the critical juncture, as it increases both material and rhetorical
engagements. On the other hand, China’s material engagement decreases, while rhetorical
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engagement increases. In essence, relevance of the buffer state cannot just be captured by
increases; decreases also showcase the dynamic nature of sub-systemic interactions and are
essential in the overall understanding of the research puzzle. The discussions on the
individual hypotheses will further shed light on these dynamics.

H2: At critical junctures, trade figures will intensify between Nepal-India and Nepal-China
due to increase in sub-systemic rivalry.

During periods of intensified sub-systemic rivalries i.e. during critical junctures,
India-Nepal trade figures increase. On the contrary, trade figures between China-Nepal
decreases during the same time. This hypothesis is accepted as both India-Nepal and ChinaNepal interactions in terms of intensifications, albeit India expresses it through increase
and China through decrease in trade.

H3: At critical junctures, FDI figures will intensify between Nepal-India and Nepal-China
due to increase in sub-systemic rivalry.

For FDI from India to Nepal, critical juncture periods witness extensive increases,
while FDI from China into Nepal decreases during the same period. As such, the hypothesis
is accepted albeit the direction of intensification of relations are opposite, just as it is the
case for the hypothesis on trade.
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H4: At critical junctures, foreign aid figures will intensify between Nepal-India and NepalChina due to increase in sub-systemic rivalry.

Hypothesis 4 is accepted as well. Foreign aid from India increase extensively during
this period but decreases for China.

H5: At critical junctures, rhetorical engagement will intensify between Nepal-India and
Nepal-China due to increase in sub-systemic rivalry.

This hypothesis is accepted as rhetorical engagement emanating from India and
China regarding Nepal increases during this period. Interestingly, positive affirmation from
India decreases but that from China increases as well. Also, India’s emphasis on “visit”
drops during the critical junctures, while China’s emphasis on “friendly” is unique in the
assessments carried out in this dissertation.

All the hypotheses are accepted as both material and rhetorical engagements
intensify during critical junctures, showcasing increased sub-systemic interest in the buffer
state i.e. increased relevance of the buffer state in the buffer system. Interestingly, the
intensification for both rhetoric and material in India’s case has been an increase across all
variables. As for China, the intensification is in the form of decrease, which also occurs
across all of the variables. However, the application of dictionaries in qualitative analysis
part of the study shows that despite decreases in overall rhetorical engagement from China
during critical junctures, there is an overall increase in positive affirmation; at the same
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time, there is a decrease in positive affirmation and increase in negative affirmation from
India.
Thus, the critical junctures, which signify changes in sub-systemic rivalries,
witness the intensification of the role of India and China, which are larger powers in the
buffer system. As such, buffer states are not simply geographic barriers; they are political
spaces that showcase intense material and rhetorical interactions. The critical junctures
support the notion that buffer states are not simply geographic discontinuities; the dynamic
changes in trade, FDI, foreign aid, and rhetorical statements all showcase the strategic
importance of Nepal for both India and China. Thus, the buffer state Nepal maintains
relevance in sub-systemic rivalries
While the assessment of the critical junctures showcase intensification, the trends
for sub-systemic interactions are further explained by analyzing the post-critical juncture
periods. India uses material and rhetorical means to influence Nepal during critical
junctures while not shying away from using rhetoric with negative connotation. India then
de-escalates through overall decrease in material engagement and increase in positive
connotation. China decrease material engagement but uses rhetorical engagement with
increase in positive connotation during critical junctures. It de-escalates rhetorical
engagement but increases foreign aid after the critical juncture. In essence, India’s
approach to critical junctures in the sub-system includes action from the get-go, while
China only increases rhetoric, while preferring to use foreign aid as a means of extending
its influence after the critical junctures. Additionally, both China and India showcase
increase in “visits” after the critical junctures, which also signal maintained relevance of
the buffer state Nepal, be it for maintenance of preponderance or extension of influence.
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The results of this study show that the buffer state in this case is more than just a
geographic break between larger powers. It is a platform wherein the buffered states
interact, materially and rhetorically, in distinct patterns. The buffered states interact with
the buffer in differing trajectories; engagement and disengagement during specific years of
critical events are strategies that support the notion of strategic competition between the
larger powers. For example, India increases while China decreases material engagement,
China being acutely aware of India’s preponderant interests in Nepal. This strategic
competition is bolstered by the fact that the non-parametric correlations showcase
competitive increases in FDI and foreign aid from India and China, in relation to each
other. Furthermore, these variables are characterized by increase over time. Also, the
rivalries of sub-systemic powers go beyond critical junctures; the post-critical juncture
period showcases its own trajectories, which are different from those during the critical
junctures. Thus, buffer states maintain relevance not just during critical junctures but after
such events as well.

Major Insights from the Study
First, the study adds to the limited literature on buffer states. It applies the
convergent parallel design to analyze sub-systemic interactions in the buffer state. The
results showcase the dynamic nature of the buffer system, away from strictly geographic
conceptions. Rhetoric and monetary tools are shown to be used strategically in times of
crisis and change in the buffer state. This opens up avenues for other buffer states to be
studied using this framework in order to analyze how sub-systemic rivalries operate and
how they impact the buffer states.
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Second, it showcases that buffered states have degrees of influence over the buffer
state. In this case, India’s influence is preponderant in Nepal and how it behaves during
critical years is very different from how China interacts with Nepal in those same years.
For example, India uses negative affirmation more confidently while ramping up material
support during critical junctures; China focuses on rhetoric, increasing its engagement with
statements that emphasize “friendship.” As such, India seeks to maintain its influence,
while China is cognizant of India’s preponderance but also wants to headway in its
relations with Nepal. Buffered states may behave differently based on their standing within
the buffer state.
Third, the combined usage of quantitative and qualitative data allowed for a more
complete understanding of sub-systemic interactions in the buffer state. Using FDI, foreign
aid, and trade data along with rhetorical statements allowed for a more nuanced
understanding of how the buffered states interact with the buffer state. For example, despite
decrease in material commitment during critical junctures, China increased its rhetorical
engagement during the same period. Thus, it shows that despite decrease in material
engagement, China’s rhetorical engagement increases as it does not seek to completely
disengage with Nepal during critical junctures.
Fourth, small states still maintain relevance for larger powers. As is the case for
Nepal as a state sandwiched between India and China, the buffer state in this case is shown
to have been a political space for both material and rhetorical engagements. Thus, small
states, particularly buffer states should garner more attention as they aid in deciphering the
patterns of behavior of larger states.
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Fifth, this dissertation also adds another dimension to the study of rivalry. While
dyadic interactions are usually the fallback for rivalry studies, emphasis on externalization
of such rivalries in smaller states adds an important dimension. In essence, rivalry studies
could benefit from utilizing small states as case studies to decipher how rivalries
externalize in other forms of political spaces.
Sixth, the framework connects geopolitics with regional/sub-systemic approaches
to security studies. As such, it bridges the gap between the two sub-disciplines in order to
garner a coherent analytical picture of the buffer system.
Overall, this dissertation affords a novel framework to analyze the role of other
buffer states in the international system. It reinforces the idea that buffer states are dynamic
political spaces wherein larger powers pursue their respective strategic interests
competitively. Concurrently, it adds to the study of regional security dynamics by
according importance to the interactions of regional powers in their respective regional
contexts.
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APPENDIX
APPENDIX 1: Results for Kruskal Wallis Test for Total Trade
NPar Tests
Kruskal-Wallis Test
Ranks
Juncture point

N

Mean Rank

1

5

7.20

2

5

7.80

3

4

7.50

Totalimports
Total

14

1

5

7.60

2

5

8.60

3

4

6.00

Totalexports
Total

14

Test Statisticsa,b
Totalimports

Chi-Square
df
Asymp. Sig.

Totalexports

.051

.863

2

2

.975

.650

a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: Juncture point
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APPENDIX 2: Results for Kruskal-Wallis Test for all Variables
NPar Tests
Kruskal-Wallis Test
Ranks
Juncture point
1
China Imports

China Exports

India Imports

India Exports

China FDI

India FDI

China Aid

India Aid

5

Mean Rank
8.00

2

5

8.00

3

4

6.25

Total
1
2
3
Total
1
2
3
Total
1
2
3
Total
1
2
3
Total
1
2
3
Total
1
2
3
Total
1

N

14
5
5
4
14
5
5
4
14
5
5
4
14
4
4
3
11
4
4
3
11
5
4
4
13
5

6.70
9.20
6.38
7.40
7.60
7.50
7.60
8.60
6.00
7.38
5.25
5.17
5.88
7.00
4.83
6.80
7.50
6.75
6.50

2

5

7.80

3

4

8.38

Total

14
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China
Imports
Chi-Square
df
Asymp.
Sig.

China
Exports

Test Statisticsa,b
India
India
Imports
Exports

China
FDI

India
FDI

China
Aid

India
Aid

.500
2

1.301
2

.006
2

.863
2

1.086
2

.744
2

.096
2

.487
2

.779

.522

.997

.650

.581

.689

.953

.784

a. Kruskal Wallis Test
b. Grouping Variable: Juncture point

213

APPENDIX 3: Descriptive Statistics for Trade
Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: Trade
Time
Pre

IndiaxChina
India

China

Total

During

India

China

ExportxImport
Exports

Mean
312.6620

218.47166

5

801.8250

841.37427

4

Total
Exports

530.0678

596.48824

9

6.7420

2.97738

5

Imports

330.3000

339.48630

5

Total
Exports

168.5210

283.38504

10

159.7020

217.28694

10

Imports

539.8667

620.36435

9

Total
Exports

339.7800

482.37438

19

337.2940

209.37983

5

Imports

1209.1400
773.2170

1563.77730
1147.81174

5
10

4.5950

2.57740

4

325.7800
183.0311

331.25503
289.00335

5
9

Total
Exports
Total
Exports
Imports

Post

India

Total
Exports
Imports

China

Total
Exports
Imports

Total

Total
Exports
Imports

Total

India

China

Total

N

Imports

Imports
Total

Std. Deviation

Total
Exports

189.4278

229.49790

9

767.4600
493.6553

1162.91442
887.42335

10
19

231.6600

158.03142

4

1236.7400
790.0378

1379.10679
1113.97494

5
9

12.0320

9.47837

5

188.9250
90.6511

149.50749
130.83992

4
9

109.6444

151.02702

9

771.0444
440.3444

1124.42283
849.41543

9
18

298.3157

189.65524

14

Imports

1102.6214

1241.01868

14

Total
Exports

700.4686

962.58926

28

8.0179

6.50630

14

Imports

288.2929

280.42909

14

Total
Exports

148.1554

241.35075

28

153.1668

197.95797

28

Imports

695.4571

975.36127

28

Total

424.3120

749.07290

56
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Appendix 4: Descriptive Statistics for FDI
Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: FDI
Country
India

China

Total

Time
Pre
During
Post
Total
Pre
During
Post
Total
Pre
During
Post
Total

Mean

Std. Deviation
21.1075
90.3100
8.0167
42.7018
33.8925
23.8450
20.9667
26.7136
27.5000
57.0775
14.4917
34.7077
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N
29.70471
165.70635
9.63823
99.87456
37.82066
26.99763
35.01893
30.44440
32.21629
115.50980
24.04161
72.51398

4
4
3
11
4
4
3
11
8
8
6
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Appendix 5: Descriptive Statistics for Foreign Aid
Descriptive Statistics
Dependent Variable: Aid
Country
Time
India
Pre

Mean
26487830.5824

Std. Deviation
20169058.57678

308986747.2490

637266042.60885

5

Post

29628183.8575

15928844.95120

4

Total

128277544.6134

380367431.54664

14

Pre
During

1044971232.7500
198304450.1450

1838926484.23039
193288409.62313

4
4

Post

1343096372.3333

2130070576.05820

3

Total

818399258.9618

1479890715.43564

11

Pre

479147120.4347

1247583107.18489

9

During

259794615.2028

469539236.24721

9

Post

592543121.7757

1416135937.29415

7

Total

431931098.9267

1055055449.48426

25

During

China

Total
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N
5

Appendix 6: Results of Correlations

Nonparametric Correlations
Correlations
China
China

Correlation

India

Chin

Export Import Export

Imports
Spearm China

India

s

s

s

a

India

Chin

India
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e year

FDI
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a Aid
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Sig. (2-
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**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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APPENDIX 7: Word Cloud for all Qualitative Data

APPENDIX 8: Word Cloud for all Pre-Critical Juncture Qualitative Data
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APPENDIX 9: Word Cloud for all during Critical Juncture Qualitative Data

APPENDIX 10: Word Cloud for all Post-Critical Juncture Qualitative Data
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APPENDIX 11: Word Cloud for all India-Nepal Data

APPENDIX 12: Word Cloud for Pre-Critical Juncture India-Nepal Data
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APPENDIX 13: Word Cloud for during-Critical Juncture India-Nepal Data

APPENDIX 14: Word Cloud for Post-Critical Juncture India-Nepal Data
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APPENDIX 15: Word Cloud for all China-Nepal Data

APPENDIX 16: Word Cloud for Pre-Critical Juncture China-Nepal Data
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APPENDIX 17: Word Cloud for Pre-Critical Juncture China-Nepal Data

APPENDIX 18: Word Cloud for Pre-Critical Juncture China-Nepal Data
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